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CHAPTER 1
The boom in the Philippines' property market in the 1990s awakened new interest in the real estate industry. For the past two decades prior to the 
1990s, the property market had been experiencing intermittent growth with 
pronounced downturns in some periods. In the later part of the 1980s, the 
market exhibited signs of increase activity reaching a peak in the early 1990s. 
Although this growth was expected in the light of the economic and political 
recoveiy of the country, the unprecedented increases in real estate activity and 
prices were rather unexpected. Real estate sales grew by an average of about 15 
percent annually between 1986 and 1996. Real estate prices also exhibited yearly 
growth increases of about 20 percent in the same period. These growth scenarios 
were comparable to the early years of urbanization in the country when high 
earnings from Philippine exports during the years 1900 and 1950 were mainly 
invested in real estate.
However, unlike the early years of the 20th century, the 1990s real estate 
boom occurred amidst higher population densities arid more complex economic 
environment. These scenarios have placed greater demands on the country's 
land resources specifically in urbanized and urbanizing areas. Land is scarce, 
and the increasing population made land for all types of uses even scarcer. 
Claims on lands came not only from farmers and industrialists but also from 
residential users, business groups and the entertainment and recreational 
sectors.
While the increased demand on land and real estate opened various 
opportunities for land development and improvements in the countiy, these 
brought to fore incipient problems and conflicts in the land and real estate 
market. Among the problems a newspaper reader hears about are the following:
(1) high cost of housing; (2) recurrent land titling scams; (3) malfeasance in the 
titling of public lands; (4) prolonged legal cases on contested property rights; 
and (5) existence of squatting syndicates. Controversies about government 
policies, specifically on zoning and housing also abound. For instance, the 
government's recent strategies to further regulate land use and development 
have been discredited as counterproductive to its policies to promote housing 
and growth of the real estate sector. The additional regulatory measures tended 
to create delays and had no significant value-added. The national and local 
governments were also at odds regarding the reclassification of lands from 
agriculture into non-agricultural lands. The effort of some local governments to
give priority to the urbanization of their localities has at times conflicted with the 
national government's land reform program. Another source of conflict pertains 
to private sector participation in government housing programs. While real 
estate developers claimed "low" profits from participation in government 
socialized housing programs, it is the government that seem to have provided 
subsidies and shouldered most of the risks in low cost housing.
The various problems and conflicts in the land and real estate market in the 
Philippines tend to indicate that the market is not functioning smoothly. This 
occurs despite the exclusivity of private land rights and the market orientation of 
land development policies in the country. On the other hand, in countries where 
government intervenes heavily in land ownership and development, the land 
and real estate market appears to have functioned better. For instance, in 
Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong most lands are of public ownership.1 In 
particular, Singapore and Australia allow private land ownership but the 
government is the single largest buyer of undeveloped lands. Land 
developments in these countries are also confined to specific master plans of 
cities. Although city plans in Hong Kong are prepared in consultation with local 
organizations and published for objections, there is no right to appeal for the 
decisions made by the planning board. In Australia, allocation of lands for 
profitable and non-profitable ventures are done by the government and land use 
changes are confined mainly on lands identified as "open" or "temporarily" 
used as parks or playgrounds. Master plans in Singapore are not subject to 
public inquiry and developments over and above the master plan are charged 
development levies.
It is also interesting to note that "fake titles" which have become common in 
the Philippines, are a rare occurrence in the United States and Australia. Like the 
Philippines, the United States and Australia have adopted the Torrens system of 
land titling. This system involves a methodical process of title registration based 
on cadastral and geodetic surveys of an area. Title registration also goes through 
a legal system that allows for a systematic recording of titles. This system has 
worked well in other countries but has apparently failed in the country.
The question then is what are the prevailing socio-economic realities in the 
Philippines urban land and real estate market? This study attempts to shed light 
on this queiy.
1.1 Objective and Central Questions
This study seeks to examine the operations and processes of the urban land 
and real estate market in the country. In particular, it envisions to provide a 
systematic assessment of institutions that affect the way the urban land and real 
estate market clears. Although several studies have been undertaken to analyze
2 The Urban Land and Real Estate M arket in  M etro  M a n ila : A  Socio-economic A n a lysis
1 A. Woodruff and J. Brown (1970). Land for the Cities o f Asia. Connecticut: John C. Collins 
Institute, University of Hartford.
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property markets, most of these studies assume institutions as exogenous 
constraints that have no influence on the level of productive activity and 
exchange. This study focuses on institutions as a major factor in the choice 
functions of economic actors.
The key questions for the analysis are the following:
1. What is the nature and character of the urban land and real estate market 
in Metro Manila?
2. What are the institutional arrangements in the market?
3. How does the institutional environment (e.g. laws, rules, statutes, etc) 
affect the institutional arrangements in the market? In particular, how 
does the structure of property rights and government policies on 
conflicting and competing uses of land in the country affect the market?
4. How do these institutional arrangements affect market outcomes?
1.2 Framework of the Study
The Institutional Approach
There has been a growing interest in recent years on the role of institutions in 
development. In studies of the historical growth process, institutions have 
emerged as a key to the performance of economies in both large-scale, complex 
and small, simple economies.2 In developed economies, institutions such as 
property rights, guarantees, corporate hierarchy, bankruptcy laws, etc. have 
largely influenced the process of exchange. On the other hand, in peasant 
communities resource allocation has been mainly defined by personalized 
exchange process. Similarly, institutions such as sharecropping, labor contracts, 
lease contracts and tenancies have governed economic transactions in agrarian 
societies.3
The term "institution" has been used in a variety of w'ays. Social scientists 
(i.e. sociologists and anthropologists) use the concept for ways of behavior of 
people that have existed over a long time period (e.g. marriage, birth rites, 
rituals, kinship, etc.). On the other hand, economists use the term in a broader 
context. Institutions are the "rules of the game in society" or more formally, the 
"humanly devised behavioral rules or constraints that shape human 
interactions."4 From this definition, institutions consist of both formal and 
informal entities. The formal ones include laws, constitutions, written contracts, 
market exchanges, and organizational by-laws while the informal entities 
include shared values, norms, customs, ethics and ideology. Some economists,
2 P. Bardhan (1988). “The New Institutional Economics and Development Theory: A Brief 
Critical Assessment.” World Development 17, p. 1389-1395.
3 K. Nabli and J. Nugent (eds.) 1991. The New Institutional Economics and Development: 
Theory and Application in Tunisia. Amsterdam: North Holland; See also G.T. Castillo (1983), 
How Participatory is Participatory Development? Manila: Philippine Institute for Development 
Studies.
4 D C. North (1990). Institutional Change and Economic Peiiormance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p.3.
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however, have redefined the concept of institutions by distinguishing between 
"institutional arrangement" and "institutional environment or structure."5 
Institutional arrangement is an arrangement among economic units in a 
specified domain that govern the way in which these units can cooperate to 
allow exchange. On the other hand, institutional environment or structure refers 
to the set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules that establishes 
the basis for production, exchange and distribution (e.g. rules governing 
elections, ideology, property rights, right to contract, customs, etc.). The term 
"institutions" has been generally referred to as institutional arrangements and 
"institutional change" as change in one institutional arrangement, not 
necessarily a change in the institutional structure.
The development of a cohesive theory of institutions is recent. However, 
analyses linking institutions to economic performance are nothing new. Around 
the late 19th century to the early 20th century, the German Historical School of 
National Economists, in particular, adopted a historical approach looking at 
economic activities as embedded in social institutions. For instance, Max Weber 
and the economic historian Polanyi looked at markets as social institutions.6 
Weber viewed market competition as a "peaceful" economic struggle in which 
market players attempt to attain control over opportunities and advantages that 
are also desired by others. Polanyi, on the other hand, looked at the market as 
only one form of organized exchange. Reciprocity and redistribution are other 
forms of exchange. These institutional arrangements are relevant sirice they 
affect resource allocation and prices of goods.
Closely related to the German school but independent was the American 
School of Institutional Economists with Thorstein Veblen (1900), Mitchell and 
John Commons (1920s and 1930s) at the fore. These economists supported the 
idea that "man-made" institutions (e.g. trade unions, cooperatives) affect 
economic outcomes.7The price system, for instance, could be changed by anew 
set of administrative controls.
Post-war developments in economic theory showed increasing interests on 
the political and social settings of economic transactions. For instance, the theory 
of industrial organization gave importance to social factors (e.g. personal links), 
public policies, pricing behavior and strategies of economic agents in the 
determination of prices. Similarly, the game theory started by Morgenstern in 
the 1940s and popularized by Shubik and Schelling in the 1960s, introduced
5 O.E. Williamson (1991). “Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete 
Structural Alternatives.” Administrative Science Quarterly 36, p. 287. See also J. Y. Fin and 
J.B Nugent (1995), Institutions and Economic Development. Handbook o f Development 
Economics, Volume III. Edited by J. Behrman and T.N. Srinivasan. Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Science B.V.p. 2303-2369.
6 This view is discussed in Swedberg. R. Swedberg (1994). Markets as Social Structures: The 
Handbook o f Economic Sociology. New York: Princeton University Press.
7 J.M.Acheson (1994). Welcome to Nobel Country: A Review o f Institutional Economics. 
Anthropology and Institutional Economics. Edited by J.M.Acheson. New York: University 
Press of America, p.5.
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intersubjectivity (i.e., each actor takes the decision of other actors into account) 
into mainstream economics. In the 1960s, the Chicago School introduced the 
economics of information, which gave importance to asymmetry of information 
in economic transactions. A new set of institutional economists also surfaced 
during this era. The "new" institutional approach had its origins in 1937 when 
Ronald Coase published his article "The Nature of the Firm."8 Coase's seminal 
ideas had no significant influence until the 1980s when economists such as 
Oliver Williamson, Douglas North, Steven Cheung and others expanded on the 
original ideas. The works of these "new" institutional economists had given rise 
to a cohesive theory of institutions referred to as the neo-institutional economics 
(NIE).
Although the neo- institutional economists focused on different directions,9 
they shared some basic assumptions of institutionalism. First, individuals have 
"bounded" rationality. This implies that individuals are often not perfectly 
informed.10 Since decision-makers do not have perfect knowledge, 
"opportunism" can and often does exist.11 Incomplete and distorted information 
also leads to greater uncertainty of transactions. Second, knowledge is very costly 
to obtain. Obtaining accurate information is costly and difficult not only because 
individuals are bounded rational but also because individuals do not have 
exclusive rights to all goods and services. Goods and services are also highly 
variable and quality is often a problem. These assumptions depart from 
mainstream neo-classical economics, which view the decision-maker as a 
rational person with perfect knowledge.
The difference in basic assumptions between the neo-classical and neo- 
institutional theory is relevant since it has important implications in the analysis 
of productive activity and exchange. Under the neo-classical economic models, 
the entrepreneur's decisions (or choice functions) are mainly based on market 
prices. Institutional changes are basically equated with the effects of an increase 
or decrease in a parameter (e.g. wage rate, tax rate, shift in demand, etc.). On the 
other hand, neo-institutional economists consider institutions as part of the 
entrepreneur's choice functions. Economic actors do not make decisions based 
on market prices alone but they operate within institutions that have impact on 
markets and choices, either constraining actions or presenting opportunities (i.e. 
motivate actions). Institutional changes are investigated not through a locus of
8 R.H. Coase (1937). “The Nature o fthe  Firm.” Economica 4. p.33-55.
9 The works o fthe  institutional economists focus on different directions, to wit: (1) institution of 
property rights and their effect on economic performance (e.g Demsetz, Alchian, Eggertsson);
(2) the relationship between rules and interaction (e.g. Bromley); (3) people organization to 
achieve collective interest or common good; (4) transaction costs and the development of 
firms and markets (e.g. Coase, Williamson); (5) evolutionary models to explain development of 
institutions through time (e.g., North).
10 O.E. Williamson (1991). “The Logic of Economic Organization.” The Nature o f the Firm: 
Origins, Evolution and Development. Edited by O.E. Williamson and S.G.Winter. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p.92.
11 “Opportunism” refers to self interest that contemplates guile. Ibid.
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changes in parameters but on how such changes bring about shifts in the cost 
structure and assignment of property rights for a specified economic activity.
The presence and variation of institutions are primarily linked to two basic 
concepts. One is transaction costs and the other is property rights. Transaction costs 
refer to the "effort, time and money necessary to make an exchange, negotiate 
the exchange and enforce the exchange."12 These costs include those incurred in 
assessing the quantities and qualities of goods or services being exchanged, 
negotiating the provisions of the contract and communicating the provisions of 
the contract to relevant agents. Transaction costs also include monitoring and 
enforcement costs including output losses due to contractual default. Some 
transaction costs are incurred before the transaction takes place (ex ante costs) 
and some after the transaction takes place (ex post cosfs).13 Ex-ante transaction 
costs are costs incurred in drafting, negotiating, safeguarding agreements 
including those arising from "adverse selection" (i.e. finding out whether those 
with incentive to accept insurance at a specified premium are primarily those 
with high risks). In contrast, the ex-post transaction costs arise because contracts 
are generally incomplete as not all aspects of human action and contingencies 
can be taken into account. These costs include the costs of dispute resolution, 
renegotiations of contracts, monitoring, and also efficiency losses arising from 
distortions such as "moral hazards. "
Properly rights, on the other hand, define the "rules of competition." These 
rights influence the way decisions are made and the way resources are treated as 
the nature of "control" over a resource can have an effect on the time horizon, 
the profitability of an asset, and the costs of possession.14 For instance, lack of 
control can lead to costly transactions. Resources can thus be acquired or desired 
not because of the price but to have greater control over the good or service.
The N eo-institu tiona l Approach to M arkets
The market is an important economic institution in society. It is not only the 
predominant mechanism that facilitates exchange but also a major mechanism of 
social integration. Exchanges, however, do not happen in a "frictionless" world 
as information is limited and asymmetric and people do not have exclusive 
rights to important goods and services. This implies that economic actors will 
resort to different institutional arrangements that will reduce the costs of 
exchanges. There can thus, be different adaptations of the market. On the other 
hand, it can also be costly to use the market and if that is the case, exchanges will 
be done through administrative allocation and control systems.
Williamson recognizes different adaptations of the market, i.e. auctions and 
"hybrids."15 However, this concept of markets is too narrow. There are more
12 O.E. Williamson. The Economic Institutions o f Capitalism. New York: Free Press, p.2.
13 Ibid.
14 J.M. Acheson, Welcome to Nobel Country, p. 10.
15 These are mutual agreements between parties such as long-term contracts, franchising, 
reciprocal trading. O.E.Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization
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forms of market organization in the wider literature of economists and 
sociologists than what Williamson suggests. Auctions, for instance, have 
different types. The open auction represents an "arms-length", impersonal 
market relations. This type comes closest to the neo-classical view of markets 
that clear on price alone. Prices are established in a collective process in which all 
parties participate. There are also the sealed bid auctions in which bidders do 
not know the bids of others although "secret deals" (i.e. not informing others) 
between parties are plausible. The Dutch and English auctions are also set up 
differently. The Dutch auction uses a descending price auction in which prices 
fall until some bidder bids. On the other hand, the English auction uses both 
descending and ascending price auctions. In the English ascending price 
auctions, prices increase until one bidder is left.
Another form of market organization is bilateral bargaining. In bilateral 
bargaining prices are not established publicly but only in the direct bargaining 
between the buyer and seller. This mode of transaction is common mainly in 
markets for quality goods (e.g. houses, cattle) where goods differ from each 
other or when quality is difficult to discern. In this market, there can be different 
prices since each transaction stands on its own and the different deals cannot 
easily be compared.
A third form of market organization is repeated bilateral bargaining or 
relational contracting between the buyer and seller. In this market, prices are 
adjusted between the seller and buyer taking into account their future 
relationship. Non-price factors such as personal relation between buyer and 
seller, the length of time buyer and seller has been doing business, etc. have 
influence on prices.16 Prices or price adjustments can thus be different across 
buyers (i.e. the correlation of price changes among buyers is low). Williamson's 
"hybrid" is one form of relational contracting. "Hybrids" mainly refer to 
business contracts or relationships between business firms. However, there can 
be "informal" forms of relational contracting that occur between persons or 
between a firm and a buyer. This form of relational contracting is primarily 
based on networks of long-term personal relationships. It is often outside the 
state, non-legal or extra-legal or even illegal. In the Philippines, the "suki" 
relationship is one type. Another informal arrangement is "grease money."17
The administrative allocation and control of goods, on the other hand, may 
be done through hierarchy (or vertical integration) or government control. 
Under hierarchy, exchanges are made within an organization through a system 
of ranks or positions (e.g. firm). Hierarchies are fundamentally different from
16 D.W,Carlton (1989). “The Theory and the Facts of How Markets Clear: Is Industrial 
organization Valuable for Understanding Macroeconomics?" Handbook o f Industrial 
Organization, vol.1. Edited by R.Schmalense and R. Willig. The Netherlands: Elsevier Science 
Publishers, p 910-946.
17 From a strictly economist’s institutional view, bribery is not an institution since economists see 
“institutions” as those arrangements written in the law. However, in a broad sense, we take a 
relativistic view and look at bribery as an institutional activity that is accepted by those 
involved.
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markets. They work through command systems rather than the price system. 
Also, internal rules rather than external factors primarily govern exchange.
Under the government control system, exchange and allocation of goods are 
based on political considerations rather than the price system. An example is the 
centrally guided economies that were once the characteristics of the communist 
countries. The socialized housing sector in the capitalist economies is another 
example. This form of exchange is usually based on subsidies whereby goods are 
allocated through political means or rationing.
The above forms of exchange and allocation can be further differentiated in 
terms of the following attributes: (1) the rules and regulations that bind 
transactions (i.e. contract law); (2) the nature and extent of incentives in the 
market; (3) the extent of controls over the assets or actions of transactors; (4) the 
autonomy of transactions; and (5) the extent of cooperation between 
transactors.18 Table 1.1 provides the distinguishing differences for each form of 
exchange.
Table 1.1
Distinguishing Attributes of Different Forms of Exchange and Allocation*
Forms of Exchange and Allocation
Attributes Market Administrative Allocation
Auction
Bilateral Relational 
Baraainina Contracting Hierarchy
Government
-Controlled
Contract Law ++
Hybrid 
++ +
Personal
Networks
0 0 0
Incentive
intensity ++ ++ + + 0 0
Administrative
Controls 0 0 + +
++ +
Performance
Attributes
Autonomy ++ + + 0 0 0
Cooperation 0 0 + + ++ ++
' ++ = strong; + = moderate; 0 = weak.
All forms of exchange and allocation are governed by sanctions (i.e. contract 
laws) that vary in terms of its legalism. In the case of auctions and bilateral 
bargaining, the rules of agreements are strictly enforced and disputes are settled
18 These features were adopted from O.E. Williamson who formulated the idea that different 
forms of exchange can be distinguished based on sanctions, controls and incentives. (See
O.E.Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: the Analysis o f Discrete Structural 
Alternatives). Williamson and also Coase considered only three forms of exchange (i.e. 
market, hybrid, and hierarchy). There are other forms. We try to distinguish the various forms 
of exchange using the attributes provided by Williamson.
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formally (through courts). On the other hand, hybrids are governed by formal 
contracts based on a legal system of contracting. However, these arrangements 
have adaptive mechanisms to effect realignment. Business firms often do not use 
legal litigation but settle things among themselves via constant bargaining rather 
than formal contracts.19 Constant bargaining is even more common in personal 
networks, which are mainly governed by personal relationship and can be legal, 
extralegal or illegal. In administrative allocation, the law is of forbearance where 
disputes are generally settled within the organization or political party.
Auctions and bilateral bargaining are also characterized by high-powered 
incentives. Better strategies or greater efforts to information can result in higher 
gains iii trade. In relational contracting incentives are sacrificed in favor of 
cooperation. Incentive structures in administrative allocation are flat or low- 
powered. Changes in effort have little or no immediate effect on compensation.
Administrative controls in auctions and bilateral bargaining are weak since 
buyers and sellers have less control over each other. Hierarchy has significant 
administrative controls where actions and assets are periodically monitored. 
Some administrative controls are also present in government-controlled 
allocation but limited to non-political favorites. In relational contracting, 
administrative controls are limited to knowing whether the objective of the 
cooperation or agreement still exists.
In general, weak administrative controls imply greater autonomy. In 
auctions, autonomy is strong, as there is less dependency among buyers and 
sellers. Bilateral bargaining involves some degree of dependency. Familiarity 
with the buyer or seller will facilitate market clearing. In relational contracting, 
the need for cooperation between buyers and sellers reduces autonomy. 
Dependency is, however, greater in personal networks than hybrid since in the 
former buyers can be highly dependent on sellers for outcomes. Hierarchies also 
have weak autonomy (or high dependency), as administrative controls within 
organization are strong. Buyers and sellers are highly dependent on each other 
for outcomes. Dependency is also high in government-controlled exchanges, as 
buyers are dependent on government for outcomes.
Cooperation is strongest in non-market forms (i.e. hierarchies and 
government-controlled). In particular, hierarchies require cohesion unlike 
auctions and bilateral bargaining where the contract law mainly governs 
relationships. Relational contracting also results from cooperative activities. 
However, this cooperation is fragile as one party can choose to break contract if 
not satisfied with the outcome of transactions.
These forms of exchange and allocation arise because of the nature arid type 
of transaction costs in the economic system.20 In Williamson's view, 
entrepreneurs adapt to situations of high transaction costs by changing the size 
of the firm. If internal transaction costs are high (principal-agent problem),
19 S. Macauley (1963). Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study. American 
Sociological Review  28,p.55-67.
20 O.E.Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization, p.270.
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entrepreneurs keep the firm small and buy tilings in the market. On the other 
hand, if external transaction costs are high (i.e. the market is characterized by 
high opportunism, e.g. many traders do not honor commitments), entrepreneurs 
expand the size of the firm and make everything inside the firm. Williamson 
further argues that entrepreneurs can create other institutional forms aside from 
adjusting the size of the firm. An example is "hybrid" arrangement such as long­
term contracts, forward contracts (i.e. the seller enters into a contract with a 
buyer at a specified price) or reciprocal trading.
Three factors raise transaction costs.21 First, is uncertainty due to opportunism 
(e.g. cheating, withholding information, asymmetrical information). The second 
is the frequency of exchange. It is much easier to learn about prices, quality of 
products, etc. if there are large number of people in the market and large 
number of exchanges taking place. The third is asset specificity, which refers to the 
"degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by 
alternative uses without sacrifice of productive value."22 There are different 
types of asset specificity, to wit:
1. Site specificity: arises from the need for successive stations to be located 
in "cheek-by-jowl" relation to each other to economize on inventory and 
transportation expenses.
2. Physical asset specificity: a specialized input is required to produce a 
particular product.
3. Human asset specificity: skill arising from a "leaming-by-doing" fashion.
4. Dedicated assets: refers to the discrete investments in general purpose 
plants that are made for a particular customer.
5. Brand name capital
6. Temporal specificity: akin to technological non-separability on which 
timely responsiveness by on site human assets is vital.
Transaction costs are high when an exchange depends on a specific person, a 
specific location, or a specific physical asset. Under these conditions, one's ability 
to bargain is low and the chances for opportunism is high.
The forms of market organization and administrative allocation affect the 
outcome of exchanges. In particular, how economic actors are socially integrated 
in exchange affects price movements and the way market clears. Experimental 
research in economic behavior during the last three decades have shown that the 
different forms of markets led to different outcomes in prices and market 
clearing.23 Very small numbers in bilateral bargaining lead to inefficient
21 O.E.Williamson (1981). “The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach.“ 
American Journal o f Sociology ,87(3) p.549-577.
22 O.E.Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization, p 281.
23 Experimental research involves laboratory market experiments where a theory’s assumption 
about agent behavior are tested through an experimental design that seeks to control the 
environment using techniques of induced valuation and defining the rules and conditions 
under which experimental subjects are allowed to trade. These experiments are integrated 
with field observations and controlled conditions are modified accordingly. An overview of 
these experimental researches on markets is found in V.L.Smith (1991), “Theory, Experiment
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agreements. Similarly, different rules in auctions lead to different price 
ou tco mes. For instance, the Dutch auction clears faster than the English 
ascending price auction, thus, the former is more often used in selling perishable 
goods. A study of stock trading by Baker (1984) also found that restrictive micro­
networks (or individuili linkages) which arise from the assumption of bounded 
rationality leads to either large and well-differentiated market structure or small 
and less differentiated market structure. In the former price volatility is 
exacerbated while dampened in the latter.24 A comparison between posted prices 
and auction prices also showed that posted price institutions yield higher selling 
prices than oral double auctions although in the former negotiations (a 
transaction cost) can be avoided and products vended do not have to be 
standardized.
1.3 Application of the Neo-institutional Approach to the Urban Land and
Real Estate Market
Exchange in the urban land and real estate market involves a transfer of a 
bundle of rights over a physical asset. These rights include the legal rights 
defining what one can do with the property and the rights over the physical 
attributes of the property. The exchange of these rights involves transaction costs 
consisting of resources necessaiy to measure both the legal and physical 
attributes of the property, the costs of policing and enforcing the agreement and 
uncertainty arising from asymmetric information. In the case of the buyer the 
uncertainty usually comes from knowing the "quality" of real estate and its 
location. On the part of the seller, the uncertainty arises from knowing the 
financial condition of the buyer. In addition, both the buyer and seller are 
uncertain about the stability of the price level. These uncertainties in the market 
become greater if property rights are weak since the search cost, information 
gathering and opportunism in the market tend to increase the costs of exchange.
In a frictionless world of zero transaction costs, there is perfect information 
and perfectly secured property rights. Both the buyer and seller in the market 
are able to ascertain costlessly the value of all attributes (physical and legal) of 
land and real estate. The standard supply and demand model can thus be used 
to define the value of property and the market clears mainly on prices (i.e., the 
buyer assumes that the value of all attributes is equal to the price of property).
In a non-zero transaction costs world, however, information is asymmetric 
and property rights are not well secured. The "quality" of real estate is normally 
difficult to assess since there are attributes that cannot be easily detected by 
ocular inspection. For instance, one cannot establish the "quality" of the 
neighborhood until one has lived in the place for sometime. This uncertainty
and Economics,” Papers in Experimental Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
24 W. E. Baker (1984). “The Social Structure of a National Securities Market.” American Journal 
of Sociology 89, p.775-811.
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also holds true in assessing the quality of land development (e.g. water system, 
drainage, and noise pollution). Information problems are compounded when 
property rights are weak. Property rights are the State laws defining conveyance 
of property, ownership, zoning laws, land registration and titling, etc. These 
laws are relevant since they may allow "third parties" to influence the attributes 
of land and real estate (e.g. behavior of neighbors, likelihood of theft, possibility 
of changes by local authorities of zoning ordinances, etc.). Also, the processes of 
land titling, settlement of land cases, issuance of building and development 
standards and protection of real estate buyers influence the "quality" of real 
estate. Weak property rights thus can lead to higher transaction costs. 
Institutional arrangements to reduce transaction costs will arise and have 
influence on the value of land and market clearing.
The higher the transaction costs, the greater is the diversion of the market 
from the "perfect market." Diversion from the "perfect market" is generally the 
case in many developing countries due to regulatory constraints and weak 
governance. In the Philippines, for instance, organizations supporting property 
rights are weak. We hear about fraudulent activities in land titling and 
registration. Squatting is also a major urban problem and police protection 
seems inadequate in controlling the problem. Moreover, there are huge 
controversies in government policies specifically those on land use and zoning.
Transaction costs in the land market thus mainly arise from two sources: one, 
land and real estate are by nature goods of experience quality (i.e. quality is 
established only during use); two, rights and permits are highly asset-specific; 
and three, weak property rights. Weak property rights exacerbate uncertainties iii 
the market because the incidence of fake titles, unclear zoning laws and 
prevalence of squatting creates "mistrust" in the system. Opportunism increases 
as the confusion with regard to government action and decisions prevails.
High transaction costs will be strongly felt in transactions involving 
government. Rights and permits are only provided by the state. They are specific 
to a particular land and are necessary for land to be developed and sold. 
Permits and licenses are also issued based on specific terms and time periods. 
The problem with veiy specific asset is that it creates bilateral dependency and 
poses added contractual hazards (post-contracting opportunism). The 
transactors become veiy dependent on the asset and are afraid that the other 
party will back out, raise prices, will refuse, etc. The logical option then of 
transactors is to have control over resources or decisions. Hierarchy or relational 
contracting is a possible option.
A problem often noticed about transaction costs is that it is difficult to 
measure them. The transaction costs perceived by firms may not be reflected in 
the individual firm or client levels since what mav be observed are the 
transaction costs that are already the result of people's intervention to reduce 
these costs.
We can surmise that the Philippine land and real estate market is 
characterized by high transaction costs. Empirical research has to determine
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how high these costs are. In general, the institutional approach tells us that 
institutional arrangements are undertaken to reduce transaction costs. 
Williamson, in particular, sees the adaptation mainly in terms of the adjustment 
of the size of the firm or through hybrid arrangements in the market. However, 
when we are dealing with the interface between private sector firms and 
government, the firms cannot internalize these transaction costs. It does not 
make sense to adjust the size of the firm since government cannot be brought 
into the firm. It also does not make sense to create hybrid arrangements since 
regulations, rules, or laws are created to prevent anarchy and thus rules 
supposedly cannot be traded or bargained. It is, however, plausible that firms 
look for other institutional arrangements, possibly of a non-legal nature. We 
have to see if this is the case in the Philippine urban real estate market.
1.4 Hypotheses of the Study
The study examines the following hypotheses.
1. The urban land market is characterized by high transaction costs as a 
result of unclear property rights and unclear government land use and 
zoning regulations.
2. The high transaction costs in the market are expressed in terms of time- 
consuming procedures resulting in direct money costs.
3. The attempts of economic actors in the market to reduce or circumvent 
transaction costs affect the organizational form of the land market. 
Auctions are absent and bilateral bargaining or relational contracting are 
the prevalent forms of exchange.
4. The phenomenon of grease or speed money should be understood as a 
form of relational contracting.
5. Time plays an important role in the market due to the boom and bust 
pattern of the real estate business. Time-saving mechanisms rather than 
price adjustments are primarily employed to clear the market.
1.5 Fieldwork Activity
Data were compiled in a fieldwork conducted from January 1996 to 
December 1998. The fieldwork started with a literature search about studies on 
the land and real estate markets in the country. The studies on these markets 
have been limited to hedonic price analysis. There were veiy few studies that 
looked at the actual activities in these markets. However, there were various 
studies that tackled specific transactions in the land or real estate markets, 
specifically, those on land titling, development control systems, land use 
planning, housing, squatting and land conversions. These studies provided 
some empirical results for this study.
Interviews with real estate developers and brokers, local governments and 
other government officials provided most of the information and insights for the
study. Although only a few private persons were willing to be interviewed, 
these persons provided a wealth of information and interesting insights about 
market.
Some newspaper columnists have also written articles on specific activities in 
the land and real estate market. In particular, these articles include reports on 
land disputes varying from land grabbing, fake titles, zoning violations and 
conversion violations. I followed up some cases with the columnists and also at 
the regional trial courts and the Supreme Court for legal decisions on specific 
land cases.
Interviews w ith local and national government offices provided the 
information about the government policies on land use and development 
controls. This included information regarding the issuance of permits and 
licenses. A historical perspective on the policies was also provided including the 
problems of government agencies in the process of approval.
The Bureau of Lands, Land Registration Authority and the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) were the major sources of 
information with regard to land laws and different anomalies on private land 
rights and government allocation of public and private lands. Some of the 
newspaper reports have also been verified from these agencies. In particular, 
the Bureau of Lands provided the historical perspective on land titling and 
ownership.
In addition to the above information, data on land prices have been 
compiled. A long time series data on prices (e.g. 1950s to 1990s) would have 
provided a good picture of the land and real estate market in Metro Manila. 
While there were pre-war records on land and real estate prices, price data 
during the early post-war years were more difficult to find. Time series price 
data were available only for the years 1990 to 1996. The data were mainly 
compiled by a private institution which started operations in mid 1990s. 
However, the company discontinued its operation in 1996 due to lack of funds. 
An international funded research firm continued monitoring real estate prices 
but the methodology was not as comprehensive as the previous company. The 
international research firm basically did real estate price monitoring primarily to 
support its appraising business.
The land prices gathered were posted prices taken from major news dailies 
that cany advertisements about the land and real estate properties on sale. The 
methodology was quite simple and it would have been possible to replicate the 
effort in years prior to the 1990s. However, the classified ads on real estate 
between 1950s and 1980s were very few. According to a senior member of the 
Manila real estate board, the reason is that most real estate transactions were 
done through trusted brokers and rarely were properties on sale or property 
prices advertised.
In addition to the land and real estate prices, data about land development 
projects with approved license to sell and development permit were also 
gathered. The data provided specifics about the type of developments that were
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placed on the market including the name and location of projects. Another 
statistical datum used in the study is that pertaining to land conversions from 
agricultural to urban uses in different regions of the countiy. This datum was 
obtained from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and from primary 
survevs of some studies on land conversion.
The study mainly used statistical indicators and case studies to test the 
hypotheses.
1.6 Organization of the Study
Chapter 2 discusses the physical and organizational dimensions of the urban 
land and real estate market. The physical dimension is defined by the 
geographical attributes of Metro Manila, which was selected as the specific area 
of study. Metro Manila was selected as the specific area of study for two reasons: 
one, it is the premier urban area in the Philippines; and two, Metro Manila's 
property market serves as a major barometer of land market activity in other 
parts of the countiy. On the other hand, the nature and composition of 
transactions in the market define the organizational dimension of the market. 
The activities in the formal and informal land market are also presented.
Chapters 3 and 4 are concerned primarily with the regulatory framework 
within which the urban land and real estate market operates in the countiy. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the legal systems of land ownership, transfers and land 
titling. On the other hand, Chapter 4 focuses on the development control system 
in the countiy. The laws and process of obtaining planning approvals are 
discussed including the problems in land development and planning.
Chapter 5 describes how the boom and slump in business cycles have 
influenced real estate activities specifically prices and production. The period of 
discussion starts from the early 1900s up to the 1997.
Chapter 6 provides evidences on market clearing mechanisms in the urban 
land and real estate market. This market is classified based on how prices are 
determined. The open or competitive land market represents the market 
whereby prices are primarily determined by supply and demand forces. On the 
other hand, the socialized land market represents the market whereby prices are 
administratively determined.
Chapter 7 discusses market clearing when property rights are imperfect. It 
focuses on two types of imperfect property rights, to wit: (1) lands supported by 
fraud titles of ownership; and (2) lands occupied by squatters.
Chapter 8 examines the nature and type of transaction cost in the urban land 
and real estate market. It presents various transaction-cost economizing 
strategies in the market including some measures of transaction costs. The 
limitations of the transaction cost measures are also discussed.
The final chapter (Chapter 9) presents a summary of the major findings and 
conclusions of the study.
CHAPTER 2
The Physical and Organizational 
Dimensions of the Urban Land and Real 
Estate Market
Metro Manila is the premier urban center in the Philippines. From the beginning of Spanish control up to the present, the city has remained 
the focal point of economic, social and political activities in the country. The 
growth of Manila into a metropolis has been particularly significant. 
Initially, only the city of Manila was considered the urbanized zone. This 
zone continued to grow steadily from the early 16th century to the mid-20th 
century, as Manila came to dominate interisland trade including 
manufacturing and service activities. These factors attracted a large part of 
the population to settle in Manila and suburban areas. By the early 20th 
century, suburban sectors simply grew together and became integrated to 
the city of Manila to form a larger metropolitan region.
Real estate trade also started to flourish in the city as early as the 20th 
century. There has been a significant conversion of agricultural lands into 
urban lands and industrial lands into more intensive uses. In particular, the 
formalizatioxi of private property rights in the country during the Spanish 
colonial government paved the way to the rise of the real estate business. 
Private ownership of land has provided citizens of the Philippines the right 
to own and acquire land in the country. Such right is the most exclusive 
form of private ownership, which is also referred to as fee simple. A holder of 
fee simple has the rights to use, obtain income from and alienate land. These 
rights can be traded wholly or in part. The former involves sale or transfer 
of fee simple rights while the latter involves lease or mortgage of private 
property rights. Sale of property rights pertains to the act of delivering land 
to the buyer or vendee by (1) turning over material possession of the land 
and (2) by symbolic transfer of private ownership.1 The first requires that 
the land be placed under the actual and physical control of the buyer, hi the 
second, transfer is effected by the execution of a public instrument such as a 
valid contract of sale to the buyer. On the other hand, mortgage or lease
1 A.E. Filamor (1997). Philippine Real Estate Law and Jurisprudence. Philippine Copyright, p.53.
transactions are temporary transfers of the right to use and/  or the right to 
obtain income from the real property.
The urban land market involves the sale of private property rights. This 
market consists of different transactions in specific markets. The transactions 
are the following: (1) buying of raw lands; (2) obtaining rights, titles and 
permits from the government; (3) contracting architects, builders, suppliers, 
etc. for the improvement of raw land; and (4) sale of developed land or real 
estate. These transactions arise because the "production" of urban land 
requires a conversion process whereby raw land is transformed into urban 
land and real estate. Raw land is unimproved for urban habitation.2 This 
includes agricultural lands, idle lands including lands occupied by 
squatters, and old urban areas that require redevelopment. On the other 
hand, developed land has been improved for urban habitation or has been 
given planning permission for urban use.
hi particular, the above transactions occur in the formal urban land and 
real estate market whereby transfer of rights and improvements on land are 
legally registered and recognized by the State. An informal land market, 
however, exists in the countiy. In this market, transfers of rights are not 
legally registered. Thus, improvements on the land are primarily self-help 
and not authorized by the State. This market arises on "borrowed" lands 
used primarily for housing purposes. Most land and real estate transactions 
in the countiy, however, are of the formal type but the informal land market 
plays a major role in providing housing for the poor and low-income 
households.
In this chapter, the physical and organizational dimensions of the urban 
land and real estate market are discussed. A description of the physical 
environment of the market is initially presented. In particular, the 
geographical attributes and urbanization trends of Metro Manila define the 
physical environment. The next section discusses the organization of the 
urban land and real estate market. The focus is on how specific transactions 
in the market are being carried out. A discussion of the relationship among 
government agencies, the private sector and professional institutions in the 
land and real estate market is presented in the third section. This is followed 
by a brief description of the informal land market. A summary of the 
discussions is presented in the last section.
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2 Land for urban habitation refers to land utilized for residential, commercial and industrial 
activities. This is in contrast to rural lands that are largely utilized for agriculture or agro­
forestry.
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2.1 The Physical Environment of Metro Manila
Land Resources
Metropolitan Manila is the capital city of the Philippines and is also referred 
to as the National Capital Region (NCR). The region is formed by 17 towns 
with a total land area of 636 square kilometers, about 0.2 percent of the total 
Philippine land area (Table 2.1). The largest town measures about 171.7 
square kilometers while the smallest is only 5.95 square kilometers.
The northern part of the metropolitan area opens to the province of 
Bulacan while the southern part is linked to the provinces of Cavite, 
Batangas, Laguna and Quezon. In the eastern part lies the province of Rizal. 
The provinces surrounding Metro Manila in the southeastern part comprise 
the CALABARZON region. The region is not a political subdivision but an 
identification of the area as an agro-industrial growth zone in the country. 
CALABARZON covers an area of 16,200 square kilometers or about 5.4% of 
total Philippine area.
Table 2.1
Land Area of Metro Manila and CALABARZON
Land Area
Hectares As % to Total
Philippines 30,000,000 100.0
CALABARZON 1,620,000 5.4
Metro Manila 63,600 0.2
Manila a/ 2.498 3.9
Caloocan 5,580 8.8
Pasay 1,397 2 2
Makati 1,831 2.9
Mandaluyong 929 1.5
San Juan 595 1.0
Quezon 17,171 27.1
Muntinlupa 3,975 6.3
Parañaque 4,657 7.4
Pasig 4,846 7.6
Marikina 2,152 3.4
Taguig 4,521 7.1
Pateros 1,040 1.6
Las Piñas 3,269 5.2
Malabon 3,264 5.2
Navotas 894 1.4
Valenzuela 4,702 7.4
a' For the municipalities comprising Metro Manila, percentages are 
based on the total NCR area.
Source: National Statistics Office (NSO), 1995
The 17 municipalities comprising Metro Manila are scattered across 
different geographic zones (Figure 2.1). The geographic zones include the
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following: (1) the G uadalupe Plateau; (2) the Coastal M argin (and reclaim ed 
area); (3) the M arikina Valley; and  (4) the Laguna Low lands. The G uadalupe 
P la teau  h as  h ig h  e lev a tio n  an d  so lid  geological foundations tha t m akes it 
su itab le for increased  in tensity  of u rban ization . This P lateau  extends from  
the  tran sp o rta tio n  co rrido r to  B atangas an d  L aguna in  the  so u th  to central 
L uzon  in  th e  n o rth . M ost m u n ic ip a litie s  in  M etro  M an ila  (Q uezon, 
M an d a lu y o n g , M akati, San  Ju an , P a rañ aq u e , Las P iñ as , V a len zu e la , 
M untin lupa and  parts  of Caloocan) rest on the  Plateau. The Coastal M argin 
lies m ain ly  a long th e  M anila Bay. Som e po rtions of th is M argin  h ave  solid  
fo u n d a tio n  b u t are  p ro n e  to  flo o d in g  d u rin g  h ig h  tides. Som e p a rts  are  
su itab le  fo r o ffshore  fisheries. The sh o re lin e  of M an ila  Bay is a good  
reclam ation  site. M anila, Pasay, N avotas an d  parts  of C aloocan are located  
on th is  M argin. The M arik ina  V alley an d  L aguna  L ow lands are  low-lying 
zones w ith  s tru c tu ra lly  inferior soils. H eavy flood dam age is experienced in 
these  areas d u e  to recu rren t flood ing  caused  by  th e  overflow  of th e  Pasig 
a n d  M arik ina  R ivers. M arik ina , P asig  an d  P ate ros  are  on  th e  M arik ina  
V alley. A d jacen t to  th e  V alley  is th e  L aguna  L ow lands w h ere  Taguig and 
p a r ts  of M u n tin lu p a  are  located .
Figure 2.1
Physiography Map of Metro Manila
Source: “Urban Planning and Development in Metro Manila,” MMDA
and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), May 1996, p.5.
Population Growth, Spread and Distribution
Initially, the urbanized area of the m etropolis was contained in the official 
city of M anila (Figure 2.2). The City of Manila, which opens to Manila Bay, a 
p ro tec ted  harbor, w as a logical choice as the colonial capital by the 
Spaniards d u ring  the 16th century. It becam e the hub from  w hich the 
Spaniards effected the political, econom ic, cu ltu ra l and  religious 
transform ation of the Philippine society. Similarly, the American m ilitary 
forces en tered  the Philippines th rough  M anila in 1898 and from the latter 
ruled the country for half a century. The brief Japanese occupation likewise 
controlled  the country  from  M anila. Thus, alm ost from  the beginning  of 
Spanish control, M anila w as the dom inant center of political pow er, of 
w ealth , of com m erce and  of Spanish, Am erican and  C hinese influences.
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Figure 2.2
Urban Expansion in Metro Manila
m .  k 'c  — . .'Vu I___ I iwo | _ j  KW
Source: Real Estate Monitor, Econotec, Inc., 1990
The growth of Manila into a metropolis basically resulted from its 
monopoly of commercial activities in the country. From the 16th century to 
the mid-20th century, Manila came to dominate inter-island trade despite its 
relatively inferior harbor.3 During this period, the city also became the chief 
manufacturing and service center. These economic activities resulted in the 
influx of population in Manila and its suburban districts. By the mid-19th 
century, Manila had become a large city with a population around the 1900 
of over 200,000. Also, it had become a multi-centered city with several 
patterns of decentralization and locality concentration. The decentralization 
and locality concentration crystallized further during the 19th century so that 
at the advent of American control Manila consisted of a dozen recognized 
districts bound into one large urban settlement. Under the American 
influence, the development of port, a clearly articulated road system and a 
commercial and financial district contributed to the urban sprawl. 
Moreover, the development of outlying areas such as Quezon City into a 
political center further increased the urbanized area. In 1901, the urban zone 
had an area of only 14.3 square miles. By the 1960s, Manila grew as a 
metropolitan region with an urbanized area of about 150 square miles and a 
population of over two million (Table 2.2).
The early metropolitan region was formed by the City of Manila and the 
chartered cities of Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan4 including about 14 nearby 
municipalities. Although the move of government during this period was 
toward decentralizing the manifold functions of the city (e.g. Manila as the 
business and financial center; Quezon City as the political center), this move 
merely served to enlarge the urbanized zone to create a still larger 
metropolitan region. In 1975, Metropolitan Manila was recognized as a 
distinct political region consisting of 17 cities or municipalities. Metro 
Manila then started to evolve into a multi-nodal system of central business 
districts (CBDs). There are now three distinct CBDs in the area, to wit, the 
cities of Manila, Makati and Pasig-Mandaluyong. Other centers are 
presently being developed and some are foreseen to rise as urbanization is 
farther pushed to the urban fringes.
The increase of Metro Manila's population has indeed been rapid. The 
1939 census showed that Metro Manila's population reached over 600,000, 
an increase of 118.5 percent from 1918 or an average annual rate of 5.6 
percent. By the 1950s, population in the metropolitan region was over one 
million. This increase to about four million in 1970 and to over nine million
3 The Manila Bay has shallow bay waters requiring offshore anchorage and lighterage 
handling of passengers and cargo. A small harbor at Cavite was found far more 
satisfactory for primary refuge and ship’s repair. F.L. Wernstedt and J. Spencer (1967), 
The Philippine Island World. California: University of California Press, p. 169.
4 The act of chartering a city removes it from the control of the provincial government and 
places it under presidential administration.
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in 1995. The population growth in Metro Manila has been higher than that 
of the entire Philippines. With the increasing population, the normal pattern 
of increasing density is noted. The increase in the number of persons per 
square meter from the 1960s to 1990 has been substantial in all 
municipalities of the metropolitan region. This has resulted in congestion 
problems that already became obvious as early as the 1970s.
Attempts to redirect migration flows away from Metro Manila have 
been pursued iti the 1970s. Two major groups of policies can be identified. 
The first includes policies toward redirection of migration flows away from 
Metro Manila and the second are policies toward retention of rural 
population. Under the first group, the following schemes have been 
employed: (1) a package of tax incentives and tariff exemptions for 
industries that locate in relatively depressed areas; (2) a ban in the location 
of new non-export industries within a fifty kilometer radius of Metro 
Manila; and (3) the launching of a Nationwide Industrial Estate Program in 
1978. The second group of policies relates to rural and agricultural 
development. Among the policies that have been instituted along this line 
were the following: (1) implementation of the Integrated Rural Development 
Program for agricultural development; (2) improvement of rural housing 
conditions by strengthening the rural component of the Bagong Lipunnn 
Improvement o f Sites and Services (BLISS) and (3) instituting a land reform 
program.
These early efforts to promote a decentralized pattern of urban 
settlement, however, were carried out with little success. The policies 
effecting the regional dispersal of industries had actually attracted 
agriculturally based industries that would have located anyway in the 
regions outside Metro Manila even in the absence of incentives. The ban on 
the location of new non-export industries in Metro Manila was eventually 
lifted after two years, as higher factor cost of locating outside Metro Manila 
discouraged the establishment of new industries. For some industries, they 
located themselves along the peripheries of Metro Manila. This simply 
resulted in a movement of population from the inner core of the city to 
municipalities at the boundaries, for instance, Pasig, Muntinlupa, Parañaque 
arid Caloocan.
On the other hand, the effect of rural development policies was even 
more disappointing. There had been no improvement in agricultural 
productivity and wages. In addition, the initial land reform program 
suffered from slow implementation. It was also limited to rice and corn 
lands and thus had no impact on a larger number of households dependent 
on other crops such sugar and coconut. The opportunities for income- 
generating activities were still lacking in the rural areas and thus, Metro 
Manila continued to attract people from the countryside.
Table 2.2
Location
Population and Density in Metro Manila
1948
Population (in millions) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
Density (in thousands persons per sq.km) 
1948 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
Philippines 19.23 27.09 36.68 48.10 60.70 68.61 0.64 0.90 1.22 1.60 2.02 2.29
Ave. Annual growth (%) 2.07 2.89 3.08 2.71 2.35 2.30
Metro Manila 1.57 2.46 3.97 5.93 7.93 9.45 2.5 3.8 6.2 9.3 12.4 14.8
Ave. Annual growth (%) 4.02 4.76 4.09 2.98 3.31 3.52
Manila 0.98 1.14 1.33 1.63 1.60 1.65 39.5 45.7 53.4 65.5 64.2 66.4
Caloocan 0.06 0.14 0.27 0.47 0.76 1.02 1.0 2.6 4.9 8.4 13.6 18.3
Pasay 0.09 0.13 0.21 0.29 0.37 0.41 6.4 9.5 14.8 20.7 26.4 29.4
Quezon 0.11 0.40 0.75 1.17 1.67 1.99 0.6 2.3 4.4 6.8 9.7 11.6
Las Piñas 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.30 0.41 0.3 0.5 1.4 4.1 9.1 12.6
Makati 0.04 0.11 0.26 0.37 0.45 0.48 2.2 6.3 14.5 20.3 24.8 26.4
Malabon 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.28 0.35 1.4 2.3 4.4 5.8 8.5 10.6
Mandaluyong 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.20 0.24 0.29 2.8 7.8 16.0 22.1 26.4 30.9
Marikina 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.21 0.31 0.36 0.9 1.5 4.3 8.0 11.7 13.5
Muntinlupa 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.28 0.40 0.5 0.6 1.6 3.4 7.0 10.1
Navotas 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.19 0.23 3.2 5.5 9.3 14.9 20.9 25.6
Parañaque 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.21 0.31 0.39 0.6 1.3 2.1 4.5 6.6 8.4
Pasig 0.04 0.06 0.16 0.27 0.40 0.47 0.7 1.3 3.2 5.6 8.1 9.7
Pateros 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.8 1.3 2.4 3.9 4.9 5.3
San Juan 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.12 5.4 9.6 17.6 21.8 21.3 20.8
Taguig 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.27 0.38 0.3 0.5 1.2 3.0 5.9 8.4
Valenzuela 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.21 0.34 0.44 0.4 0.9 2.1 4.5 7.2 9.3
Source: National Statistics Office.
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In the 1990s, however, there has been a considerable movement of 
industries outside Metro Manila. This movement has been primarily due to 
the steep rise in the prices of land in Metro Manila. Many industrial firms 
that have been located in Metro Manila suddenly found themselves sitting 
on a gold mine. It has become more viable for these industrial firms to sell 
the property or redevelop the property for more intensive uses and locate in 
outlying suburban areas. Local governments have also been encouraging 
these moves of industries to relocate outside Metro Manila. Aside from 
these industries, real estate developers have also been constrained by the 
high cost of land in Metro Manila and thus started developing residential 
subdivisions particularly for the middle and low-end markets in outlying 
suburban areas.
In particular, the CALABARZON region has become an attractive 
alternative for industrialists and real estate developers. Its proximity to 
Metro Manila provides easy access to markets, materials, business services 
and government offices. In addition, infrastructure facilities (e.g. roads, 
telecommunications) have considerably improved in the region. This is 
partly a result of government identifying the region as the industrialization 
showcase of the Philippines. The growing industrialization in the region has 
further encouraged commercialization and the bulk of "overspill" 
population from Metro Manila to locate in the region. The evolving spatial 
distribution in Metro Manila thus, shows a more intensive use of land in the 
metropolitan region. Residential condominiums have in fact mushroomed 
in the 1990s and developers foresee this trend to continue in the future. On 
the other hand, subdivision developments are mostly undertaken in the 
outlying suburban areas. In particular, the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, 
Batangas and Rizal are under great pressure for urban expansion.
Land Use Trends
With urbanization comes a greater demand for urban land. There has been a 
substantial conversion of agricultural and public lands into urban and 
private uses. Only four percent of Metro Manila's area remained 
agricultural in 1994 compared to more than 50 percent in 1938 (Table 2.3). In 
1938, agricultural lands could be found in many parts of Metro Manila 
particularly the municipalities of Quezon City, Novaliches, Las Piñas and 
Muntinlupa. Public lands (classified as forestlands) were also found in 
Quezon City and Novaliches. In the 1980s, Metro Manila's comprehensive 
land use plan also showed minimal allocation for agricultural uses in the 
city. By the 1990s, residential and commercial land uses in the city became 
more prominent posting increases of more than twice their levels in 1980.
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T ab le  2.3
Metro Manila’s Land Use
Land Use As % to Total Land Area
1938 1980 1990 1994
Residential 14.2a 29.4 65.0 65.0
Commercial - 3.0 3.4 8.0
Industrial - 4.7 4.0 3.0
Institutional - 4.5 5.2 10.6
Utilities - 1.4 4.0 4.0
Agricultural 55.6b 12.5b 8.4 4.4
Open Space 5.1 24.3 8.0 4.0
Forest Land/Parks 25.1 20.2 2.0 1.0
Total, Metro Manila 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a/ includes commercial and industrial lands
6/ includes fishery (4.4% ) and mining and quarrying (0.2% )
c/includes fishpond areas
Source: Census on Real Estate, 1938
Metro Manila Commission (M MC), 1983
N C R Regional Development Plan (1993-98), MM DA
Urban Planning and Development in Metro Manila, M M DA  and JICA, May 1996
Between 1990 and 1994, conversion of lands into higher density 
development became the trend. Lands that were once zoned for industrial 
and institutional uses were rezoned into commercial areas (Table 2.4). Old 
residential areas were converted into high-rise commercial and residential 
places. Specifically, a significant increase in condominium developments in 
Metro Manila was observed for the period 1991 and 1996. While the number 
of condominium units remained more or less the same between 1965 and 
1991, with 1,104 buildings, the period between 1991 and 1996 saw the 
construction of another 1,105 buildings.5
T ab le  2.4
Major Land Use Conversions in Metro Manila I
Location
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig 
Alabang Stock Farm, Muntinlupa
RFM Factory, Pasig
Old Bilibid Prison, Manila 
Sta. Ana, Manila
Previous Use
Military Reserve 
Breeding Farm 
Plant Site for Food 
Processing 
Penitentiary 
Race Track
Existing/Planned Use
Financial/Business Center 
Financial/Business Center
Residential
Commercial Complex 
Commercial Complex
The trends in land use that characterized the metropolitan area were as 
follows: (1) a depletion of agricultural land; (2) the conversion of residential 
property to commercial use, (3) the conversion of industrial property to 
commercial use; (4) trend towards waterfront development; (5) maximized 
land resources via high-rise buildings for commercial and residential uses;
5 Condoliving/Condo Factbook 1996, Manila: E M. Feliciano & Co., Inc.
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(6) development following linear patterns along major thoroughfares; and
(7) mixed use development.
Trends in Land and Home Ownership
The census on real estate conducted in 1938 showed that mainly individuals 
held private lands in the Philippines (Table 2.5). Private lands held by the 
religious organizations account for only less than one percent of total 
private lands while those owned by government agencies as private 
property account for about 3.3 percent. The total number of landowning 
individuals is only about 18.1% of total population. The distribution is more 
skewed in Metro Manila where only about 4% of population are 
landowners.
After the 1938 census, comprehensive information on ownership of 
private lands in the Philippines remains hard to find. However, some orders 
of magnitude can be inferred in individual studies conducted in the 1980s 
and 1990s. In a study by Mendiola (1983),6 650 hectares of contiguous 
private land north of Makati were traced to 465 owners or an average of 1.4 
hectares per landowner. In all NCR, about 56 percent to owners had 300 sq 
m or less while 44 percent had large tracts of land. A survey of a northern 
middle-class subdivision in the early 1990s revealed that 43 percent of 
households owned sites or houses in other subdivisions.7 Most land 
holdings though were small.
The studies show that there has been a considerable subdivision of 
private lands in Metro Manila. Average landholding is shrinking specifically 
for residential land. Moreover, the distribution of landholdings has 
become less skewed.
6 E.Mendiola (1983). Urban Land Reform in the Philippines. In Land for Housing the Poor.
Singapore:Select Books, p.475.
7 E. Dekker (1992) Conventional Housing in Manila: The Development of a Residential
Subdivision and Government Involvement. Urban Research Working Paper 28. 
Amsterdam: Vrije University, Institute of Cultural Anthropology.
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Table 2.5
Ownership of Private Lands, Philippines, 1938
Total Area 
( 000 hectares)
Number of 
Owners
Average
Area
(hectares)
Ratio of Private 
Landowners to 
Population (%)c'
Philippines 8645.1 2899035 2.98
Government Lands37 287 0 1220 235.25
Cooperatives/Associations 338.2 5909 57.23
Religious Organization 52.9 1964 26.93
Individuals 7967.0 2889$ 2.76 18.1
Metro Manila“ 37.7 40509 0.72 4.1
City of Manila 2.7 15813 0.17 2.5
Caloocan 10.5 2644 3.97 3.4
Pasay 0.5 2356 0.21 4.3
Las Piñas 3.6 1498 2.40 22.0
Navotas 0.8 1145 0.70 5.5
Makati 1.7 219 7.76 0.6
Pasig 2.4 2719 0.88 9.9
Malabon 1.5 1526 0.98 4.6
Parañaque 3.5 3000 1.17 14.2
Mandaluyong 1.0 861 1.16 4.7
Marikina 3.5 621 5.64 4.1
Muntinlupa 2.6 1079 2.41 11.7
Pateros 0.2 1014 0.20 14.2
San Juan 1.5 3544 0.42 18.8
Taguig 1.7 2470 0.69 20.4
a/ lands held by the United States and Commonwealth government, cities, provinces and 
municipalities.
b/ other municipalities comprising Metro Manila was then considered part of Rizal province.
"  based on 1939 population census.
Source: Census of Real Estate, 1938.
Data on survey of housing reveal that in 1985 about 50 percent of 
households owned their homelots (Table 2.6.). This proportion is lower in 
Metro Manila. The CALABARZON region (Region 4) exhibited a higher 
ratio of home and lot ownership than the Philippines average in both urban 
and rural areas. However, lot and home ownership in the countiy is noted 
to be a rising trend within a 10-year period. This rising trend indicates that 
the real estate sector has been increasingly providing homeownership in the 
countiy.
This trend is also exhibited by the declining rate of homeownership on 
"borrowed" lands within the 10-year period (Table 2.7). The rate of decline is 
noted to be faster in the urban areas than in the rural areas. This trend 
indicates a movement of households into either land ownership or the rental 
market.
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Table 2.6
Proportion of Lot and Home 
Ownership, Philippines, 1985-94 
(in percent)a/
1985 1991 1994
Philippines 58.1 62.8 65.4
Total Urban 50.1 58.2 61.6
Total Rural 63.0 67.7 69.1
Metro Manila 41.2 45.5 49.4
Region 4 (urban) 60.5 66.7 73.4
Region 4 (rural) 68.6 65.5 71.1
37 refers to own/owner-like possession of house 
and lot including amortizing owners.
Source: Family Income and Expenditure Survey 
(FIES), NSO
Table 2.7
Proportion of Home Ownership on 
Borrowed Lands,a/ Philippines, 
1985-94 (in percent)
1985 1991 1994
Philippines 30.0 25.2 23.8
Total Urban 26.9 22.6 20.8
Total Rural 31.8 27.4 26.8
Metro Manila 20.4 15.6 14.3
Region 4 
(urban) 24.4 18.9 14.2
Region 4 (rural) 25.7 28.2 24.0
a/ refers to homes built on rented land, rent-free 
land with consent of owner or rent-free land 
without consent of owner (e.g. squatters).
Source: FIES, NSO
2.2 Specific Modes of Transaction in the Urban Land Market
The urban land market consists of special transactions in different 
markets (Figure 2.3). These transactions arise from the process of converting 
raw land to developed land. The conversion process entails the following 
activities: (1) buying of raw land; (2) obtaining rights, titles and permits 
from the government agencies; and (3) contracting of builders, architects, 
suppliers for land improvement. When these transactions are completed 
land is sold in the developed land market. Each of these transactions is 
discussed below.
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Figure 2.3
Components ofthe Urban Land Market
Buying Raw Land
Raw land refers to agricultural lands, "old" urban areas, vacant and idle 
private and government lands (including those occupied by squatters). 
Agricultural lands can still be found in Metro Manila but the bulk is located 
at the urban fringes. In particular, the CALABARZON region has become 
the alternative to Metro Manila's land market. Substantial conversions of 
agricultural lands iti the region have taken place. In particular, the region 
accounted for 44 % of the approved land conversions in the country between 
1988 and 1997 (Table 2.8). The bulk of these conversions occurred in the 
provinces of Cavite, Laguna and Rizal.
Table 2.8
Approved Applications on Land Use 
conversion,3' Philippines, 1985-94 (in percent)
Location Area ,% to Total(hectares)
Philippines 56,168.54 100.0
NCR 83.11 0.2
Region IV (CALABARZON) 25,108.56 44.7
Region III (Central Luzon) 11,025.71 19.6
Other regions 19,951.16 35.5
a/ This includes agricultural lands converted by the rezoning act 
of the local government prior to 1988 (i.e. enactment of the 
CARP law)
Source: DAR-PARC
Land occupied by squatters is also an important source of raw land. In 
the 1980s, the area occupied by squatters in Metro Manila was estimated to 
cover about 638 hectares or 1.1 percent of Metro Manila's land area. This 
area corresponds to the 244 squatter colonies identified under the
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government's Area for Priority Development (APD) program.8 An estimate 
of squatters' population in the 1990s placed 1.99 million squatters in 385 
colonies.
Buying raw land entails the transfer of rights and title of ownership from 
the previous landowner to the new owner. This transfer has to be registered 
and acknowledged by the State. Otherwise, the sale becomes null and void. 
In some cases, individual titles have to be consolidated specifically if the 
raw land required is a vast tract of land consisting of many parcels owned 
by one or more landowners. Consolidation of titles has also to be cleared 
and registered with the government. Likewise, subdivision of land into 
parcels will also need government approval.
Investors, land speculators and developers (private or government) are 
the major buyers of raw land. In general, these buyers initiate trade in the 
raw land market. Raw land available for sale is not widely advertised. 
Buyers (i.e. investors, land speculators and developers) search the market 
through friends or business associates, by ocular inspection of an area or 
through their trusted brokers. Also, sales of raw land are often not 
transparent involving a good deal of haggling. The offer or listed price is 
seldom the final price. The reason is that raw land requires many legal 
considerations. Agricultural lands require conversion approval before 
development can take place. Also, the law requires squatters to be 
compensated when they are ejected from private lands. Conversion 
approval and the settlement of squatters involve transaction costs that are 
significant considerations on the price of land. The question of who takes 
responsibility for these tasks becomes part of the sale agreement.
Another reason for higgling in this market is that there are various ways 
by which sales can be completed. Direct sale is not the only means to clear 
the market. Raw lands have been purchased through joint venture and barter 
arrangements. In joint venture, the landowner becomes an investor in the 
development project by using the land as his or her equity. The partners 
then share in the profit and risks of their joint venture agreement. On the 
other hand, barter sale is a scheme whereby the property on sale is 
exchanged for another property that is acceptable to the seller.
Raw land is not necessarily developed or improved upon completion of 
sale. The land may be left idle for sometime or may be leased while the 
owner waits for the appropriate time to develop the land. It may also be that 
the buyer decides to sell the land in its raw form.
This program identifies specific squatter areas as an urban land reform zone where 
existing occupants are given the right of first purchase of the land at a price approved by 
the government. These areas are also given priority under government housing program.
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The Land Development Phase
The land development process technically starts from the decision to buy 
raw land up to the construction phase. After the buyer has acquired the 
rights and title to the raw land, he or she can engage in the following 
transactions: one, obtaining planning permission from government agencies; 
and two, contracting architects, builders, suppliers, etc. Both transactions 
may be done simultaneously. In particular, obtaining planning permission 
requires a blueprint of the proposed land development project.
The real estate developers are the key actors in the land development 
process. They make decisions with regard to buying raw land, the timing 
and type of land development as well as contracting architects, builders and 
suppliers.
There are two types of developers, to wit, private and government. This 
distinction highlights the public and private strategies in land development. 
The government is into land development specifically to provide socialized 
housing. It buys land in the raw land market, transforms the land into 
socialized and low cost housing and awards or sells the developed lands to 
squatters and low income earners. The task of providing housing mainly 
rests on the National Housing Authority (NHA) whose history dates back to 
the 1930s. On the other hand, private developers are mainly into land 
development for profit. They develop a wide range of land development 
projects that includes housing, commercial, leisure and industrial 
developments. In particular, housing developments of private developers 
cater to different income levels from low to high-income households.
Although the objectives of both developers are distinct, it is possible to 
have joint venture development projects between the government and 
private developers given the right incentives. Such scheme has evolved 
primarily in housing programs of the government. In the 1980s, the NHA 
started its joint venture program by providing the raw land while the 
private sector was responsible for land development and housing 
construction (Table 2.9). In the early part of the 1990s, the private sector has 
become more aggressive in these ventures. It has tapped other government 
agencies as partners (e.g. Philippine National Railways, Bases Conversion 
and Development Authority, local governments) while NHA was limited to 
providing technical assistance that included among others facilitation of 
planning permission.
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Table 2.9
Joint Venture Projects fo NHA, 1950-1995 
________ (in number of projects)
Year Land Land+Cash Cash
Technical 
Assistance a/ Total
1950-65 0 - - - 0
1979-85 12 - - - 12
1987 2 - - - 2
1988 - 2 - 2
1989 5 1 2 - 8
1990 5 2 2 - 9
- - - 0
1991 4 - 4 1 9
1992 4 1 2 6 13
1993 2 1 2 6 11
1994 - 3 13 16
1995 - - 3 3
To ta l 2 2 5 17 29 73
37 Technical Assistance pertains to government's help in project 
packaging and engineering works. This includes access to 
financial services of government institutions, facilitating 
approval of permits and licenses and marketing assistance.
" - “— none or zero
Source: NHA Annual Reports, various years
Contracting architects, builders and suppliers is primarily a private 
sector undertaking. The developer seeks for the architect, builder, and 
suppliers in the service market and contracts them for a specific project. If 
the development firm is in business for a long time, the firm may have 
developed long-term relationship with some firms offering building 
services. Developers may also bring into the firm architects, builders, 
suppliers, brokers, etc. This maybe done by employing workers or by 
creating a conglomerate that consists of separate firms offering different real 
estate services. Of the number of real estate development firms operating in 
Metro Manila, about 63% are developers only, meaning most of the 
contracting is done outside of the firm (Table 2.10). About 1.4% operates as a 
developer and supplier and about 33.1% have brokerage firms.
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Tab le  2.10
Distribution of Developers Operating in Metro Manila 
___________ by Nature of Business, 1996
Nature of Business Number of Firms % to Total
Developer Only 927 63.1
Developer-Brokera/ 486 33.1
Developer-Supplier 20 1.4
Developer-Professionalb/ 11 0.7
Developer-Funder 8 0.5
Developer-Broker-Supplier 3 0.2
Developer-Broker-Professional 6 0.4
Developer -Broker-Funder 6 0.4
Developer-Supplier-Funder 1 0.1
Developer-Supplier-Professional 2 0.1
Total 1470 100
a/ include real estate dealers and realtors 
b/ include real estate consultancy and management 
services (e.g. architectural, engineering services 
Source: Philippine Real Estate Investment Factbook and Directory, 1995- 
96, CREBA
Prior to construction, the developer has to obtain planning permission 
from the government. Planning perm ission requires the developer to get 
perm its and licenses from the governm ent before im provem ents on land can 
be made. This requirem ent is im plem ented through a developm ent control 
process w hereby the governm ent determ ines w hether the chosen land use, 
developm ent intensity and boundary and building standards are consistent 
w ith the legal standards.
Developm ent controls in the country were adopted silice the Spanish 
colonial period. However, it took a long time before the w ider perspective of 
land planning gained institutional foothold. From the Spanish governm ent 
until the 1970s, land planning w as contained and limited to subdivision or 
"m aster" planning. Planning conformity was required only for land 
developm ents w ithin specific planned locations or areas. In the mid-1970s, 
under the Marcos regime, the Philippines moved in the direction of more 
planning and political centralization. More planning resulted in a 
com prehensive developm ent control system whereby all land developm ents 
in the countiy regardless of location were subjected to the developm ent 
control process. O n the other hand, the move tow ard centralization implied 
that the pow ers and decision-making became concentrated in the center. 
A lthough the Marcos regime can be credited for its efforts at adm inistrative
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decentralization, the central governm ent continued to dom inate local fiscal 
policy and adm inistration including physical planning and regulation.9
This tw in-m ove of more planning and centralization resulted in the 
creation of major agencies that w ere given "blanket" authority over physical 
planning and regulation in the country. In particular, these functions were 
provided in the M inistry of H um an Settlements and its bureau, the H um an 
Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC).
In the early 1990s, there was a massive attem pt of decentralization. In 
particular, the Aquino regime scaled dow n central authority and switched 
to greater local autonomy. The deconcentration effort of the Marcos regime 
was retained and w ith  it political decentralization w as adopted. Provinces, 
cities, municipalities arid barangays were recognized as areas of political 
decentralization and thus w ere vested w ith  pow ers to raise revenues, 
entitled to a set of elective officials and a legislative body. These provisions 
implied that local governm ents were provided powers and authority over 
local affairs including physical planning and regulation. In particular, the 
decentralization of physical planning and regulation im plied m aximum 
participation of the people affected by land developm ents including 
decision-making at the lower levels of government. Thus, the developm ent 
control process has become localized and required involvem ent of various 
people's organizations. U nder the Aquino adm inistration, the M inistry of 
H um an Settlements was abolished and the HSRC was reorganized into the 
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Some regulatory 
powers of the HLURB w ere devolved to the local government.
hi addition to the decentralization efforts, the Aquino adm inistration, 
also switched from governm ent intervention to m arket policy. More m arket 
implies less planning. The Aquino governm ent did not abolish the 
developm ent control process. However, there is now  a stronger conflict 
between m arket and social objectives w ith  regard to land uses. Social 
objectives tend to be sacrificed for profit.
The decentralization and m arket policies started during the Aquino 
regime was continued by President Ramos w ho took over the reigns of the 
governm ent in 1992. hi particular, the Ramos governm ent adm inistered the 
decentralization policies of the Aquino governm ent and adopted more 
m arket policy. These efforts continued to be supported by the present 
Estrada adm inistration.
9 Administrative decentralization focuses on the deconcentration of administrative functions 
and appropriate authority from the national line agencies to the regional offices. The 
Marcos regime also moved towards pro-decentralization policies, however, these policies 
were neutralized, sometimes negated by the authoritarian rule. See A.B.Brillantes (1987). 
“Decentralization in the Philippines: An Overview.” Philippine Journal o f Public 
Administration, 31 (April), p. 131-148.
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Selling Developed Land and Real Estate
Sale of developed land and real estate begins after the developer has 
obtained planning permission. In particular, a license to sell is issued upon 
completion of the developm ent control process. This license authorizes the 
developer to sell h is /h e r  product in the market. A license to sell may be 
issued even before construction has been started or com pleted although 
developers are required to post performance bonds10 to ensure that the 
proposed land developm ents will be undertaken.
Developers provide a w ide range of real estate products in the market. 
These products maybe classified as follows:
1. residential subdivision — a vast tract of land is subdivided into smaller 
units and titled individually.
2. residential condominium  — a tract of land developed into high intensity 
urban living w here land is ow ned in com mon and individual titles 
are provided to each housing unit rather than on the land.
3. leisure development project —a vast tract of land developed for sports 
and recreational activities (e.g. golf) where land is held in common 
and ow nership to the land is in the form of com pany shares or 
membership.
4. industrial estates —a vast tract of land developed m ainly foi- 
industries. Land is individually titled and m ay be acquired by sale or 
long term  lease.
5. commercial sites — a vast tract of land is developed m ainly for business 
establishments. These establishments include malls, commercial and 
office condom inium s and hotels.
Mixed developm ents are also common such as combining residential 
subdivisions w ith leisure development. Industrial estates are usually 
designed w ith  provisions for residential and commercial uses. Leisure, 
industrial and commercial developm ents are basically for the high-end 
m arket where the target clientele are prim arily companies or firms. On the 
other hand, the target clientele of residential developm ents is m ainly the 
household. Developers thus, come up w ith different types of residential 
developm ents to m atch the income levels (or paying capacity) of the 
targeted household. For example, the residential m arket in NCR and major 
urban areas have been classified as follows (see next page):
10 The value of performance bond is based on the total project costs and the extent of 
project completion.
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Classification 87 Price (Pesos) per unit (including land) b/
Estimated Price of lo t01 
(Pesos/square meter)
Socialized housing 
Low cost/affordable housing 
Medium cost housing 
High cost housing
150 ,000 - 180,000
300.000 -  700,000
1.0 M- 2.5 M 
> 2.5 M
1.500-2 ,000 (32 sqm)
2.500- 3,500 (45- 72 sqm) 
4 ,000- 7,000 (90-150 sqm) 
> 7,000 ( > 150 sqm)
a/ This classification is based on assessment of brokers. 
b/ Based on 1996-97 prices
01 Estimated based on given prices of housing units and the standard lot size per classification (in 
parentheses).
Buyers of real estate are classified into the following types:
1. End-User — buyers w ho make investm ent decisions based on cost and 
affordability. These buyers enhance the property because they intend 
to live or use the property.
2. Inves tor—buys a piece of property in the hope that in the future its 
value w ill appreciate and he or she can sell it for profit or that there 
is going to be some future use for which he or she can apply the 
property.
3. Speculator — buys property in anticipation of short-term  increase in 
prices or w indfall and takes advantage of arbitrage opportunities, i.e. 
interest rates are low and funding is easy to obtain. This buyer 
usually hopes to turn  around the investm ent in a short period of 
time.
The speculator is the m ost vulnerable am ong buyers, h i a recession, the 
financial m arket can w ork against the investm ent since interest rates would 
go up. This buyer finds that the price appreciation that could be realized 
from increase real estate price can be eaten up by interest cost.
A real estate developm ent firm m ay sell its "products" through three 
different m arketing schemes. It m ay sell its products by hiring brokers who 
are paid fixed salaries (i.e. in-house brokers). The firm m ay also choose to 
m arket its products through accredited broker firms w hereby m arketing 
paraphernalia (e.g. office, telephones, vehicles) in addition to commissions 
are provided by the firm. In some cases, the firm m ay accept freelance 
brokers w ho include the firm 's product in their listings and are paid by 
commission. The firm can employ all three schemes in a single project. The 
choice of m arketing schemes largely depends on the product being 
marketed. For instance, in the socialized and low-end markets the m arketing 
strategy is to sell fast. This objective is achieved by creating a netw ork of 
brokers. These brokers may hire non-professional or unlicensed sellers paid 
on commission basis to increase m arket network. The idea is to have brisk 
sale through more sellers. On the other hand, selling in the high-end m arket
requires brokers to be trained in proper m arketing approach thus there is an 
incentive for developers to em ploy in-house brokers.
Inform ation about properties on sale are dissem inated in the m arket 
through the following: (1) advertisem ents for sale in prin t or television; (2) 
telephone or personal call to brokers or real estate developm ent company;
(3) "for sale" signs on land; and (4) real estate inform ation centers. The 
m eans of dissem inating inform ation about land prices and properties on 
sale has changed w ith  the grow th of Metro Manila. In the 1920s, only a few 
properties w ere listed in new spapers or print. Most inquiries on real estate 
for sale w ere done through personal calls or visits to a trusted broker. 
Economic advancem ent in the 1920s brought about phenom enal grow th in 
M anila's real estate market. By 1938, real estate brokers have increased 
prom pting the creation of the M anila Board of Realtors (1938). The Board 
was established no t only to im part a code of ethics am ong brokers but also 
as a m eans to share inform ation on prices and property listing. An attem pt 
was m ade in the 1970s to institutionalize this sharing scheme. Through the 
initiative of the M anila Board, the Philippine Real Estate Exchange 
(PHILREX) w as created. The PHILREX was envisioned to serve as the 
central m arketing arm  (i.e. clearing houses) of real estate properties. Brokers 
paid a joining fee of 10,000 pesos (US$2,000) to have their properties listed. 
However, this scheme was short-lived, as the scheme created conflicts 
among brokers over good projects on the market.
Advertising through brokers continued to be the system of inform ation 
for the market. In the 1980s, the new spaper had become a popular m edium  
for advertising properties on sale. There has also been a m arked sectional 
separation in the m arket by location and by type of property. This showed 
an increase in property listing and also a more diversified real estate market. 
The im provem ents in telecommunication and the boom in real estate in the 
1990s, created different avenues for dissem inating inform ation about the 
property market. Aside from new spapers or real estate magazines, 
electronic mails have also been used in m arketing real estate projects. Real 
estate forum s are now  also being aired through televisions. Moreover, real 
estate organizations have set up  trade shows in the domestic and 
international m arkets for their products. Developers have become active in 
tapping not only the local m arket bu t also the international market.
In contrast to the raw land market, sales in the developed m arket are 
more transparent. One reason is that a license to sell (or perm it to sell) 
requires that the property for sale should be published and widely 
circulated. Another reason is that land is bought as a final product. Direct 
sales thus are more common. Barter does happen but is limited to the high- 
end markets. A third reason is that sales in the m arket are done through 
financing while raw  lands are generally bought in cash.
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Real estate sales become valid only upon the signing of a contract by the 
buyer and seller. The m ost com mon form of sale contract is the contract to 
sell. This is a contract executed for properties sold by installments, which 
binds the buyer to fulfill the conditions of paym ent and the developer to 
deliver to the buyer the quality of land developm ent promised. There is no 
transfer of title yet bu t only a m utual prom ise to sell and buy. If one party 
fails to deliver the conditions stated in  the contract, the aggrieved party  may 
resort to legal action. Usually, the developer signs this contract only upon 
paym ent by the buyer of the agreed dow n payment. In turn, the developer 
has to deliver the agreed land developm ent w ithin six m onths that the dow n 
paym ent has been paid (Presidential Decree 927: Subdivision and 
Condom inium  Buyer's Protective Decree).
The contract to sell has become a convenient instrum ent in the sale of real 
estate because there are cases w hen the buyer w ithdraw s from the sale due 
to inability to fulfill the conditions of the contract The buyer can transfer his 
or her rights and obligations to another interested buyer by simply signing a 
Transfer of Rights Agreement. Moreover, paym ent of real estate taxes rests 
on the developer. However, it may inconvenience the buyer because the 
contract does not extinguish the right of the developer to have the property 
mortgaged.
In cases w hen buyers obtain financing from financial institutions 
including financing under governm ent housing programs, a transfer of title 
to the buyer's nam e is required. The title is then m ortgaged to the financial 
institution and the Deed o f Sale with Mortgage is used as the contract between 
the buyer and developer. In particular, developers usually face a dilemma 
w ith  regard to properties availing of governm ent financing. The reason is 
that after going through the process of title transfer, the buyers m ay turn  out 
to be unqualified or that governm ent financing is not sufficient. Thus, if the 
buyer decides to w ithdraw  from the sale, transfer of rights becomes more 
difficult com pared to the contract to sell since the property title has to be 
conveyed and registered w ith the new  buyer.
Both the contract to sell and the deeds o f sale luith mortgage are only initial 
agreements of sale. The sale is only com pleted after full paym ent has been 
m ade and the buyer and developer or the m ortgagor has signed a Deed of 
Absolute Sale. This Deed will effectively convey the title to the buyer. To 
effect the transfer of property rights, the deed is registered w ith the Registry 
of Deeds under the requirem ents of the Torrens Registration Law.
2.3 Roles of Private and Government Agencies in the Land Market
The transactions in  the land m arket are undertaken through both private 
and governm ent agencies. Land developm ent and real estate sales are
supported by various related industries such as appraising, financing and 
property consultants (Figure 2.4). O n the other hand, governm ent provides 
three major functions, to wit: (1) regulate land developm ent and real estate 
sales; (2) provide financial assistance for governm ent housing programs; 
and (3) undertake production of low and socialized housing. There are 
various governm ent agencies involved in these functions.
The private sector is also supported by professional organizations. 
These organizations have two basic functions: first, as a lobby group; and 
second, to protect the interest of the industry from "bogus" traders. As a 
lobby group, the private sector works for changes in governm ent policies 
that im pact on the real estate industry (e.g. developm ent controls, housing 
finance, etc.). Obtaining rights and perm its are major transactions in the 
market. Land developm ents could be delayed if planning controls are not 
responsive to the industry 's needs. Moreover, facilitating finance from 
governm ent is an im portant clearing mechanism in the developed land 
market, specifically, for the low-income sector.
The biggest um brella organization of the real estate industry is the 
Cham ber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA), w hich include as 
members firms engage in  real estate business (e.g. developers, suppliers, 
professionals, etc.). Smaller real estate organizations, however, have been 
formed catering to very specific concerns such as the Subdivision and 
H ousing Developm ent Association (SHDA) that was organized mainly for 
those firms engaged in subdivision housing development. Recently, the 
Condom inium  Builders and Developers Association of the Philippines 
(CBDAP) was also formed specifically to address concerns on condom inium  
development.
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Appraising
Brokerage/Marketing
Financing
Consultancy
Construction
Land Development
Management
Syndication
Code of Ethics 
Education 
Interest Group 
Member Welfare 
Public Service 
Quality Standard 
Real Estate 
Exchange 
Research
Home Financing 
Housing Dev’t 
Building Code 
Land Use Control 
Licensing 
Zoning Laws 
Mortgage 
Administration 
Property Tax 
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Regulation
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Realtors/Brokers
Contractors
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Banks/Non-banks
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Contractors/
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F igure 2.4
Structure of the Real Estate Industry
CREBA
NREA
CBDAP
RE BAP
PAREB
SHDA
UAP
PRISLIHA
GSIS, SSS 
PAG-IBIG
NHA, PEA, HUDCC 
LMB (or BL)
HIGC
LRA
LGU
DAR
DA
DENR
HLURB
NHMFC
Source: G.P. Casimiro, Real Estate Industry Today, Fookien Times, 1982
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Professional organizations were also established to protect the real estate 
industry from illegal and unethical transactions or practices. For instance, the 
Philippine Association of Real Estate Brokers (PAREB) was organized to 
provide some guarantee to buyers of the professionalism of real estate 
brokers, hi particular, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) licensed 
real estate brokers. However, this is not a guarantee of the absence of spurious 
deals even among licensed brokers. The DTI could only revoke the license but 
the sale that was undertaken can be resolved only through the courts.
On the other hand, organizations such as the United Architects of the 
Philippines (UAP) was set up to provide protection of unethical professional 
practices. The real estate boom of the 1990s had encouraged many 
developers to contract foreign architects for their projects. This practice was 
a disadvantage to local architects. Thus, the UAP sought government's help 
to look into the "illegal" hiring of these foreign consultants.
Just as there are unprofessional brokers, the industry also talks about 
"fly-by-night" developers. These are developers who simply take advantage 
of the active real estate market but have no intention of staying in the 
business. These developers are in the business for "easy profits" and are less 
concerned on the quality of developments.
2.4 The Informal Land Market
The informal land market generally occurs in lands occupied by 
squatters. Squatters realized that they are not the legal owners of the land 
they occupy, thus, any arrangements with regard to "rights" of occupancy 
and land improvements are done w ithout recourse to the legal process.
hi particular, a squatter's occupancy "rights" in squatter colonies is 
being traded among squatter households and new migrant households who 
do not have a place to stay in the city. A squatter household who intends to 
leave the squatter area "waives" its occupancy rights over a piece of land in 
the colony.11 The price varies depending on the "improvements" made on 
the land.12 The trade may be done verbally or written. Written agreements, 
whereby the squatter household signs a "waiver" over its occupancy rights 
iii the colony, are usually practiced in colonies with organized squatters
11 Cases of these “land trade” have been reported in a number of studies. See R. Stone 
(1973), The Politics o f Public and Private Property in Greater Manila Area, Special report 
No. 6, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, May 1973; Philippine Assistance for Rural and 
Urban Development (1983), Reason for Hope: A Study o f Five Urban Poor Communities 
in Metro Manila, Manila: Share and Apostolate for Poor Settler.
12 Based on interview with Board member of the Ninoy Aquino Pilot Community (NAPICO) 
Association, Rosario-Manggahan, Pasig, 04 and 10 January 1998.
association. The officers of the association require this written agreement for 
record purposes.
This scheme of "rights" trading continues to be used even in areas that 
have been the recipient of government housing programs. A major program 
of the NHA on squatter areas was the slum-upgrading program. Under this 
program government buys the land occupied by squatters from the legal 
owners, subdivides and develops the land and awards or sells the 
developed land to squatters. The awardees of this government program are 
also provided financing payable in 25 years. While these awardees are 
paying amortization on the land, government provides them legal rights of 
occupancy. However, this right can only be transferred through hereditary 
succession. Despite this restriction, the awardees have been trading these 
rights to households other than their relatives.13 The awardee who sells his 
or her rights simply signs a notarized waiver (i.e. quit claim). The 
government was unable to stop this practice, as the reasons for moving out 
of the area were valid. That is, the awardee sold his or her rights either with 
the intention of going back to the province or to locate in another area nearer 
his or her current work area.14
Land may also be developed through informal means. This refers to lands 
that were "improved" without the aid of subdivision plans but primarily 
through self-help efforts. Since these developments are unplanned and were 
"improved" without consideration of standards pertaining to road easements, 
drainage system, road width, etc., these areas usually degenerate into slums.
Informal land developments did not occur only on lands occupied by 
squatters. Prior to the formalization of the development control system, land 
developments outside designated planned locations were not subjected to 
planning permission. Thus, in some areas of Metro Manila, houses were 
built without consideration of subdivision standards. We see residential 
areas with very narrow streets and houses built with no roads (i.e. they do 
not face the road and can be reached only by foot). Formal developments 
became popular in the 1980s, a result of the adoption of the development 
control system requiring planning permission for all land developments. 
Informal developments still occur at present but mostly on "borrowed" 
lands (e.g. lands occupied illegally).
There are practically three types of land developments that can be found 
in Metro Manila, to wit: (1) public sector development; (2) private sector 
development; and (3) informal development. Public sector developments
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13 Interview with NHA Area Manager, Tondo Foreshore Development Project, 18 May 1998. 
See also study by the Planning and Development Collaborative International (PADCO), 
Inc. (1993), “Assessment o fth e  Community Mortgage Program,” vol. 3, USAID.
14 This practice has been legitimized. NHA now allows this type of transfers subject to 
payment of transfer fees.
refer to government housing development projects that target improvement 
of slums or squatter areas in specific locations. Improvement of these areas 
has been a major housing program of the National Housing Authority. Qn 
the other hand, private sector developments are primarily those done by 
private developers including other housing projects of the government as well 
as joint ventures. These developments are planned and have gone through the 
formal procedure of subdivision regulation. For informal development, 
improvements on the land are made without the aid of subdivision plans and 
government support. In particular, this type of development plays a major role 
in supplying housing for low-income families.
The development condition in many parts of Metro Manila depicts the 
co-existence of these three types of development areas within a zonal area. It 
is common to see well-planned residential subdivision surrounded by 
clusters of informal developments. Figure 2.5 presents an example.
Figure 2.5
Development Conditions in Quezon City Case Study Area
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Source: Tetsuro Kidokoro.(1992), “Development Control Systems for Housing Development in Southeast 
Asian Cities," Regional Development Dialogue, 13 (Spring).
The study area is located in Quezon City, 12.5 to 17.5 kilometers north 
east of a major radial road (Commonwealth Avenue). The picture was taken 
in 1986 when the Commonwealth area was just starting to be the hub of
commercial activities south of Quezon City. The study area occupied a total 
of 1,872 hectares. Private formal developments had a total area of 1,441 
hectares. These developments were depicted by orderly patterns of housing 
where all houses face the road of prescribed width. Houses were built on 
only 40% of the area developed. The typical plot size was quite large with 
82 percent of the housing lots having a size of about 400 square meters. This 
implies that the development was primarily for high-income families. On 
the other hand, the informal developments occupied 431 hectares (22.8 %) of 
the study area. In these areas, there were no clear layouts. The road's width 
was insufficient and the infrastructure level did not follow the prescribed 
subdivision regulation. Part of the informal area was to be developed as 
government housing project. In particular, a 15,000 housing project was to 
be built on a 150-hectare public land where squatters currently reside. The 
development of the government-housing project started in 1988 and in 1991, 
796 houses in an area of 6.7 hectares were developed.
Informal land market transactions have been undertaken primarily for 
housing purposes. These transactions have played a major role in the 
provision of housing for the poor and low-income households. For this 
reason, government and also the private sector have taken steps to bring the 
informal market into the formal system (see Chapter 7).
2.5 The Metro Manila Land and Real Estate Market: a Preview
Manila's fast pace of urbanization started around the 16th century when 
the Spaniards made the city the seat of colonial government. Since then, 
Manila became the dominant center of wealth, of commerce, of political 
power and of cultural influences. People thus were drawn to Manila and the 
city grew not only in number but also in size. Urbanization expanded to 
surrounding suburban areas, which became integrated to the city of Manila 
to form the metropolitan region. From an urbanized area of 20 square miles 
in 1901, metropolitan Manila's land area increased to its present area of
245.6 square miles in the 1970s.
Metro Manila has become densely populated despite various efforts of 
the government to divert population to other regions. This situation led to 
problems of congestion, inadequate housing, squatting and other 
environmental problems. These problems mainly arise from issues on land 
specifically its ownership and management. Ownership of land in the city as 
in other parts of the countiy has been highly skewed with only about 4% of 
Metro Manila's population owning lands. These landowners have benefited 
much from the increases in land values brought about by urbanization and 
development. They have been able to hold on to these large landholdings 
due to the undervaluation of real estate properties for tax purposes and the
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absence of development and betterment levies in the country.
The management of land resources in the countiy has also been quite 
lax. Comprehensive land use maps and zoning plans for the city of Manila 
have been instituted only in the late 1970s. Prior to this period, land uses 
have been based on city plans that focused mainly on the design of the 
central business districts. Areas outside the central district are usually 
neglected. The private sector has been provided with greater flexibility in 
directing land developments. The problem, however, is that land use 
become uncertain. A person is not able to gauge what his or her neighbor 
will be doing with h is/her land. Thus, a subdivision-based approach to land 
development has been common. This approach requires ownership of a large 
tract of contiguous land such that planned developments in the land will not 
be substantially affected by prospective developments in adjacent lands.
The apparent poor management of land resources in the countiy did not 
deter real estate activity. The real estate business has in fact flourished in 
Metro Manila. Since the early 1900s, the increase rn land and real estate 
prices in the metropolitan region has been phenomenal. The urban fringes 
surrounding Metro Manila equally portrayed an active real estate market. 
Many agricultural lands in these areas (e.g. CALABARZON) have been 
converted into urban lands while large tracts of urban land have been 
subdivided and developed into more intensive uses. These real estate 
activities are now being replicated in neighboring regions where urban 
centers are also fast developing.
However, despite positive developments in the real estate market, land 
or home ownership in the countiy is still too expensive for most households. 
The government's attempt to subsidize housing has been saddled with high 
losses and the problem of subsidies being cornered by the "non-poor." 
Although homeownership has improved in the last twenty years, there is 
still a significant proportion of families on "borrowed land." Moreover, the 
number of illegal occupants is on the rise and the informal land and real 
estate market continues to thrive.
Most transactions in the urban land and real estate market, however, are 
done through the formal system. This system starts from the act of buying 
raw land for urban development to the process of land conversion and 
development up to the trading of developed land or real estate to the end- 
user. Each specific transaction is highly dependent on government statutes 
(specifically property rights) as ownership and transfer of land or real estate 
requires a legal process. Formal transactions thus still prevail over informal 
ones. However, the legal system in the countiy is not necessarily free from 
"informal dealings" and these transactions lead to fraud in land ownership, 
problems in urban land development and eventually to problems in land 
allocation and distribution.
CHAPTER 3
Land as a Commodity: 
Legislation and Titling Problems
arket organizations to a large extent are formed by the nature of the good
or service being traded. For instance, agricultural commodities have 
different production cycles and processing requirements. Rice and com require 
smaller scale processing than sugarcane and pineapple. Different peculiarities 
of trade (e.g. grading system, market channels, credit terms, etc.) do arise from 
factors that are specific to a commodity.1 In the case of land, its nature is 
defined by its natural features (e.g. site-specificity, fixed supply) and "legal" 
composition. The legal factors are relevant because exchanges in land markets 
(unlike most commodity markets) do not involve a transfer of the land itself but 
a transfer of land titles. The issuance and transfer of these titles are the result of 
a legal process that defines the property rights and the physical limits of the
The legal character of land titles in the Philippines is the subject of this 
chapter. The discussions focus on laws pertaining to private ownership of lands 
and the methods of land titling and transfer of land titles. A historical account 
of ownership rights on land is presented because of its relevance to existing 
land laws. In the first section, the development of property rights in the 
Philippines is discussed. The process of title registration is presented in the 
second section. This section points to the difficulties and problems of the title 
registration process. The third section discusses the many irregularities and 
anomalous transactions in land titling. Thè discussion takes into account 
different types of fraudulent activities under different time periods. In the last 
section, the implications of fake titles in the operation of the land and real estate 
market are presented.
1 For a fuller discussion of marketing systems and agricultural products refer to A. Siamwalla 
(1978), “Farmers and Middlemen: Aspects of Agricultural Marketing in Thailand.’’ Economic 
Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific, 25(1) p. 38-50.
land.
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3.1 Private Property Rights on Land
Public and Private Lands
In precolonial Philippines, land ownership was based on usufruct rights. 
Filipinos regarded uncleared and often also cleared but uncultivated land as a 
free good. Families and groups that have cleared forestlands or cultivated 
unclaimed lands for agricultural use could claim usufruct rights as long as they 
continued to cultivate the land. The Spanish colonial government tried to 
introduce the institution of legally registered private property rights. Initially, 
only the religious orders and Spanish individuals used this instrument to 
enforce their claims to large tracts of land. However, in the second half of the 
19th century, the government tried to stimulate people to register their 
landholdings legally through the passage of several Royal Decrees. These 
decrees distinguished two categories of land, to wit, public and private lands. 
Public lands were those owned or held by the State that have not yet been 
alienated. On the other hand, public lands transferred to private entities by law 
or act of government were classified as private lands.
Under the American administration a threefold classification emerged. In 
addition to private lands, a distinction was made between public land that had 
to remain forested and public land that could in principle be opened up (Public 
Land Act No.979). Public land that had to remain forested consists of forest and 
timberlands2 that cannot be disposed or alienated for private ownership. On the 
other hand, public land that can be opened up refers primarily to agricultural 
lands, which are considered alienable and disposable (A&D) for private use. 
The distinction between forest and agricultural lands was further defined under 
Philippine land laws as follows: forestlands are those lands with a slope of 18 
degrees and above while agricultural lands are those lands below the 18-degree 
slope. Forestlands were placed under the administration of the Bureau of 
Forestry, while the management of A&D lands became the responsibility of the 
Bureau of Lands.
Recent Philippine land classification shows that about 47 percent are 
alienable lands (A&D) and 50 percent are forestlands including mineral lands 
(Table 3.1). Some 3.0 percent of Philippine land areas are unclassified. On a 
regional basis about 75.8 percent of Metro Manila's total land area are A&D 
lands. Forestland occupies about 1 percent of the region's land area while 23.2 
percent is unclassified lands. Unclassified areas are largely properties of public 
dominion (e.g. roads, canals, and ports). Most lands at the urban fringes 
specifically the provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Batangas and Laguna are A&D 
lands. A&D lands in these areas account for about three fourths of total land 
area. On the other hand, in the provinces of Rizal and Quezon about 50 percent 
are forestlands representing a vast tract of inalienable land.
2 Inalienable lands also includes m ineral lands, lands use for canals, ports, roads, etc.
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degrees and above while agricultural lands are those lands below the 18-degree 
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Forestry, while the management of A&D lands became the responsibility of the 
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Recent Philippine land classification shows that about 47 percent are 
alienable lands (A&D) and 50 percent are forestlands including mineral lands 
(Table 3.1). Some 3.0 percent of Philippine land areas are unclassified. On a 
regional basis about 75.8 percent of Metro Manila's total land area are A&D 
lands. Forestland occupies about 1 percent of the region's land area while 23.2 
percent is unclassified lands. Unclassified areas are largely properties of public 
dominion (e.g. roads, canals, and ports). Most lands at the urban fringes 
specifically the provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Batangas and Laguna are A&D 
lands. A&D lands in these areas account for about three fourths of total land 
area. On the other hand, in the provinces of Rizal and Quezon about 50 percent 
are forestlands representing a vast tract of inalienable land.
2 Inalienable lands also includes m ineral lands, lands use for canals, ports, roads, etc.
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Table 3.1
Alienable and Inalienable Lands, Philippines (in percent to total area)
Regional/ Total Area 
Province (in hectares)
A&D
Land
Forest
Land Unclassified
A&D
Land
Forest
Land Unclassified
Philippines 30,000,000 48.9 46.7 4.4 47.0 50.0 3.0
NCR 63,600 65.5 - 34.8 75.8 1.0 23.2
Bulacan 262,500 68.8 31.2 - 70.6 29.2 0.2
Batangas 316,581 73.0 0.2 26 8 83.8 13.3 2.9
Cavite 128,755 78.1 3.9 18.0 78.1 12.1 9.8
Laguna 175,973 74.8 8.4 16.8 76.6 23.4 -
Quezon 870,660 56.8 43.2 - 54.3 40.0 5.7
Rizal 130,892 49.5 50.5 - 48.8 51.2 -
a/ Under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, the reclassification of public lands 
as A&D has been stopped. Instead, the remaining public agricultural lands have been 
earmarked for CARP.
Source: National Mapping and Resources Information Authority (NAMRIA).
The supply of "new" lands in the market depends on how much public 
land can be released as alienable and disposable lands (A&D). The limits on 
what could be A&D is dependent on government, specifically the Bureau of 
Forestry. The approval of the Director of Forestry would be needed to reclassify 
lands that are classified as forest reserves and convert those into A&D for 
agriculture or other purposes (Public Land Act 979).
Of the A&D lands in the Philippines, about 64.8 percent are titled and 
privately owned (Figure 3.1). About 11.8 percent are under the administration 
of different government agencies (other than the Bureau of Lands) mainly for 
public use. In particular, the Department of Agrarian Reform is managing 10.6 
percent of the A&D lands for the agrarian reform program, specifically the 
CARP.3 About 12.8 percent of A&D lands are untitled, and thus, represent the 
potential public lands that could still be transferred to private entities. Recently, 
some of the untitled A&D lands have been allocated for the government social 
housing projects such as the resettlement site in Taguig. Under this program, 
the processing of land titles to qualified homeless beneficiaries is ongoing.
In Metro Manila, all A&D lands are titled properties.4 Most A&D lands in 
Bulacan, Cavite, Batangas and Laguna are also titled properties. Cavite was
3 Starting 1988, the government called fo ra  moratorium on the classification of public lands as 
A&D. This was one proviso o fthe  comprehensive agrarian reform law enacted in 1988.
4 Metro Manila is the most surveyed region in the country. Cadastral surveys since the 1940s 
were mostly done in Metro Manila. Interview with Division Chief, Planning Office, Land 
Management Bureau, 13 June 1996.
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Ownership of Public Lands 
The Spanish land laws 
allowed three ways of 
acquiring public land. The first 
consisted of simple 
occupation; the secondL by 
petition addressed to the 
provincial government; and 
the third by purchase from the 
Office of Finance. In the first 
case, holders who were in 
actual possession of land and 
under their cultivation for at 
least six years were provided 
possessory rights. Holders of 
possessory rights were 
allowed to continue 
occupying and cultivating the 
land and secure free title deed 
on the land. On the other hand, purchase from the Office of Finance, required the 
applicant to be in possession of the land for ten years. A Royal Order of 4 
February 1862 stated that individuals could apply for public land by paying the 
to the Office of Finance the amount of 50 pesos for each quinon (= 2.8 hectares). 
Private ownership right on land is called fee simple. This right allowed owners 
exclusive rights to use, derive income from, and alienate the land.
When the United States acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, the 
American colonial government (1899-1941) supported the idea of property 
rights. Moreover, they viewed the transfer of vast public lands to private entities 
as a means to accelerate economic development. Thus, on the basis of the 1903 
Public Land Act (Act No. 979), several ways of acquiring public lands were 
recognized:
1. Homesteads. Citizens of the Philippines and the United States were 
entitled to acquire title or patent to public land through an application 
before a land court. This patent required the applicant to have resided 
and cultivated at least 20% of the land for a term of five years. The right 
to transfer homestead patents was restricted by the government. Patents 
could not be alienated except through succession within five years after 
it was granted. Its alienation also required the approval from the 
Director of Environment and Natural Resources. Also, if a patent was 
transferred to another private entity, the original owner had the right to 
redeem the property within five years. The maximum size of land that
10.58
22.23
■  Judicially Titled 
^Adm inistratively Titled 
OS CARP Areas
□  Areas Turned Over to Other Agencies
□  Non-agricultural
Figure 3.1
Status of Land Titling in the Philippines, 1996
Source: Land Management Bureau
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was transferred to another private entity, the original owner had the 
right to redeem the property within five years. The maximum size of 
land that can be acquired under homestead was 16 hectares that was 
later adjusted upwards.
2. Sale. This was done by open bidding. The right to occupy and cultivate 
the land was given to the highest bidder. The condition for sale patent 
was that, the buyer did not have to start cultivating the land. An 
individual is allowed to buy up to 144 hectares, and for a corporation 
up to 1024 hectares. These limits were later adjusted downwards.
3. Free Patent. Citizens of the Philippmes who had continuously occupied 
and cultivated a piece of land before 18985 were entitled to have a 
patent issued without compensation for such tracts of land. The 
conditions for sale or alienation of free patents were similar to that of 
the homestead patent.
4. Perfecting unperfected Spanish titles, grants and concessions. Persons who 
had occupied and cultivated public lands and whose titles had been in 
the process of approval but were not perfected due to regime change or 
civil wars could confirm their titles either through the land court or the 
Court of Land Registration.
Most provisions of the American Public Land Act continued to be applied 
iii the land laws under the Philippine Republic. The exceptions included 
provisions pertaining to the size of landholdings and to the citizenship of those 
who may own land. Under the laws of the Philippine Republic, smaller 
landholdings were provided, as land became scarce. An initial move under the 
Republic was to subdivide vast tracts of private lands held by different 
religious orders (i.e. friar lands). These friar lands were purchased by the 
government and were placed under the administration of the Bureau of Lands. 
Another move of government was the enactment of an agrarian reform 
program starting in the early 1960s, which led to the further subdivision of 
large landholdings into smaller units.
With regard to ownership by citizenship, land ownership under the 
Philippine Republic was confined to Filipino citizens. Under the Spanish and 
American colonial governments, citizens of Spain and the United States, 
respectively, were allowed private ownership of land in the Philippines. 
However, since the 1935 Philippine Constitution, non-citizens of the Philippines 
were disqualified from owning lands in the countiy. There were two exceptions 
to this rule. One, friar lands held for religious and academic activities were 
allowed to be retained as private property. Two, citizens of the United States 
were allowed to own lands in the Philippines until 1974 through the Parity
5 PsJej& is a. statoitocvj <ÿaat tha t can be withdrawn or extended anytime. U nder the
Amendment Act appended to the 1935 Philippine Constitution. After the 
expiration of the Parity Act, lands acquired by the Americans after the 1935 
Constitution had to be surrendered or transferred to the Philippine government 
or to Filipino citizens.6 The concession to citizens of the United States was 
farther extended by virtue of a special decree issued by President Marcos in 
1974 (PD 713). This decree allowed citizens of the United States who have 
become permanent residents of the Philippines and those who have resided in 
the Philippines continuously since 1955 to maintain full ownership (fee simple) 
over private residential lands.7 The Philippine Republic also provided other 
ways for an alien to acquire land in the Philippines. One way was through the 
ownership of a corporation that is 60% Filipino owned. Another way was by 
buying condominium units where land is held in common.8 An alien who was a 
natural-born citizen9 of the Philippines may also acquire land as his or her 
residence in the countiy or for business purposes.10
Recently, there is a proposal under the present Estrada administration to 
further ease the rule on land ownership of foreign nationals. The plan is to 
allow foreign investors 100 percent land ownership (including condominiums) 
and ownership of residential land up to 1,600 square meters. This proposal is 
being considered to revive the property market. Between 1990 and 1996, the 
real estate market has been very active enjoying brisk sales and significant price 
increases, which encouraged banks to increase their investment in land and 
other real properties. However, the slowdown in the real estate business in 
1997 dampened the asset quality of banks that had substantial investment in 
real estate. By relaxing land ownership, the new administration hopes that 
foreign demand can spur demand in the property market.
3.2 The Land Title Registration Process
The formalization of property rights in the countiy is supported by a land 
registry system that includes the approval of titles to land and the recording or
50 The Urban Land and Real Estate M arket in  M etro  M anila: A  Socio-economic A n a lysis
6 American citizens who chose to maintain their properties may do so but titles to these lands 
are valid only against other private persons and not to the State (1935 & 1973 Philippine 
Constitution) as cited in A. Filamor. Philippine Real Estate Law and Jurisprudence. Philippine 
Copyright 1997.
7 The area should not exceed 5,000 square meters and said lot should only be used for family 
dwelling.
8 By law, condominium is a form of corporation where owners of condo units have a ‘share” on 
the piece of land where the condominium building is located. Foreigners are allowed to own 
up to 40% of total condo units.
9 Natural bom citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to 
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Also included were those born 
before January 17,1973 of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the 
age of majority (=18 years old) (1987 Philippine Constitution).
10 Batas Pambansa 185 limits land ownership for residential purposes to 1,000 square meters 
for urban lands and one hectare for rural lands. On the other hand, under the New Investment 
Act, former Filipinos may also own lands up to 5,000 square meters for business purposes.
registration of such titles to the book of files. Patents are merely contracts 
between the government and grantee. Only when the patent has been 
registered and provided a certificate of title can property rights bind the land. A 
certificate of title signifies the State's support and recognition of property 
rights. It is a conclusive proof of ownership that shows to whom the rights are 
bestowed, the boundaries of the titled property and the encumbrances on the 
existing property rights. The titling and recording of land titles are, thus, crucial 
in supporting private property rights.
During the Spanish period, the colonial government vacillated in the 
organization of land registration. Initially, the Bureau of Forestry handled land 
registration under the leadership of engineers. However, since the Bureau 
lacked the resources to make maps of state lands and to survey claims, the 
process of land titling was very slow.11 In the early 1880s, the Spanish 
government decreed that the right to issue titles be transferred to local boards, 
consisting of local Spanish and Filipino officials. This action resulted in a 
"politicized" organization for the issuance of land titles. "Grave irregularities 
were reported from some of the provinces, showing that the officials were 
using their power as a means of furthering their own ends."12 In addition, 
issuance of land titles also suffered due to the insufficient number of licensed 
surveyors. The lack of licensed surveyors prompted the government to accept 
the services of unlicensed surveyors (non-engineers or perito practico (practical 
expert) in land adjustments (Royal Decree 13 February 1894). It was reported 
that in many instances these experts were incompetent.
The shortcomings in title issuance and land adjustments resulted in abusive 
practices. First, landowners occupied areas larger than the limits set by the 
government.13 Second, persons soliciting adjustment of lands became 
discouraged by the endless delays in perfecting their titles and instead 
contented themselves to customaiy private use of the land.14 Only one percent 
of the applicants complied with the Royal Decree of 17 April 1894, which 
extended the applications for titling. Third, owners of larger areas usurped the 
cultivated lands of others who had no written documents.15 The process of land 
titling became slower than when title issuance was under the Bureau of 
Forestry. The Spanish minister stated in a preamble submitted to the Crown in 
1894 that there were 200,000 unfinished dossiers relating to sales and 
adjustments of lands.16
The American colonial government was confronted with a situation where
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11 Remarks by Gregorio Basa, Assistant Forester, Bureau of Forestry. Report o fthe  Philippine 
Commission, 1901.
12 Ibid. p. 51-52
13 G. Sancianco y Goson (1975). The Progress o fth e  Philippines. Manila: National Historical 
Institute, p.41-42.
14 Gregorio Basa, Report o fthe  Philippine Commission j ) .  52-53.
15 G. Sancianco y Goson, The Progress o fth e  Philippines.
16 Gregorio Basa, Report o f the Philippine Commission.
only a relatively small number of people held Spanish titles. To facilitate and 
improve on the title registration in the country, the Americans provided for a 
new system of title registration known as the Torrens title. Claimants whose 
applications were approved under the Public Land Act would receive a Torrens 
title to their land. A Torrens title is based on a land cadastral survey linked to 
the geodetic survey of the area and registered with the proper government 
agency. This titling system was relatively more efficient than the old Spanish 
titles which were based on a verbal description of the land claimed using 
physical land markers (e.g. rivers, creeks, trees, roads).
The Torrens registration system was done through approval from the land 
court (Figure 3.2). The general scheme was as follows: A person who desires to 
register title to a private land will have the land surveyed by a surveyor of the 
Bureau of Lands or by a licensed private land surveyor, who prepares the plan 
for the land. The plan of the land will be submitted to the Bureau of Lands for 
verification and approval. There could be a series of reverification by the 
Bureau of Lands prior to approval. Upon approval, the owner then proceeds to 
file his petition with the land court in the province where the land is located. 
The Court sets the hearing and advises the Land Registration Office to make 
the necessaiy publication regarding the filing of application and the date of 
hearing. The notice is published for three consecutive weeks. In the hearing, if 
there are no other claimants and the applicant proved that he has fulfilled the 
requirements of the patent applied for, the Court renders a decision confirming 
the title and ordering the registration of the land in the name of the applicant. 
After the decision has become final, the court issues an order to the Chief of the 
Land Registration Office to prepare and issue the decree of confirmation and 
registration. A certified copy of the decree is sent to the Register of Deeds of the 
province where the land is located. The Register transcribes the decree in the 
Registration book. The entry made is the original certificate of title (OCT). The 
registrar makes a duplicate called "Owner's Duplicate Certificate" and delivers 
it to the registered owner.
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Figure 3.2
Judicial Land Titling and Registration Process, Torrens Titling System
17
1 - Owner's application reaches the surveyor.
2 - Surveyor sends it to the Bureau of Lands
3 - Bureau of Land Returns Application and the Surveyor does this work,
4 - Surveyor sends result of work to the Bureau to be recorded.
5 - If doubts exist the Bureau return survey results to surveyor for changes.
6 - If the survey is found satisfactory, the surveyor returns it to owner.
7 - Owner takes approved application to court through his/her attorney.
8 - Attorney files application with the clerk of court.
9 - Clerk of court send application to the General Land Registration Office.
1 0 - Publication
11 - Land Registration Office returns application with notice of publication to the clerk of court
12 - Clerk of Court schedules the application for hearing.
1 3 - Land Court decides.
14 - Decision of court is submitted to the clerk of court for recording.
 ^g Sent to the General Land Registration Office for issuance of decree of confirmation and 
registration.
_lg Decree sent to Provincial Registrar for transcription of the original certificate of title (OCT) 
including its recording and filing.
17 - OCT Owner’s duplicate copy is released to the owner’s attorney.
18 - Owner receives his or her title.
Source: F.W . Sherman (1930). W hat’s Wrong with the Lands Bureau? Manila: Eugene Arthur Perkins.
An administrative land titling system was also adopted during the 
Commonwealth period (1935-1941) to bring more land under the operation of 
the Torrens system. Under the administrative system, the Bureau of Lands and 
the Minister or Secretary of Natural Resources decided upon the approval for 
land titling. Moreover, the system did not require publication but simply 
notices of perfecting title to be placed at strategic locations. The scheme was as
follows: Any person interested to have a piece of land titled files his or her 
application with the Bureau of Lands (Figure 3.3). The petitioner may or may 
not submit a survey of the property. The Bureau of Lands conducts preliminary 
investigation to verify the qualifications of the petitioner and whether the land 
is free from any other claims. If the investigation is favorable, the Director ofthe 
Bureau of Lands grants the petitioner permission of entry. The petitioner takes 
possession of the land and cultivates at least one-fifth of the land within five 
years.17 After five years, the petitioner applies for a patent and posts the 
necessary notices for perfecting his or her claim. The notices are posted for 30 
days in the land itself, the municipal buildings, and in the barangay. The Bureau 
of Lands conducts final investigation. If found in order, the Director of Lands 
recommends approval to the Minister or Secretary of Natural Resources with 
the President as the final signatory. Upon approval by the Minister or Secretary 
of Natural Resources, the patent is presented to the Land Registrar for 
recording and issuance of title.
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Figure 3.3
Administrative Land Titling and Registration Process
3 - application for final proof after 5 years
4 - post notices of perfecting title
5 - final investigation
6 - issuance of patent
7 -  registration of patent
8 -  issuance of OCT
Source: Based on discussions in R. Casanova (1979). Issuance of Torrens Title Through Administrative 
Proceedings. Property Registration: Proceedings of the Institute on Property Registration, p.34-63.
The Torrens title continued to be adopted by the present Philippine 
Republic. The judicial process of registration did not depart significantly from 
the early 1900s except for changes in government offices. In particular, the land 
court or the Court of Land Registration was abolished in 1914 and the Court's
17 This applies to both the acquisition of land by homestead and sale.
jurisdiction over land affairs was turned over to the Courts of First Instance 
(CFI). The CFI handled not only cases pertaining to land ownership or conflicts 
but also civil and criminal cases. This same task was accorded to the Regional 
Trial Courts that replaced the CFI in 1987. In the case of the administrative 
system, a major change was that land surveys became a prerequisite in the 
filing of application for administrative titling. This requirement was put in 
effect after WWII, as the acceptance of the Bureau of Lands of application even 
for unsurveyed lands caused overlapping claims on land.18
Efforts on administrative decentralization and regionalization under the 
Philippine Republic also brought important changes in the administration of 
land titling. While the Spanish colonial government had started the 
decentralization efforts by transferring land titling from the Bureau of Forestry 
to the local governments, the Americans reverted to a centralized government. 
Applications for titling had to be filed with the Bureau of Lands in Manila. 
Investigations and approval were all decided in Manila. Under the Philippine 
Republic, efforts toward administrative decentralization started in the 1950s, 
however, the regional structures to carry out these efforts were in place only in 
the 1970s.19 The general strategy included the deconcentration of the national 
planning and administration functions to the regional level. The country was 
divided into several regions, and equivalent regional field units of national 
ministries or departments were created. In particular, District Offices of the 
Lands Bureau were established in different regions. These offices were 
provided the authority to accept and approve applications for titling in their 
respective areas of jurisdiction. In the 1990s, decentralization efforts under the 
Aquino regime institutionalized the role of the local government specifically in 
land classification. Under the 1991 Local Government Code, the local 
governments were provided powers to reclassify a portion of their land area. 
Local governments were allowed within certain limits to reclassify agricultural 
lands and determine land uses in their respective areas of jurisdiction. The 
Bureau of Lands was also reorganized into the Land Management Bureau 
(LMB). This reorganization transferred the powers of the Bureau to dispose 
public lands to regional offices of the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR). The LMB now mainly functions as a support bureau to the 
DENR on policies concerning the management of public lands.
The decentralization efforts of the government brought positive results in 
land titling. A major impact was that it accelerated the disposition and titling of 
public lands. Under the American colonial government, it took 52 months to 
have a land titled.20 With administrative decentralization, it took an average of
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Property Registration: Proceedings o fthe  Institute on Property Registration, p.42.
19 See Brillantes, Decentralization in the Philippines, p. 139.
20 F.W.Sherman (1930) “W hat’s wrong with the Lands Bureau?" Reprint from the Manila Daily 
Bulletin. Manila: Eugene Arthur Perkins.
one year to have a land titled. Another positive result was that double 
application or conflicts of application for a particular land very seldom 
happened as verification and monitoring of applications at the District Offices 
became easier.21 Despite these results, however, the problems of overlapping 
claims, landgrabbing and "politicized" land approvals still remained (further 
discussion on this in the next section).
With regard to title registration, the Registers of Deeds had been primarily 
localized institutions since the Spanish regime. These Registers existed as 
independent institutions in different provinces throughout the country. 
Although they were under the General Land Registration Office for 
administrative purposes, the registers were completely independent in the 
exercise of their judgement and discretion regarding documents presented for 
registration. A document that was registerable in one province may not be so in 
another. Thus, while most national departments were decentralizing their 
functions to the regional areas, the Land Registration Office moved toward 
centralizing functions and offices. All Registers of Deeds were placed directly 
under the control and supervision of the Chief of the Land Registration Office. 
The Chief was provided the powers to promulgate rules for guidance of all 
Registers of Deeds and also to review, revise, modify and reverse decisions or 
rulings of the Registers.
Privately owned lands that are sold or transferred to another juridical 
person(s) do not require court proceedings. A notarized deed of conveyance 
together with other instruments of land transfer (e.g. tax payments, license to 
sell, etc.) is submitted to the Land Registration Authority that issues a transfer 
certificate of title (TCT). The requirements varied depending on the nature of 
land transfer (Box 3.1).
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Box 3.1
Requirements for Registration of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
( as o f 1998)
I Common Requirements:
! 1 Original copy of the deed/instrument3 
! 2. Owner's and co-owner's copy of the certificate of title
3. Tax declaration
; 4. DAR clearance and Affidavit of Aggregate Land Holding o fthe  transferee if the land is 
; covered by CARP
: Specific Requirements:
1 Deeds of Transfer
a)BIR certificate authorizing registration
b) revenue tax receipts or documentary stamp tax
c) real property tax clearance
d) proof of the payment of transfer tax
2. If the transferor or transferee is a corporation
a) Board resolution to sell/purchase
b)Articles of incorporation (transferee)
c) certificate of the SEC that the articles of incorporation had been registered.
d) If the land being transferred is covered by patent, the deed of sale is to be 
approved by the Regional Executive Director, DENR.
Additional Requirements:
1.For extrajudicial settlement/adjudication
a) affidavit o f publication o fthe  publisher/editor
b) if the deed includes personal property a bond shall be filed
2. Sale of Subdivision Lots
a)license to sell and/or certificate of registration by HLURB
3. Power of Attorney or any deed, instrument executed abroad.
a)certificate of authentication by the nearest Philippine Consulate.
4. Consolidation of ownership
a) affidavit of consolidation of the purchase/deed of sale of the mortgage.
5. For Subdivision and/or Consolidation plan
a)without change of ownership
1. letter-request
2.tracing cloth
3. blue print copy o fthe  plan
4. original technical description
b)with change of ownership
1. agreement of partition
2. real estate tax clearance
a If the original copy can not be produced, a certified true copy shall be presented accompanied 
with a sworn affidavit stating why the original copy can not be presented.
Source: Land Registration Authority
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3.3 Fraud in Land Title Registration
Although the Torrens title system was more systematic than the Spanish 
title system, the Torrens title like the Spanish title was not immune from 
fraudulent titling and registration. In countries (e.g. United States, Australia) 
that adopted the Torrens system the results had been quite ideal.22 Why the 
system failed in the Philippines has been attributed to several factors.
Between 1903 and 1941, the problem was that the colonial government 
lacked the means to deal with all claims on land and carry out the requirements 
of the American Public Land Act (1903). First, the liberality with which the 
American regime conducted the perfection of incomplete Spanish titles made 
the land policy largely ineffectual. The law recognized prior claims dating from 
the Spanish period, even when papers had been lost during the war. Those who 
based their claim on possession alone due to the widespread destruction of 
Spanish records were able to enlarge their real property by claiming adjacent 
public land as their own. This abuse was not effectively curbed.23
Second, like the Spanish law, the American land law was based on the 
distinction between public land and private land. However, the government 
could only know which land was public when private owners or claimants had 
surveyed and registered their lands. To compel people to register their lands or 
claims, the government itself instituted cadastral proceedings in the countiy 
(Act 2259, 1913), which authorized the compulsory survey of all lands in a 
given municipality. However, cadastral surveys were costly and had been a 
slow process.24 The local governments, which were tasked to conduct the 
cadastral survey program in their respective localities, had no sufficient funds. 
Moreover, cadastral su rveys done by locals required the approval of the Bureau 
of Lands, which created duplication of work. The conduct of cadastral surveys 
in the countiy had also been ambitious given the limited resources of 
government. In the 1930s, the Bureau of Lands did cadastral surveys on lands, 
95 percent of which there was no immediate need for the survey. Areas that 
were already surveyed were given priority while vast areas of unsurveyed 
public lands were neglected. It was basically in these unsurveyed public lands 
that land grabbing was rampant.25 The practice of land grabbers was to get 
persons to settle temporarily on public lands that had not been aggregated and 
recorded by the government. They then had the land surveyed by private 
surveyors and registered under the names of the temporary settlers. These
22 W. Wolters. The Development of Property Rights in Land: The Philippines Mid-19th Century to 
the 1920s. Property Rights and Economic Development: Land and Natural Resources in 
Southeast Asia and Oceania. Edited by T. van Meiji and F. von Benda Beckmann. 
London:Kegan Paul International.
23 A.M. McDiarmid (1953). Agricultural Land Policy in the Philippines during the American Period. 
Philippine Law Journal, 28(6).
24 F. Sherman, What’s Wrong with the Lands Bureau? p.15.
25 Ibid. p. 14
settlers, who were not the bonafide owners, would later transfer their titles to the 
land grabbers.
Third, the law had placed too much power in the hands of the Director of 
Lands. Initially, the disposal of public lands was done through the legal system. 
The courts did the interpretation of the land laws including the classification of 
public lands into alienable and inalienable. Starting 1919, however, the law 
directly assigned to the Director of the Bureau of Lands and his advisors, the 
responsibility for the classification, survey, management and disposition of all 
lands of the public domain. It provided the Director of Lands the powers to 
" limit and delimit, add and take away, change, cancel, approve and disapprove" all 
applications received on public lands (Act No. 979). The standing principle was 
that the decision of the Director of Lands on questions of fact "shall be conclusive 
and binding upon the Courts of Justice.” This implied that when decisions of the 
Director of Lands was appealed to a higher court, the court was only limited to 
making decisions on question of law but not on questions of fact. With this 
arbitrary power, regulations had an interchangeable interpretation depending 
upon the will of the director. No one had any assurance of gaining anything 
under the present system.26
Fourth, the processing of land registration was expensive. The cost of survey 
plus attorney's fee for land registration could be higher than the value of the 
property. An example helps clarify this point:
Camp Bumpus in Tacloban, Leyte was taken over by the military authorities in 
1900 prior to the enactment of the Public Land Act. Filipinos occupied all of the 
land in small parcels. The officers negotiated with each owner to purchase his 
property at a stipulated price (a written contract). When the Torrens system was 
decreed, the Filipinos were required to have their lands registered within a certain 
period or their lands will be registered in the name of the American government. 
Each farmer had his or her lands surveyed and the first land court judge came to 
Tacloban to hear the case. After six years the land court granted the decree of 
registration to the Filipinos but the military generals appealed to the Supreme 
Court to review the case on the grounds that the Filipinos had "no titles" when the 
area was occupied by the military. In 1911, the Supreme Court upheld the decision 
of the land court. Based on the written contract of 1900, the military bought the 
land from the Filipinos. Tomas Soriano who owns Parcel No. 17 sold his property 
at P100 but for which he paid out P640 to acquire the Torrens title. Expenses 
amounted to the following: 200 pesos for survey and plan; 100 pesos for Attorney's 
fee at the lower court; 200 pesos for Attorney's fee at the Supreme Court; 100 pesos 
for printed brief; and 40 pesos for registration and publication.27
Many did not have sufficient funds to go through the land registration 
process. Obtaining debts to have a property registered, of which the results
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were uncertain, provided no incentive for landowners.
After World War II, fraud in land registration took another form. This time 
the "land grabbers" were those who were able to register previously registered 
land by using spurious documents. The Director of the Lands Bureau explained 
that "there were syndicates and  fa s t operators w ho took advantage o fth e  fa c t tha t some 
25% o f the co u n try 's  land records were destroyed durin g  W orld  W ar I."28 The 
Supreme Court also acknowledged that there were num erous Spanish fake 
titles discovered after their supposed reconstitu tion  subsequent to W orld War
II.29 The reconstitution process was specifically adopted to allow owners of lost 
titles to have their titles restored. From WWII until 1978, the process required 
an adm inistrative method. The owner simply had to present a land survey and 
tax declaration to the LRA. However, some persons abused this practice and 
provided fake documents to have lands titled to them. In the Property 
Registration Act of 1978 the governm ent sought to minimize these abuses by 
requiring a judicial process for reconstitution of titles.
Land conflicts also arose due to fake Spanish titles. Until 1978, both the 
Torrens and Spanish titles were recognized by the State as valid claims to 
private land rights. However, there had been a proliferation of fictitious claims 
on land based on Spanish titles. One such case is the following:
Prior to the abolition of the Spanish title, heirs of Mariano San Pedro claimed 
173,000 hectares of land starting from Norzagaray, Bulacan to Laguna extending up 
to the Quezon province on the strength of an old Spanish title (Titulo 4136). In 1971, 
The Court of First Instance (CFI) in Bulacan approved the request of a certain E. 
Mariano as the administrator of the estate of Don Mariano San Pedro. In 1976, the 
Director of Forestry (represented by the Republic of the Philippines) filed a motion 
for intervention and opposition on the alleged Don Mariano estate. However, the 
lower court denied this motion in 30 August 1976. In May 1978, the Republic filed a 
reconsideration of the case and in November 1978, the lower court ruled that the 
Spanish title (titulo 4136) was spurious. The Mariano heirs appealed to the 
Supreme Court the ruling of the lower court. In December 1996, the Supreme 
Court affirmed that Titulo 4136 was spurious. (G.R. No. 103727 Suprem e Court o f  the 
Philippines).
In 1978, a decree declaring all Spanish titles null and void was enacted. 
H olders of legitimate Spanish titles were given a year to register their titles 
under the Torrens system.
Other modi operandi of fake land titling that have become popular in recent 
years w ere the following:30
28 “ When the Price of a Piece of Real Estate is Too “Right”, You Can’t Go Wrong by Checking 
Out its Land Title”, Philippine Panorama, 11 October 1981.
29 Case analysis Don Mariano San Pedro Estate. Supreme Court Resolution G.R 103727.
30 In the later part of 1996, the Bureau of Lands and the LRA, joined forces to come up with a 
comprehensive program called Oplan: Fake Titles. The program has a twin objective of
First, fake titles resulted from fake surveys. A title m ust be supported by a 
survey. However, there w ere surveys that resulted from m isguided actions of 
surveyors. A survey m ust always be pu t w ithin the w ider fram ework of the 
geodetic survey from which grids are established. Surveys, thus, should be 
based on existing approved geodetic survey at the Lands Office. However, 
some surveyors m ade it appear that the technical description on the title was 
based on survey records that have not existed. Some surveys also covered 
portions of titled property and surveyors m ade it appear that the land was 
unregistered or had not been titled. Another way to fake a survey was to 
tam per the contents of previously approved surveys. By changing the tie line 
the parcel of land originally surveyed was transferred to another location. 
These fake surveys obtained approval from LMB, the court, and Land 
Registration Authority (LRA). The lost of geodetic and cadastral survey records 
at the LMB and the LRA had opened opportunities for faking surveys. It 
became difficult to trace fake surveys, as in depth research was needed.
A second m ethod of faking titles was by tam pering the contents of 
previously approved surveys. This m ethod was done by erasing the approved 
survey and replacing its contents (e.g. tie line, lot location, etc.) w ith a new 
survey. The "alleged" approved plan was then presented for registration.
The third modus operandi w as to fake the signatures of approving 
governm ent officials. This was the case in the Fort Bonifacio land scam where 
the signature of the Director of Lands was forged in the deeds of conveyance.31 
These "fake" deeds were then presented to the Registrar for issuance of TCT. 
The Fort Bonifacio land in Taguig w as titled property of the government 
(previously friar lands) placed under the adm inistration of the Lands Bureau. 
By virtue of a Presidential Proclamation in 1964, the land was decreed for 
disposal to military officers. The requirem ent to gain access to the land was for 
the claimant to p u t improvements on the land and pay a cost of P15 per square 
meter. The Proclamation was im plem ented only in 1987. However, the military 
had difficulty meeting the requirem ents and they fast tracked the disposal of 
the land by forging the deeds of conveyance. On the other hand, the Registrar 
of Pasig, failed to verify these deeds with the Bureau of Lands. Of the 1000 
TCTs issued on the property, only 142 were considered genuine.32
A similar case of forgery was traced to the Navy Officers Association. The 
Association issued a "fake" Proclamation by forging the signature of President
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correcting fake and illegal titles circulating in the country and instituting remedial measures to 
prevent title frauds. The findings ofthe committee are contained in the Land Management 
Bureau (LMB) Oplan: Fake Titles Operation Manual.
31 The Proclamation covered an area of 212-hectare. According to LMB though titles have also
been issued to portions of a 10-hectare land in the area classified as public domain and thus 
should not be disposed of. Titles to this land were considered not only fake but also illegal 
(Interview with an officer ofthe Land Management Bureau, 5 August 1998; Philippine Daily 
Inquirer 23 September 1993 p. 1).
32 Ibid.
Aquino (1987-92). This alleged Proclamation decreed the disposal of a land in 
Pasig to members of the Navy. Again fake deeds of conveyance w ere issued to 
have the parcel of land titled.33
Fraud titles have also been issued on inalienable lands specifically 
forestlands. Forestlands and forest reserves cannot be converted into private 
ownership or possession.34 No m atter how long, the governm ent could claim 
back ownership on these lands. Many such cases have been filed in court. There 
were, however, cases w hen the court acclaimed private over public ow nership 
of forestland for the following reasons: (1) the property has been titled before 
Act 2096 was decreed;35 and (2) there is no sufficient or convincing proof that 
the property was more valuable for forestry than agriculture.36
Sometimes, the governm ent is just "too weak" to protect inalienable lands 
as exemplified in the Hacienda Calatagan case.
In 1960, government sought the recovery of public lands in Batangas province 
claimed by the clan of E. Zobel. Qn 31 May 1965, the Supreme Court issued a final 
and executory judgement that declared the government the rightful owner of 
some 2,000 hectares of public lands and waters bordering the private property of 
the Zobel clan. Through legal machinations, the Zobel family until now was able 
to block the State's efforts to execute the final judgement. The government case 
was also prejudiced by bureaucratic "inefficiencies" in the registry of Deeds and 
Bureau of Lands. An inquiry by the Office of the Solicitor General on why the writ 
of execution cannot be served showed the following: first, the Register of Deeds in 
Batangas reasoned lack of material time; second, the local lands Bureau cited lack 
of funds for a relocation survey estimated to cost 750,000 pesos. (Republic of the 
Philippines v. Ayala y  Cia, G.R. No L-20950; 14 SCRA 259 (1965)).
In the 1990s, the classification of areas as agro-industrial and ecotourism 
zones has opened more opportunities for illegal titling of forestlands. To foster 
developm ent of industries and tourism  in the countiy, governm ent has 
identified potential agro-industrial and ecotourism zones in various regions. In 
these zones the conversion of agricultural and forest lands into industrial, 
commercial, and tourist purposes has been allowed. While the creation of these 
zones does not include the sale of public domains, reports have indicated 
otherwise. For instance, the Senate is currently investigating the sale of 4,000
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33 Interview with an Officer ofthe Land Management Bureau, 5 August 1998.
34 Proclamation No. 42, 21 October 1921 superseded by Presidential Decree 716,28 May 1941.
35 Prior to the 1920s, the judicial courts handled the classification of lands into alienable and 
inalienable. In 1920, Act No 2096 was enacted whereby the responsibility of classifying public 
lands was assigned to the executive branch. Specifically, this task rested solely on the Bureau 
of Forest Development (BFD, now Forest Management Bureau) up to 1975. After 1975, a 
team composed of technical men from the BFD, the Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Fisheries 
and Aquatic Resources, and the Bureau of Mines and Geological Sciences, handled land 
classification. Only certified A&D lands by the land classification team can be titled. (Republic 
of the Philippines v. Payatas Estate; Republic of the Philippines v. Piedad Estate).
36 Hernandez v. Director of Forestry, CA27802 (1963); Ramos v. Director of Lands (39 Phil 175, 
1918).
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hectares of forested national parks in Quezon province to a Taiwanese 
consortium.37 The area is part of the proclaimed Marilaque (M arinduque, 
Laguna, Quezon) economic zone. Government is also investigating the titling of 
a vast reservation area in Bicol region identified as another ecotourism zone.38 
In the M arikina W atershed Reservation which extends to the province of Rizal, 
patents w ere issued by the Provincial Environment and N atural Resources 
Officer (PENRO) to a pine forest.39 There were also cases w hen the tenants of 
leased parcels of public land produced fake patents and used these patents to 
sell the leased parcels to naive clients.
3.4 Im plications of "Fake" Titles in  the Land and Real Estate M arket
Title registration in the countiy has been subjected to m any grave 
irregularities resulting in double titling, overlapping titles, fake titles, etc. Any 
buyer of real estate, thus, has to be cautioned w hen buying land. Two types of 
titles are distinguished in the land market. The first is a "clean" title; and the 
second a "defective" title. A "clean" title carries the character of indefeasibility 
and is free from any encumbrance (including squatters). On the other hand, a 
"defective" title may be either fake (or illegal) or doubtful. A title is fake or 
illegal w hen its issuance is not based on any of the legal authorities involved or 
recognized in the official process of land titling.
The extent of title fraud is not know n but m any cases of such fraud have 
been reported. Title frauds also vaiy  by area. Survey records in M etro Manila 
are relatively complete. The incidences of fake surveys are few and are 
concentrated on prim e properties.40 In 1997, the Lands Office of DENR-NCR 
unearthed 14 cases of spurious land titling in Metro Manila (Box 3.2).
Box 3.2
Areas of Land Cases involving Cancellation of Titles and Survey Plans, NCR
(reported in 1997)
Referred to DENR
1. Adriatico Street, Manila
2. Sta. Ana, Manila
3. Quezon City Reconstituted title
4. West Rembo, Makati
5. Pembo, Makati
Referred to the LRA
1. J.P  Rizal, Makati
2. Quiapo, Manila
3. Taguig
Referred to the Director of LMB
1. Bagong Bantay, Quezon City
2. Diliman, Quezon City
3. Piedad Estate, Quezon City
4. Pasay City
5. Fort Bonifacio, Taguig
6. Don Antonio, Quezon City
Source: Lands Office, DENR-NCR.
37 Senate Environment Committee, Philippine Star, 29 October 1996.
38 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 06 December 1996.
39 N. H. Cruz, Landgrabbing, Squatting, Fake Land titling, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 April 1999.
40 Interview with the Director, Lands Office, DENR-NCR, 10 August 1998.
There are municipalities in the NCR w here the incidence of land conflicts 
due to fraud is high. For instance, in Quezon City about 42 percent ofthe City's 
land area or 7,177 hectares of titled properties are the subject of conflicting 
claims and overlapping titles.41 This is prim arily due to "land grabbing" in the 
process of title reconstitution and organized squatting. In 1988, the Quezon City 
local registrar's office was gutted by fire whereby 500,000 land titles were 
dam aged and requiring reconstitution.42 In Caloocan, about 90 percent of its 
commercial and industrial areas have been the subject of a titling fraud that 
dates back to the 1960s w hen the Court of First Instance (CFI) approved a Deed 
of Transfer and Conveyance based on spurious docum ents.43 The fraud was 
m ade possible through connivance involving the courts and the local registry 
office in Caloocan. Title frauds are also common in Las Piñas w hose cadastral 
records w ere lost in the 1980s. The province of Cavite is also saddled w ith 
problems on conflicting claims and overlapping titles. About 90% of the 
province of Cavite w as originally owned by friars. In the early 1900s, these friar 
lands were bought by the governm ent and w ere subdivided. M ost of the 
survey records, however, including subdivision maps have been stolen from 
the Bureau of Lands.44 Properties in the area have been titled w ithout the 
knowledge of the Lands Bureau. The Bureau surmise that private titles have 
been obtained through fake deeds of conveyance similar to the Fort Bonifacio 
land case.
Philippine real estate laws contend that all land titles registered under the 
Torrens systems are indefeasible unless proven otherwise. The State considers 
any buyer of good faith and guarantees him or her rights to the safeguards and 
remedies provided under the Torrens system. A buyer is not held Hable for 
defective titles nor is he or she bound to trace the title's history but only to 
ensure that the Land Registrar has certified the title of the lot on sale factually. 
However, while the State will always support a true title from a falsely issued 
title, going through the legal process is costly. It also takes time before title 
frauds can be detected. For example, in the case of the Don Mariano Estate, it 
took five years before the Director of Forestry acted to file a case against the 
false claim. And it took 20 years before the Supreme Court m ade its final 
judgement. The same case happened to the Maysilo Estate. The fraud was 
conceived in 1965 but was only uncovered in 1997. Until the courts have 
resolved conflicts on the land, the land is subject to lis pendens.45
Title frauds increase the cost of making exchanges in land markets. The cost 
involves the time arid effort exerted in finding out the correctness of titles or in
41 Quezon City Special Task Force of Squatting and Resettlement, 1996.
42 Manila Chronicle, 24 June 1988, p.1
43 .Maysilo Estate Special Proceedings 732, CFI Rizal, 13 June 1966.
44 Interview with an officer ofthe Bureau of Lands, 5 August 1998.
45An annotation on the title of property that notifies that said property is in litigation and serves 
as a warning that anyone who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk.
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defending your title in court. This cost can delay land im provements or 
delivery of urban lands since permission to develop land cannot proceed when 
titles are spurious or doubtful. Developers would not also w ant to proceed with 
land developm ent if titles are not "clean" since this will create a w rong signal to 
prospective buyers.
On the other hand, there are efforts being undertaken by governm ent and 
the private sector to minimize this cost. For instance, developers through their 
professional organizations have linked up  w ith the LRA to form a Task Force 
on Land Title Verification to facilitate verification of titles. Also, these 
organizations conduct seminars to train representatives of real estate 
companies on detecting fake titles. On the governm ent side, the 
com puterization and microfilming of Torrens titles have been set up  to facilitate 
and protect land records from pilferage. The Bureau of Lands is also in the 
process of m aking an inventory of the existing survey records w ith the 
government. Those records that will not be included in the inventory list will be 
considered unofficial and thus will not be recognized as a legal basis for land 
surveys. The effects of all these moves on the land market, however, are still to 
be seen.
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CHAPTER 4
The Land Development Control Process: 
Permits, Licenses and Planning Strategies
Conversion of raw land into developed land entails the building or rebuilding of relatively perm anent structures over land. This process is 
governed by planning regulations that require land developm ent activities 
to conform to certain standards. Governm ent intervention in economic 
process is nothing new. Such intervention is norm ally justified by the 
Pigovian welfare economic thesis of m arket failure, notably "externalities" 
and by extension, "public goods."1 A recent view regarded such 
intervention as a m eans to establish or dim inish property rights by the 
state.2
There are varied tools by w hich governm ent intervenes in land 
developm ent activities or projects of the private sector. The more common 
tools include zoning and subdivision regulations, environm ental controls, 
building regulations or buyer's protection laws. These tools are 
im plem ented in a developm ent control process that basically safeguards the 
intent of planning regulations. Through this process, the landow ner or land 
user is required to apply for an intended change in use, intensity of 
development, variation in the extension, scale of development, land 
subdivision and sale of land developments. Also, developm ent controls 
usually provide that no diggings or excavation over land can be started 
w ithout governm ent perm ission or authorization.
The developm ent control process in the countiy has undergone 
significant changes over the years. As early as the Spanish colonial 
governm ent ideas for tow n planning w ere already codified in various 
ordinances. These laws provided guidelines for site selection, layout and 
dim ensions of squares, streets, etc, and the m ain phases of planning and 
construction. U nder the American period, tow n planning was more
1 Externalities are the external forces, external benefits, external costs resulting from 
production or consumption activities. Public goods (e.g. roads) are considered externalities 
because these goods are consumed but not directly paid, fully or overtly by consumers.
2 Government forward planning or development controls are tools that can either establish 
exclusive property rights or to attenuate initial assignments of rights over land. This recent 
view is cited in L. Wai-chung Lai (1996). Zoning and Property Rights: A Hong Kong Case 
Study. Hong Kong University Press.
localized. The Americans did not develop a "m aster plan" but individual 
tow n plans w ere prepared for specific cities. While tow n planning was 
formalized early in the country, it took time before the w ider perspective of 
tow n planning gained institutional foothold. Between 1930 and the early 
postw ar years, tow n planning w as given legal status. National and local 
planning boards were set up. These commissions, however, lacked 
substance, as the plans that w ere drafted did not m aterialized.3 In the 1970s, 
governm ent adopted interventionist policies that called for m ore planning. 
This move resulted in the institutionalization of a com prehensive 
developm ent control process in  the country. In the 1990s, governm ent 
switched to m arket-oriented and decentralization policies that m eant less 
planning and greater private sector participation. The com prehensive 
developm ent control process was retained bu t substantial changes in its 
im plem entation were undertaken. In particular, tow n planning became 
more "participative" and locally oriented. However, the land developm ent 
control process became more complicated.
This chapter presents the legal and adm inistrative fram ework of the 
land developm ent control process in the countiy. The discussion starts w ith 
a review of governm ent strategies on tow n planning from the colonial 
period to the present. The review is divided into six time periods (i.e. 16th 
century to 1935; 1935-1950; 1950-72; 1972-86; 1986-92; 1992-98) representing 
notable changes in the legislation and adm inistration of tow n planning. The 
next section highlights the procedures and requirem ents of obtaining 
perm its and licenses for planning permission. In the last section, the 
problem s of perm itting and licensing are discussed. In particular, the 
discussion points to the institutional gaps in the legislation and 
adm inistration of the developm ent control process. The chapter ends w ith 
some concluding rem arks on planning controls as it relates to urban 
developm ent and land and real estate m arket in Metro Manila.
4.1 G overnm ent U rban P lanning Strategies
Colonial Period (16th cen tu ry  to 1935)
This period encompasses tow n planning under the Spanish and American 
colonial governm ent in the countiy. Town planning ideas under both 
adm inistrations focused mainly on the physical make-up of towns and 
cities. These ideas were initially im printed in the City of Manila, which was 
the seat of governm ent during the colonial period.
In particular, the Spaniards m ade the City of Manila the colonial capital 
iii 1595. W ithin two years, the Spanish governm ent evolved ideas for tow n
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3 R.B. Ocampo (1992). Planning and Development of Prewar Manila. Philippine Journal o f 
Public Administration, 36(4), p.322.
planning prim arily based on Italian Renaissance theorists that em phasized 
the plaza complex in city developm ent.4 The idea of tow n planning was 
codified in ordinances prom ulgated by King Philip II w hereby guidelines 
for site selection, layout and dim ensions of squares and streets and other 
land uses w ere provided. These ordinances also prescribed the appropriate 
Spanish relations w ith  the natives in the tow n plans and processes. 
However, w hile m ain public areas in Manila and other towns adhered to 
the "plaza complex," the tow n planning guidelines w ere not followed in all 
instances.5 There were other factors that influenced the form ation of urban 
settlements. First, the suburban sectors w ere never subjected to integrated 
formal planning. The Spanish governm ent also left subdivisions beyond the 
"mairi plaza" (or governm ent area) to the local councils w ho w ere more 
concerned w ith  their ow n grandeur rather than of housing or settlem ent of 
the locals. In time these suburban towns that consisted of racially and 
occupationally diverse population simply grew together to form the larger 
part of the city of Manila. Second, the Spanish friars w ho were provided vast 
tracts of lands became "m asters of the city" preferring to bring the locals 
under their fold even at the expense of the guidelines set in tow n planning. 
And third, the city's developm ent w as periodically interrupted by civil 
uprisings and the British attacked w hich left m any developm ent projects 
unfinished. Frequent rebuilding was also required.
W hen Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States in the late 19th 
century, Manila was not an impressive city. Nevertheless, the Americans 
retained w hat Spain had built into the country's development. Unlike the 
Spaniards, the Americans did not develop a "m aster plan" as codified in 
King Philip II's edict on colonial tow n planning bu t rather based 
developm ents on architectural plans draw n up for specific areas. For 
instance, architectural plans w ere done for M anila and other chartered cities 
like Baguio, Cebu, Iloilo, etc. Famous American architects, w ho placed 
em phasis on developm ent of port facilities, clearly articulated road system, 
the high-rise architecture of the business core and the suburban zoning of 
residential and industrial buildings, prepared these plans.
The im plem entation of these architectural plans gradually 
institutionalized tow n planning in the countiy. P lanning and 
im plem entation of governm ent projects w ere basically a central governm ent
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4 According to the Italian Renaissance theorists, the ideal city “should have open squares 
where children might play and where nurses might set a competitive standard of 
cleanliness... At the center of the city, the municipal buildings were to overlook the plaza. 
Throughout all streets and squares, a uniform style was to govern all construction; streets 
were to be one width; cornices and moldings were to be continuous and uniform; and the 
town has to spread in a symmetrical manner to the plaza." M.R. Hollnsteiner (1969). The 
Urbanization of Metro Manila. Paper Presented in the Foundations of Filipino Society, 
Research Foundation in Philippine Anthropology and Archaeology, Makati.
5 R.B.Ocampo, Planning and Development, p.309.
undertaking. Town plans for specific cities were prepared at the Division of 
Architecture of the Bureau of Public Works. The im plem entation of these 
plans w as also under the supervision of the central government. However, 
to facilitate the execution of plans, a city or tow n w as provided a board of 
three members appointed by the Governor General and an advisory body 
com posed of representatives from different city or tow n districts. The board 
and its advisory body served as the linked between the national and local 
governments. In the 1920s, the position of the City Engineer was created. 
The City Engineers played a prom inent role in city governance as ex-officio 
board member. They were the key persons that usually pushed for the 
approval of projects through local councils. However, their m ost im portant 
contribution in tow n planning w as to incorporate land developm ent and 
building standards in their respective city plans. While architects placed 
greater em phasis on aesthetics, the engineers w ere concerned w ith 
sanitation, housing and social development. These concerns resulted in the 
form ulation of building codes, subdivision regulations and city maps. 
Zoning plans for cities w ere prepared in 1929, however, nothing came out of 
these plans due to opposition from the real estate sector and other interests.6 
Town planning has gone a long w ay in terms of formalization under the 
American regime, however, its institutionalization was still at infancy stage.
C om m onw ealth  and  Early Postw ar Period, 1935-50
The Com m onw ealth governm ent was inaugurated in 1935. Under this 
regime, Filipinos w ere allowed to rule the Philippines although the 
governm ent was still largely under the influence of the United States. Town 
planning as introduced by the Americans continued to be adopted. An 
attem pt in the early years of the Com m onwealth was m ade to decentralize 
planning to the local governm ents bu t this move was short-lived. Although 
local planning commissions w ere already created in specific areas, the 
planning job gravitated back to the D epartm ent of Public W orks.7
Town planning experienced even greater centralization tow ard the 
1940s. The Office of the Com m onwealth President became involved in city 
planning. This started w ith the hiring of a foreign expert w ho prepared 
reconstruction plans for Manila. By 1945, a City Planning Office under the 
Office of the President was created and headed by an American architect. 
The Office prepared a m etropolitan thoroughfare plan and a dow ntow n 
Manila plan. However, it was not clear w hat happened to these plans.
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7 The local planning commission consisted of the Provincial Governor, district engineer and 
other local officials. This commission was specifically tasked to do surveys and submit 
plans to the Director of Public Works. Ibid.
The next few years of postw ar period saw rapid reorganization of the 
City Planning Office. In 1946, the City Planning Office was converted into a 
National Urban Planning Commission tasked to undertake urban planning 
in the country. A Real Property Board w as also created in 1947 to assist the 
Commission. In 1948, another Planning Commission (i.e. Capital City 
Planning Commission) was created specifically to look into the 
developm ent of Quezon City as the "new " capital city site and governm ent 
center.8 However, in 1950, these three agencies were abolished and replaced 
by a single office, the National Planning Comm ission (NPC) created under 
the office of the President (E.O. 367,1950).
Like the prew ar Bureau of Public Works Division of Architecture, the 
NPC prepared and adm inistered plans in urban and regional areas. It was 
also given powers over zoning, subdivision and building regulations. The 
NPC though concentrated in  rehabilitating M anila and other chartered cities 
that were devastated during the Pacific War. Urban planning as in the 
colonial era involved draw ing up m aster plans and reconstruction plans of 
major urban cities specifically M anila and Quezon City.
Early Years o f  P hilippine Political Independence, 1950-1972  
The Americans granted the Philippines political independence in 1946. The 
early efforts of the Philippine Republic were tow ard political and 
adm inistrative decentralization. A lthough decentralization started around 
the 1950s, efforts to institutionalize began at a later period. The first local 
autonom y act w as passed only in  1959. This Act vested in  the city and 
m unicipal governm ents greater fiscal, planning and regulatory powers 
(Republic Act 2264). In particular, it gave the cities and municipalities 
powers to adopt zoning and planning ordinances. In the 1960s, the local 
autonom y act was supported by efforts to deconcentrate functions of 
national agencies to regional offices. For instance, the deconcentration of 
regional planning was undertaken through the creation of regional 
planning boards.9 These moves devolved various functions of the NPC to 
local governm ents and the regional planning boards. The NPC rem ained 
the main planning agency, however, its powers over zoning, subdivision 
and building regulations w ere devolved to city and municipal governments.
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8 In 1940, President Quezon directed the NPC to select a new government center because 
Manila was getting too crowded. In 1948, under the administration of President Osmeña, 
Quezon City was chosen as the new government center and capital site.
9 Examples were the following: (1) Mindanao Development Authority (1961); (2) Central 
Luzon and Cagayan Valley Authority (1961); (3) Hundred Islands Conservation and 
Development Authority (1963); (4) Mountain Province Development Authority (1964); (5) 
Mindoro Development Board (1965); (6) Panay Development Authority (1964); (7) Bicol 
Development Company (1965); (8) Laguna Lake Development Authority (1966).
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The NPC "largely kept out of local planning unless asked by the local 
governm ent."10
While the organization for urban planning w as decentralized, the 
problem was that formal guidelines w ith regard to planning, zoning and 
subdivision were slow to evolve. M any cities and municipalities had no 
planning experts and relied m ainly on the NPC, w hich was also very slow 
in evolving com prehensive planning guidelines. Thus, m ost towns or cities 
except those governed by the regional boards had no t come up w ith 
com prehensive tow n plans. Their "planning" w ere basically limited to 
effecting building standards as contained in the National Building Code 
(RA 6541).
Zoning and subdivision regulations w ere mainly private sector 
undertakings. During this period, subdivision developm ents had started in 
different areas of Metro Manila, h i particular, the Ayala family who 
developed in the 1950s a 900-hectare land in M akati into a central business 
and commercial district popularized these developments. The Ayalas 
im posed their ow n subdivision zoning restriction w ith  regard to 
commercial and residential developm ents in the area. Succeeding 
residential subdivisions followed similar type of zoning restriction.
M artin i Laxo Years, 1972-86
President Marcos im posed M artial Law in 1972. U nder this law, political 
decentralization suffered a setback w ith the concentration of decision­
making powers in the hands of Marcos. Marcos abolished the Congress and 
suspended national and local elections arrogating unto him self the pow er of 
a dictator. The centralization approach was specifically felt in town 
planning, which was placed under the adm inistration of the M inistry of 
H um an Settlements created in 1978 w ith Marcos' wife, Imelda as head .11 
While regional developm ent councils and other local governm ent 
organizations w ere created as avenues for consultative dialogues, the 
powers over zoning, subdivision and building regulations w ere taken from 
the local governm ents and transferred to the Ministry. These pow ers were 
specifically provided to the H um an Settlement Regulatory Commission 
(HSRC), w hich was later reorganized into the H ousing Land Use 
Regulatory Board (HLURB).
In particular, Metro Manila w as a creation of the centralization attem pts 
during this period. Prior to the creation of the Metro Manila region in 1975, 
Manila referred m ainly to the City of Manila. The suburban areas
10 Philippine Government (1965). Request to the United Nations Special Fund for Technical 
Cooperation in the Establishment of an Institute of Planning, Manila. June 1965.
11 The centralization process in land use planning was actually started in 1976 with the 
creation of the Human Settlements Commission. The Commission was later elevated to 
the status of a Ministry in 1978.
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surrounding the City of Manila were part of the province of Rizal. Previous 
attem pts to integrate Manila and the suburbs into one m etropolitan region 
did not succeed due to opposition from the m unicipal politicians and the 
governor of Rizal Province.12 However, under the m artial law regime, 
Marcos succeeded in integrating the City of Manila and 16 local 
governm ents into a Metro Manila region (PD 824 of 1975). Marcos also 
succeeded in placing the 17 municipalities under a central government. A 
m etropolitan council headed by a governor then ruled metro Manila.
The Marcos adm inistration also coincided w ith the period w hen the 
W orld Bank stim ulated interventionist policies in developing economies. 
Marcos and his technocrats m oved in the direction of these policies, which 
resulted in more planning. In particular, tow n planning was strengthened 
and broadened to include the entire range of land use m anagem ent and 
development.
The initial attem pt of the Marcos adm inistration to regulate land use 
was m ade w ith the am endm ent of the agrarian reform law in 1972!3 This 
law placed limits on ow nership of rice and corn lands and im posed 
restrictions on the conversion of rice and corn lands to non-agricultural
uses.14
In 1976, President Marcos decreed a national urban planning program  in 
the country. This resulted in the establishm ent of a com prehensive land 
developm ent control process whereby changes in land uses and building of 
structures on land had to pass through a system of perm its and licensing. 
This system also redefined the em phasis of the anti-conversion law (PD 815) 
from one prim arily concerned w ith  the welfare of tenants or lessees to that 
of land use m anagem ent. Thus, part of the responsibility for guiding land 
use conversion w as devolved to the HSRC.
In particular, planning regulations w ere undertaken through the 
following measures:
1. Land Use Control: All cities and municipalities in the countiy  were 
required to provide com prehensive land use and zoning plans in their 
specific localities. Comprehensive zoning plans w ere first com pleted in 
Metro Manila. Each local governm ent unit w as divided into m any zoning 
districts. The boundaries of said districts were show n by centerlines of
12 Caoili, M.A. (1988). The Origins of Metropolitan Manila: A Political and Social Analysis. 
Manila: New Day Publishers, p. 136-160.
13 The agrarian reform law in 1963 (RA 3844) was enacted primarily to abolish tenancy in the 
country. The 1972 amendment of the agrarian reform law (PD 27) provided the limits on 
ownership not only on public lands that will be alienated but also on privately owned lands.
14 The law preventing conversion of rice and corn lands was enacted in October 1975 
through Presidential Decree 815. This law was primarily a response to the practice of 
some big landowners who convert their lands into non-agriculture or into production of 
other crops to avoid the application of land reform laws on their land. The rationale of this 
law was to protect tenants and lessees from unlawful ejectment.
streets or highw ays or "rights of way" lines. For each district, a pattern of 
land use is provided (see Box 4.1).
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Box 4.1 
Pattern of Land Use
R1
R 2
R3
Low Intensity Residential Zone: Characterized mainly by single family, single detached dwellings 
Medium Intensity Residential Zone: Characterized mainly by medium density housing like low and 
medium rise, multiple family dwellings on limited scale.
High Intensity Residential Zone: Characterized by mixed housing types and high density housing, like 
high-rise buildings.
C1 Low Intensity Commercial Zone: Permits all uses under R1, R2, and R3.
Medium Intensity Commercial Zone: Characterized by commercial development which is a mixture of 
C2 retail and wholesale trade and may contain the service and entertainment industries (e.g. restaurants, 
shopping centers).
Heavy Intensity Commercial Zone: Characterized by heavy commercial developments usually trade, 
service, and entertainment on a metropolitan (regional) scale of operations.
Light Industrial Zone: Covers those industries that are classified as non-pollutive but may or may not 
be hazardous.
Medium Industrial Zones: Covers those industries classified as pollutive but may or may not be 
hazardous.
13 Heavy Industrial Zone: Cover those industries classified as highly pollutive and hazardous.
Special Districts
A1 Agro-industrial District: Area devoted to industrial uses that are agriculturally derived.
Government Center: Area devoted to national and regional government office, structures and 
institutions.
Agricultural District: Area with prime agricultural lands where activities are restricted to agriculture and 
compatible uses (e.g.milling).
C Cultural District: Area reserved for culture institutions like galleries, museums, and cultural center.
Planned Unit Development: Refers to land development projects that allow planned land uses mixes 
designed to enhance environment rather than result in deterioration.
AZ Airport Zone: a self-contained unit specifically devoted for airport terminals and related facilities.
C3
11
I2
GC
AGR
PUD
S o u rce : Hum an S ettlem ents  R egu la tory C om m ission. M etro M anila Zoning O rd inance, R esolu tion 
N um ber 81-01.
Land use zones w ere given identity labels such as "R" for residential, 
"C" for commercial and "I" for industrial. Each category was further 
subdivided as to density controls and height restrictions. Low intensity 
residential uses characterized by single detached dwellings were zoned 
differently from those residential areas characterized by high-rise buildings. 
Also, industries w ere further subdivided based on pollution levels. Land 
use zones w ere spatially arranged to prevent uses considered incompatible 
from interfering w ith each other. For instance, areas zoned for industrial 
uses w ere located in areas outside of residential zones.
2. Subdivision D evelopment Approval: Planning perm ission required 
conformity not only w ith land use but also w ith the physical and legal 
standards of property subdivision and sale. There were two laws decreed to 
set m inim um  design standards for land developments. First, the
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Subdivision and Condom inium  Buyers Protective Decree (PD 957 of 1976) 
which provided standards on roads, drainage, sewerage, w ater systems, 
lighting systems, etc. for subdivision or condom inium  projects. In addition, 
developers w ere to register and obtain a license to sell for the project. 
Second, the Rules and Standards for Economic and Socialized H ousing 
Projects (Batas Pambansa (BP) 220 of 1982) w hich defined the standards for 
low cost housing developm ents (i.e. house and lot w orth not more than 
P375,000).
3. Building Permit: Building regulations were adopted in the 1950s w ith 
the enactm ent of the National Building Code (RA 6541) revised in 1978 (PD 
1096). This Code provided m inim um  standards relating to structural, 
plum bing and sanitary, electrical, mechanical and fire protection of 
proposed building plans. The local governm ents w ere tasked to verify and 
approved building plans based on the standards of the Building Code.
4. Environmental Control: The Philippine Environm ental Policy was 
decreed in 1977 through the creation of the N ational Environm ent 
Protection Council (NEPC). In 1978, the Environm ental Im pact Statem ent 
(EIS) System was established (PD 1586) w hich required all environm entally 
critical projects and projects in environm entally critical areas to subm it to 
the EIS. The EIS provided the guidelines to determ ine quality standards for 
air, w ater and land use. It also required m onitoring of land developm ent 
projects of both private and public entities w ith  regard to their effects on the 
environm ent.
U rban planning specifically land use m anagem ent under the Marcos 
adm inistration w ere im plem ented through a centralized system of 
governance. Metro M anila w as placed under the adm inistration of the 
Metro M anila Comm ission (MMC) w hich was the central governm ent of 
Metro Manila. Land use plans for the 17 m unicipalities and cities 
com prising Metro Manila was regulated by the MMC. Besides the MMC, 
the HSRC (now HLURB) w as created as the central planning and regulatory 
agency for land use and subdivision development. P lanning perm ission was 
essentially provided by the HLURB. In addition, the agency w as given 
judicial authority over disputes arising from real estate trade and business.
Democratic Restoration Period, 1986-92
The February 1986 political revolution m arked the downfall of President 
Marcos and the assum ption of Corazon Aquino to the presidency of the 
Philippines. In particular, President Aquino restored democratic institutions 
in the country. This restoration was done initially through the ratification of 
a new Constitution in 1987 that basically institutionalized political 
decentralization in the country. The Constitution, for the first time, 
recognized regional levels of governm ent (i.e. provincial and national) and
identified as areas of political decentralization, provinces, cities, 
municipalities and barangays.
Political centralization was further supported by a local government 
code that was enacted into law in 1991. This Code vested upon the political 
subdivisions the powers to raise revenues and are entitled to a set of local 
officials including a legislative body. Such provisions provided local 
governments greater authority in the management of local affairs, which 
brought about important changes on the decision-making process at the 
local level. In particular, the Code had a major impact on land use 
management and urban planning. For one, the local governments were 
given the authority to reclassify alienable and disposable lands.15 Second, 
specific functions of the H LU R B  were devolved to the local authorities, to 
wit: (1) the issuance of locational clearances for locally significant projects; 
(2) the approval and monitoring of subdivision plans and development 
plans of housing projects; and (3) the formulation and updating of 
comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs). These functions provided the local 
governments powers over the approval or rejection of development projects 
in their respective jurisdiction.
hi Metro Manila, decentralization was put into effect even prior to the 
1991 local government code w ith the streamlining of the Metro Manila 
Commission. The Commission was given a "floating" status from 1986 to 
1992. In 1992, before the end of President Aquino's term, the M M C was 
reorganized into the Metro Manila Development Authority (M M D A ) whose 
prim ary responsibility was limited to coordinating the delivery of "metro- 
w ide" services16 w ithin Metro Manila. The planning, taxing, regulatory and 
implementing powers of the previous M M C were transferred to each of the 
17 local government units comprising Metro Manila.
The Aquino administration also scaled down interventionist policy and 
moved to market-oriented policy. Social reform programs aimed to reduce 
wealth and income disparities among households specifically supported 
market policies. A major program that had important impact on urban 
planning was the comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP). The 
C A RP was implemented in 1988 subjecting all agricultural lands (i.e. not 
limited to rice and corn) to the agrarian reform law .17 The rationale of the
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15 The area allowable for reclassification is a percentage of the municipality’s total land area. 
The percentage varies (ranges from 5-15%) depending on the economic status of the 
municipality. Reclassification in excess ofthe limits may be allowed subject to the approval 
of the President upon recommendation of NEDA. 1991 Local Government Code. Rules 
and Regulations.
16 These are services considered “metropolitan” in character such as traffic management, 
waste management, flood control and metropolitan planning.
17 Excluded under this law are agricultural lands devoted to fisheries and aquaculture as well 
as poultry and livestocks.
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program was not only to abolish tenancy and lim it ownership size of 
agricultural lands but more importantly to create a deeper commitment for 
the preservation and conservation of agricultural land. Urban planning and 
land use management thus became linked to the broader objective of 
national food security. This linkage brought about important impact on 
urban planning specifically in the implementation of the development 
control process.
In particular, the C A RP provided "blanket authority" to the Department 
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in evaluating and approving land conversions. 
Prior to CARP, D A R  allowed conversions subject to studies on zoning by 
the H LU RB. The H LU R B  was empowered to issue the rules and regulations 
to ensure compliance w ith policies, plans, standards and guidelines on 
human settlement including zoning. Under CARP, agricultural lands that 
were intended for non-agricultural purposes had to go through a 
conversion approval process. The D A R was provided the "exclusive authority 
to approve or disapprove applications for conversion of agricultural lands into non- 
agricultural uses" (Executive Order No.l29-A). Local government units were 
to work w ith the D A R in matters concerning land conversions.
The C A RP also resulted in different categories of agricultural lands. 
Agricultural lands were further classified into prime and non-prime lands 
and into tenanted or untenanted lands. These classifications were made to 
determine which agricultural lands could be converted into non- 
agricultural use or would require conversion approval. In particular, the 
land conversion law under C A RP prohibited the conversion of prime 
agricultural lands.18 The law also identified untenanted lands that required 
no conversion approval from the DAR. These lands included the following:
1. Lands of less than fifty hectares without tenants and/or farm 
workers and located w ithin the non-agricultural zones of land use 
plans approved by the H LU RB;
2. Lands outside the non-agricultural zones in approved Town Plans 
provided there are no tenants or farm workers and are intended as a 
government project or joint-venture government private sector 
project;
3. Lands in areas without Town Plans provided there are no tenants or 
farm workers and are intended as a government project or a joint 
venture government-project.
In 1992, the government passed another social reform policy that also 
had direct impact on the land development control process. In particular, 
Republic Act 7279 or the Urban Development and Housing Act (U D H A )
18 Administrative Order 15 (1988). Similar intent was stated in lieu of the land reform law of 
1972 whereby Presidential Decree 815 series of 1975 was issued to prevent the 
conversion of rice and corn land into any non-agricultural use or into the production of any 
other crop.
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was enacted w ith the objective of rationalizing the use and development of 
urban land. An important provision of the Act was to require local 
governments to review and update their land use plans. Many 
municipalities had no existing town plans or had town plans that were not 
updated since the 1980s. A  rationalized town plan was necessary as relevant 
basis for the approval of development projects.
Another important provision of the U D H A  was to institutionalize 
private sector participation in socialized housing. This law mandated 
developers of non-socialized subdivision projects to provide socialized 
housing developments equivalent to at least 20% of total subdivision area or 
project cost. Compliance w ith this provision became a prerequisite for the 
issuance of development permits and/or licenses to sell.
Constitutional Democracy, 1992-98
The period 1992-1998 was a government based prim arily on the 1987 
Constitution. President Ramos who was Aquino's "anointed" won the 1992 
presidential election and thus became the first president to implement the 
gains of democratic reforms. Ramos adopted the major policies decreed by 
the Aquino regime, however, he implemented these policies toward greater 
market orientation. The major thrust of the Ramos government was for the 
countiy to reach NIC-hood status by the turn of the century (2000). 
Industrialization had to be fast-tracked and this thrust im plicitly viewed 
land conversion to be inevitable. It was under the Ramos regime that 
various "growth centers" sprouted in different parts of the countiy. For 
instance, the growth triangles and quadrangles, the ecotourism areas, the 
ecozones, the people's industrial estates (PIEs) and the regional agro­
industrial centers (RA IC S ) ! 9 The C A LA BA RZO N  Project in particular was 
considered the showcase of the Ramos industrialization program. In these 
"growth centers" urbanization and industrialization were the primary 
strategy and thus the application of land conversion rules was more lax. 
There were cases when agricultural productivity was sacrifice in lieu of 
industrialization.20
The Ramos administration provided greater flexibility in the land 
conversion rules. Administrative Order 12 of 1994, which consolidated all 
revised rules and procedures governing conversion of agricultural lands to
19 Examples include Northern Luzon Quad, Baguio-La Trinidad Zone, Panay-Negros Growth 
Pole, North Coast Agri-Industrial Corridor, SOCSARGEN, Batangas RAIC, etc. Although 
not all centers were operationalized during the Ramos administration, these areas 
provided the potential for land conversion. NEDA. Long-term National Spatial Development 
Vision and Strategy, 1996-2025, Draft Report. 31 October 1995.
20 For instance, the DTI identified approximately 10,547 hectares of prime agricultural land 
that would be converted into one of these RICS. D.A.Sermeno (1994). The Folly of Land 
Conversion, INTERSECT, 9 (July). Manila:lnstitute on Church and Social Issues, p.8-9.
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non-agricultural uses provided different categorization of agricultural lands 
and of obtaining land conversion approval.
Land conversion applications were categorized as follows:
1. Exemption: Agricultural lands classified or zoned as non-agricultural 
based on Town Plans approved by the H LU R B  before 15 June 1988 
shall be exempted from the land conversion approval process 
(defined in AO  6 series of 1994).21
2. Exclusion: Excluded under the C A RP coverage are the following: (1) 
agricultural lands directly and exclusively used and found to be 
necessary for parks, w ildlife, school sites, experimental farm 
stations, etc. (AO  13 series of 1990 and Section 10 of C A RP Law); 
and (2) agricultural lands devoted to poultry, swine or livestock 
raising as of 15 June 1988.
3. Conversion: The conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural 
use or purpose may be allowed under the following conditions (AO  
12):
a. Agricultural lands reclassified as non-agricultural lands in the 
new or revised town plans promulgated by the local government 
unit and approved by the H LU R B  or by the sangguniang bayan 
(i.e. local legislative body) after 15 June 1988.
b. If the land falls w ithin the agricultural zone, conversion is 
allowed when (i) the land ceases to be economically feasible and 
sound for agricultural purposes as certified by the Regional 
Director of the Department of Agriculture; or (ii) the locality has 
become highly urbanized and the land w ill have greater 
economic value for residential, commercial or industrial 
purposes as certified by the local government unit.
c. If the city or municipality does not have a comprehensive 
development plan and zoning ordinances approved by the 
H LU R B  or Sanggunian, but the dominant use in the area is no 
longer agricultural or if the proposed use is similar to or 
compatible w ith the dominant use of the surrounding areas as 
determined by the DAR, conversion may be possible.
d. Agricultural lands w ithin the selected regional agro-industrial 
centers, tourism development areas and sites for socialized 
housing.22
21 This excludes tenanted rice and corn lands that were under the agrarian land reform of 
1972 (Presidential Decree 27).
22 Starting the 1990s, government has been identifying growth areas or centers based on 
their potential for industrial, tourism development and recently for socialized housing 
(UDHA). DAR undertakes the processing of conversion within these areas in coordination 
with the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) (Memo Circular N o.1 series o f
1990 and Executive Order No. 124 series o f 1993 o fthe  Office o fthe  President).
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Agricultural lands were also reclassified based on their negotiability to 
land conversion. "Nonnegotiable" lands, which are contained in the 
Department of Agriculture's (DA 's) charter on the Network of Protected 
Areas for Agriculture (N PA A ) included the following:23
1. National Integrated Protected Areas (N IPA S), viz. lands reserved for 
agricultural activities including watersheds, aquifers and areas 
identified environmentally critical by the DENR.
2. Agricultural lands where irrigation is currently available or w ithin 
the areas programmed for irrigation facility rehabilitation by the 
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the National Irrigation 
Authority (N IA ).
3. Agricultural lands w ith irrigation facilities operated by private 
organizations.
4. Agro-industrial croplands
5. Highlands located in elevations of 500 meters or above w ith 
potential for growing semi-temperate and high value crops.
The DA's charter on N PA A  also developed a classification whereby 
land categories were grouped according to the level of restriction. Three 
levels of restriction were recognized and defined as follows:
1. Highly restricted. These lands include the irrigated paddy/terrace 
ricelands; rainfed paddy ricelands; efficient diversified croplands 
and agro-industrial lands located on level to nearly level alluvial 
plains; gently sloping/ terrace lands and the highlands presently 
planted to or have potential for the production of high value semi- 
temperate crops.
2. Moderately restricted. These are the moderately efficient lands within 
8-18% slope presently planted to agricultural crops. These also 
include idle and/or underutilized lands, mostly grasslands and 
shrublands and existing and developed pasturelands.
3. Conditionally Restricted. These include grasslands/shrublands within 
30% slope and pasturelands above 18 percent slope.
The further reclassification of agricultural lands and conversion brings 
land use policy into a sharper focus and considers potential conflicts on 
land use. However, the protection of agriculturally productive lands 
remained conditional. Although the N PA A  areas have been identified, the 
restriction on conversion of these lands is being diluted by the 
reclassification of farmlands into highly, moderately and conditionally 
restricted depending on soil fertility, availability of infrastructure and the 
land's location. Moreover, while the Bureau of Soil and Water Management 
(BSW M ) has already identified the protected areas for agriculture in zoning
23 Under AO 12 only Nos. 2&3 were identified as “nonnegotiable” lands. The list was later 
expanded under AO 7 of 1997.
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maps of municipalities, an initial assessment of these maps revealed 
limitations in the protection of the N PA A . For instance, in the zoning map 
in Laguna, a study24 noted that only a narrow portion of Laguna was 
classified as highly restricted from conversion while a larger portion was 
merely conditionally restricted. This was found not to be representative of 
the quality of soil in Laguna, which is largely alluvial, irrigated or irrigable. 
The study concludes that if the principles behind the preservation of 
agricultural lands have been followed, Laguna should have been largely 
marked as highly restricted from conversion.
4.2 Procedure for Planning Approval
The development control process subjects land developments into a 
permit and licensing system. Permits and licenses are secured depending on 
the purpose for which projects are undertaken. Housing projects of the 
N H A  (except joint ventures) are regulated w ithin N H A  itself and do not 
need to obtain permits from the local government or H LU R B .25 On the other 
hand, land developments undertaken by the private sector for own use or 
for lease purposes have only to secure building permits and locational 
clearance. Those land developments undertaken by the private sector for 
sale26 to the public go through an intensive planning approval process. 
Permits and licenses other than the building permit have to be secured. In 
particular, projects requiring conversion clearance require the most tedious 
permit and licensing approval system.
The three major permits that had to be secured under the development 
control process are the following:
1. Development Permit. This refers to permission granted w ith regard to 
compliance w ith subdivision standards and regulations based on the 
criteria provided under PD957 for subdivision and condominium 
developments or BP220 for socialized housing developments.
24 V.Ladlad (1997). NPAA’s Land Use Zoning Map in Laguna. In Land Conversions: 
Highlighting Land Use Conflicts between Housing and Agriculture. A Paper for the 
Conference-Workshop on Poverty and the Environment. Philippine Peasant Institute, p. 5.
25 In the first two years of implementation of PD 957, NHA had the authority to regulate the 
real estate trade and business in the country (PD 957, 1976). This authority was 
transferred to the HSRC (now HLURB) upon its creation in 1978. However, NHA was 
provided the privilege of not seeking development approval from the HLURB. This privilege 
was only for NHA projects. Not covered are joint venture projects of NHA with the private 
sector. However, NHA generally provided technical assistance to its joint venture projects 
to facilitate the issuance of permits and licenses.
26 Sale refers to every disposition or attempt to dispose a subdivision lot including the 
building and other improvements. This may be undertaken under a “contract to sell,” a 
contract of purchase, an exchange, an attempt to sell, an option of sale or purchase, a 
solicitation of sale, an offerto sell (PD 957, Section 2).
2. Building Permit. This permit refers to compliance w ith the National 
Building Code of the countiy. It gives the applicant the "go-signal" 
for construction activities to start.
3. License (or Permit) to Sell. This permit provides the owner of property 
the authority to sell any subdivision lot or condominium unit that 
result from a land development process.27 This license is acquired 
after the development and building permits have been issued.
The development control process has been administered under different 
governance structures. The period from the 1970s to 1992 represents a 
centralized and interventionist regime. Although the C A RP was enacted in 
1988, its implementing rules and guidelines were set forth in the later part 
of 1989. The substantial changes in the procedure for conversion and the 
whole planning approval process came after the implementation of the 1991 
local government code. The code was decreed in 1991 but the devolution of 
functions and powers to the local government units was put into effect in 
1992. The period from 1992 to 1998, thus, represents the decentralized and 
market oriented policies of government. The development control process 
under these two governance structures has resulted in a different set of 
procedures and requirements including level of complexity and time 
requirement.
Centralized and Interventionist Period, 1980-1992
Prior to the 1991 local government code, the H LU R B  had the exclusive 
jurisdiction over the issuance of development permits and license to sell 
(Figure 4.1). The H LU R B  was provided the following powers; (1) the 
promulgation of zoning and other land use control standards and 
guidelines to govern land use plans and zoning ordinances of local 
governments; and (2) to review, evaluate and approve or disapprove 
comprehensive land use plans and zoning ordinances of local governments. 
The Board basically set the rules in the applications of locational clearance, 
development permits and license to sell. In  particular, in areas classified as 
APDs, sale transactions on land were also regulated by H LU R B .28
Local governments mainly provided the building permits and 
endorsements for the project. Locational clearance was approved by the 
H LU R B  based on M M C Zoning Ordinance 81-01 for projects located in the
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27 The license to sell is not required in case of sale or transfer of a subdivision lot by the 
original purchaser and other subsequent sale. It is also not needed in case a mortgagor 
sell property on account of bona fide debts. (PD 957, Sec 7).
28 In 1978, President Marcos decreed an Urban Land Reform Program that identified certain 
sites in Metro Manila as Areas for Priority Development (APDs). These APDs were 
squatter areas whereby land sales (i.e. price of land, buyers and sellers) were monitored 
and regulated by the government. The practice of identifying APDs was discontinued after 
the Marcos government.
N C R and the town plans for projects at the urban fringes. In cases when 
projects were non-conforming to the M M C zoning ordinance, the 
endorsement of the M M D A  was required (in the case of NCR) prior to 
approval by the H LU RB. For projects on agricultural lands locational 
clearances were approved based on the joint memorandum in 1977 between 
the H LU RB, D AR and the Department of Local Government and 
Community Development (D LG CD ).29 This memorandum provided some 
general criteria for converting lands and the procedures to follow in 
applying for conversion. H LU RB evaluated land conversion based on the 
criteria set forth in the joint memorandum.
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29 These agencies assumed specific roles with regard to land conversion. DAR had the 
authority to allow conversions subject to studies on zoning by HLURB (RA 3844, Land 
Reform of 1963). HLURB was empowered to issue rules and regulations to ensure 
compliance with policies, plans, standards and guidelines on human settlements including 
zoning. The local governments under the DLGCD were involved in the conduct of zoning 
studies and in implementing rules and procedures for converting agricultural lands.
Figure 4.1
Requirements for Permits and Licenses, 1980-1991
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The issuance of a development permit for socialized and economic 
housing was simplified as provided by BP 220. BP 220 provided an 
integrated approval system (IA S) that allowed H LU R B  to issue both 
building and development permits at the same time. This scheme simplified 
the process of planning permission since the review and approval process 
for land development and building permits were done by a single agency 
(i.e. one-stop shop processing). Endorsements and building permits from 
the local government units were also not necessary. The IA S  was not 
provided under PD  957.
W ith  an approved development permit, the applicant can file his or her 
application for a license to sell. A  license to sell is the registration of 
developed properties placed on the real estate market for sale. This license 
requires certifications from the utility companies (i.e. Meralco and LW U A ), 
performance bond; and copies of publication. Publication is needed to 
inform the public about the project and provide an opportunity for anyone 
to contest on legal grounds the ownership or development of the property. 
This has to be posted in two leading national newspapers for two 
consecutive weeks. For projects developed under BP220, only one week of 
publication is required.
A  license to sell can be approved prior to construction. The performance 
bond guarantees for the full development of the project. The amount of the 
bond varies depending on the extent of development undertaken. Thus, 
developers who have made substantial improvements on the land post 
lower bonds than those who have not started improvements on the land.
Decentralized and Market-Oriented Period, 1992-1998
Under the 1991 local government code, the LGUs were provided the role of a 
government planner. HLURB's authority to issue locational clearance and 
development permits for projects under PD957 and BP220 were devolved to local 
government units (EO 71 series of 1993). Specifically, the role of the HLURB was 
confined to the issuance of licenses to sell and locational clearances for "vital" projects 
identified by the NED A. Qn the other hand, the role of the local governments on 
urban planning was expanded. Aside from the devolved functions, the LGUs were 
provided powers to reclassify agricultural lands. They were also tasked to formulate 
their own comprehensive zoning and land use plans (CLUPs).
The administrative changes resulting from the local government code 
had not only reorganized the government offices that issued permits and 
licenses but also increased the number of permits and offices involved in the 
approval process (Figure 4.2). Under the new local government code, 
permits had to be obtained from the barangay level up to the mayor's office 
and the sanggunian bayan. Moreover, barangay, municipal, provincial and 
regional representatives of national agencies (e.g. DAR, DA, DENR, etc.) 
were also involved in the permitting and licensing system.
I
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Figure 4.2
Requirements for Permits and Licenses, 1992-1998
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The increase in the permits and licenses required for land development 
arose from the requirements imposed by the C A RP and U D H A  laws. For 
instance, compliance to the 20% socialized housing proviso under U D H A  
was a prerequisite to the issuance of a development permit.30 On the other 
hand, C A RP resulted in more certifications for the approval of land 
conversion applications. Unlike in the previous period when only rice and 
com lands were covered by the agrarian reform, C A RP necessitated the 
involvement of agencies such as the Sugar Regulatory Administration, the 
Philippine Coconut Authority, the Bureau of Soils, the National Irrigation 
Administration and the various organizations of agrarian reform 
beneficiaries.
Additional requirements also came from the stricter enforcement of 
environmental laws. The real estate boom of the 1990s resulted in an 
increased demand for non-agricultural lands that awakened the national 
concern for environmental protection. In the past, the issuance of an 
environmental permit was limited to environmentally critical projects (e.g. 
heavy industries, resource extractive industries, infrastructure) and projects 
(regardless of type) in environmentally critical areas (e.g. national parks, 
watersheds, tourist spots, land w ith critical slopes, prime agricultural lands, 
areas frequently visited by natural calamities; etc.). Since 1981, Metro 
M anila mid highly urbanized areas were declared environmentally critical 
particularly for projects involving high-rise structures. However, the local 
government and H LU R B  did not implement this law in the issuance of 
building and development permits. The view  of the local governments then 
was that environmental problems were mainly linked to industries. Land 
development specifically for human settlements were not conceived 
environmentally critical regardless of their location.
This view  apparently changed in the early 1990s when incidents of soil 
erosion from residential developments (e.g. Mount Makiling in Calamba, 
Laguna) prompted the government to require environmental protection 
laws on all types of land developments. These permits included the 
following:
1. Environmental clearance (EC). A  certification that the project is not 
hazardous or has no adverse effect to the environment. It is required 
for all types of land development whether high-rise or subdivision 
developments.
30 Compliance to UDHA is not restrictive. Compliance may be done through the following 
schemes. First, developers can register past socialized housing projects in any area 
provided that said projects have not been registered in the past. Second, development 
projects with a density of at least 100 units per hectare are considered to have complied 
with UDHA. For instance, a project with an area of 1200 square meter with a proposed 
number of saleable lots of 15 units has a density of 125 units per hectare (i.e. No. of 
units/Area). Subdivision projects with four units or less are excluded from coverage.
2. Environmental compliance certificate (ECC). This is a requirement for 
projects undertaken in zones that do not conform to the approved 
zoning ordinances of LG Us or in areas considered "environmentally 
critical" by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources 
(D EN R). The issuance of an ECC is based on systematic studies 
assessing the effects of a project on human health, 
biophysical/ecological, geophysical and socioeconomic aspects of 
the community.
The Environmental Management Bureau (EM B) under the D EN R was 
task to examine land development projects and issue environmental 
permits. The Bureau took over the environmental regulatory functions of 
the previous National Environmental Protection Council (N EPC ) which was 
established during the Marcos administration.
The requirements for the license to sell under this period are similar as 
the previous period. However, in the previous period, the issuance of a 
license to sell has been ministerial on the part of H LU R B  since the project 
has already been examined upon approval of the development permit. In 
the recent system, projects have to be re-examined by the H LU R B  since 
some local governments may issue development permits even without 
environmental clearance or compliance to UDH A. For instance, some LGUs 
render the task of evaluating compliance to U D H A  to H LU R B  (e.g. Quezon 
City). Moreover, most LGUs are in the process of familiarizing themselves 
w ith the technical aspects of subdivision approval. H LU R B  thus has to go 
through a review and reexamination process. It has to check whether the 
requirements have been completed and the standards for subdivision land 
development followed. When disagreements arise between H LU R B  and the 
LG U, the approval of the license to sell takes longer time.
For socialized housing land developments, the government has created 
a one-stop shop system for permits and licensing in lieu of the integrated 
approval system under BP220 (EO  184 series of 1994). Under this system, 
Socialized Housing One-Stop Processing Centers (SHO PC) have been 
established in different administrative regions in the countiy. 
Representatives of the HUDCC, H LU RB, DAR, DENR, DA and D ILG  
manned each center. The main objective of this center is to issue the 
necessary permits and licenses w ithin a period of 90 days. However, this 
scheme did not facilitate the approval system. The reason is that the 
representatives assigned to the Centers have no authority to make 
approvals. These representatives merely accepted applications, reviewed 
the requirements but made no approval. Developers thus opted to bring the 
documents themselves in the proper offices or agencies. Some developers 
feared that the documents may get lost in the process of transporting them. 
Moreover, since the major permits require clearances from other agencies,
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which are not represented in the Centers (e.g. barangay officials, Registry of 
Deeds), the purpose of the SH O PC  is defeated.
Of the additional requirements imposed on land development, the D AR 
conversion clearance is the most tedious. This clearance affects 
developments undertaken in agricultural lands. In the NCR, agricultural 
land conversion has not been a major problem because lands have been 
predominantly classified for urban use prior to CARP. The urban 
classification has already been adopted in the M M C zoning ordinance of 
1981. Conversion clearances prim arily affect developments at the urban 
fringes where vast tracts of agricultural lands are found. Also, in these 
areas, most town plans have not adequately projected municipal or city 
growth.
The D AR conversion clearance is obtained either as an exemption or 
conversion certificate. Prior to 1994, an exemption certificate required no 
clearance from the DAR. However, in 1994, AO 6 was decreed requiring 
"exempted agricultural lands to obtain a certificate of exemption from DAR.” 
Developers thus have to go through the process of applying for an 
exemption certificate. An exemption certificate requires the following: (1) 
certification from the local government and from the H LU R B  on the zoning 
ordinance; (2) certification from the N IA  that the area is not irrigated nor 
scheduled for irrigation; and (3) proof of payment of disturbance 
compensation in case land is occupied by farmers, tenants, squatters.
The conversion clearance, on the other hand, involves more procedures. 
Aside from the certifications under exemption, clearances from the DA, 
H LU RB, N IA  and D EN R have to be obtained. In particular, tenanted lands 
require certifications from the Bureau of Land Acquisition and 
Development (BLA D ) and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). The 
displaced tenants and farm workers are entitled to a disturbance 
compensation of at least the cash equivalent to five times the average of 
annual gross value of harvest in the last five years. In 1997 (D AR AO  7 
series of 1997), compensation for the tenants and farm workers also 
included the following: (1) capital to allow the affected farmers to shift to 
another livelihood; (2) skills training; and (3) relocation sites.
The process of land conversion approval is undertaken through 
different levels of authority at the D A R office (Figure 4.3). This authority is 
dependent on the size of land applied for conversion. The D A R Regional 
Director approves land conversion applications below five hectares. 
Applications w ith land areas in excess of five hectares to 50 hectares are 
reviewed by the D AR Regional C LU PP I and forwarded to the Land Use
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Conversion (LU C ) Committee at the Central Office.31 The Undersecretary of 
Field Operations provides the final decision based on the recommendation 
of the Committee. For areas beyond 50 hectares, the applications are initially 
reviewed by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PA RC )32 and 
forwarded to the D A R Secretaiy for approval.
31 This Committee is composed of two representatives from the Bureau of Land 
Development, two from Legal Affairs Division, one from the PARC Secretariat and one 
from the Special Concerns Division.
32 The PARC is composed ofthe President as Chairman and the Secretaries or Heads ofthe 
DAR, DA, DENR, Budget and Management, Finance, Justice, Labor and Employment, 
Local Government, Public Works, Trade and Industry, Transportation and 
Communications, NEDA, Land Bank and the Presidential Commission on Good 
Government.
Figure 4.3
Flowchart of Land Conversion Procedure
Source: DAR O ffice
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Land conversion procedures have also been through a series of 
revisions. Prior to 1997, land conversion application forms were issued 
without concern on the number of issuances. These forms can be easily 
obtained at the municipal and provincial D A R  offices. However, this 
practice has been abused. Land application forms have been used w ith the 
objective of subdividing the land into small parcels. The objective is to keep 
the approval process at the regional level. Starting in 1997 (AO  7 series of 
1997), land conversion forms can only be obtained from the Regional and 
Central DAR offices. Each form also corresponds to a specific control 
number for easier tracking of application. Another important change under 
AO 7 is the process of field investigation. Previous to 1997, applications for 
conversion were reviewed and investigated at different levels. The 
municipal agrarian officer (M ARO ) initiated the process by reviewing the 
documents submitted by the applicant and conducting field investigations 
to verify the information in them. The recommendations were then 
forwarded to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO ) who reviewed 
the report, conducted further field investigation and endorsed findings to 
the Regional Director and the Regional C LU PP I for processing. However, 
this system created many layers. Moreover, the M ARO  and PA RO  were 
placed in an uncompromising situation. Under AO 7, applications for land 
conversion have to be filed at the D AR Regional C LU PP I (Center for Land 
Use, Policy, Planning and Implementation). The Regional C LU PP I reviews 
the application while a team headed by the regional C LU PP I does field 
investigation and provides recommendations to the approving authority.
The increased complexity in permits and licensing for a residential 
subdivision development requiring conversion approval can be seen in the 
number of requirements and on the time spent to obtain the necessary 
permits and licenses (Table 4.1). Between the period 1980-92 and 1992-98, the 
number of approving personnel increased from about 27 persons to 155 
persons. The number of permits and licenses that have to be obtained also 
increased from 16 to 41 during the periods in review. Moreover, while it 
took about five months in the 1980s to complete the development process, it 
now takes 18 months to complete the same process.
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Table 4.1
Residential Subdivision Development: Permits and Licensing
Year 1990 1998
No. of Agencies 9 31
Approx. No. of Approving Personnel 27 155
Total No. of Requirements 45 160
Time Frame (in months)a/ 4.5 18
No. of Permits/Clearance 16 41
No. of Repeating Requirements 6 16
a/ T im e fram e under norm al c ircum stances. More tim e is required under the 
fo llow ing cases: (1) overlapp ing approved subdiv is ion plans (LMB); (2) 
d isag reem en ts  w ith farm ers, tenants or illegal c la im ants: (3) d isag reem ent am ong 
LGU personnel or between the LGU and national governm ent agencies: (4) social 
pressure
Source: R eport o f the O ffice  o f Specia l A ss is tan t to the Executive V ice 
P resident, F iiinvest, 1998
4.3. The Problem of Permitting and Licensing
Developers consider the development control process a major problem 
area. There are more permits to obtain and one can be caught in the 
conflicting interests among government agencies and the political and 
personal biases of authorities in the approval of permits and licenses. There 
are several areas whereby conflicts and biases may occur. These areas are 
discussed below.
Inadequacy of Town Plans
The approval of permits and licenses (e.g. locational clearance, 
development permit, ECC, EC, D AR conversion) are linked to the land use 
and zoning plans of cities and municipalities. This linkage is based on the 
assumption that land use plans provide a useful basis for guiding decisions 
on land use conversion and urban planning. This assumption applies if 
current town plans are based on a rationalized land use code. In the 
Philippines, however, this assumption does not apply and many problems 
in permits and licenses result from the inadequacy of land use and zoning 
plans or town plans in the country.
First, municipalities in the country are either without town plans or with 
town plans that have not been updated. Of the total municipalities 25.2% 
are still without town plans as of 1998 (Table 4.2). In Region 4 where most 
land conversions have been occurring, about 22.9% (51 municipalities) do 
not have town plans. A  similar situation is noted in other regions.
On the other hand, while most municipalities or cities have approved 
town plans, some plans are outdated. Land use and zoning plans are
supposed to be reviewed and updated every five years. However, there are 
many plans that have not been updated since the 1980s. For instance, in the 
NCR, M M C Ordinance 81-01 is still the legally recognized zoning 
ordinance. This Ordinance was adopted by the 17 cities and municipalities 
in line w ith the devolution of land use planning functions to cities and 
municipalities under the 1991 local government code. Adoption implies that 
no changes have been made but that the Ordinance is recognized as the 
basis for the formulation and updating of land use and zoning plans. Most 
cities in the N CR have actually formulated and revised their comprehensive 
land use plans (CLUPs) but these "new " CLUPs have yet to be approved by 
their respective sanggunian bayan and/or ratified by the H LU RB. Under the
1991 local government code although local governments were provided the 
authority to formulate their respective land use and zoning plans, these 
plans have to be ratified by the H LU R B  for highly urbanized cities33 or the 
sanggunian panlalawigan (provincial legislative body) for other 
cities/municipalities (EO  72 1993). Thus, unless the H LU R B  or the 
sanggunian panlalawigan has ratified the revised town plans, they cannot be 
used as a legal basis for development approvals.
Table 4.2
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Town Plan Review (as of June 1998)
Region
Total Cities and 
Municipalities
Approve 
d Town 
Plans3'
Without
Town
Plans
CAR (Cordillera Autonomous Region) 78 32 46
Region I (llocos) 125 94 31
Region II (Cagayan Valley) 103 93 10
Region III (Central Luzon) 122 104 18
Region IV (Southern Tagalog) 223 172 51
NCR (Metro Manila) 17 17 0
Region V (Bicol) 115 80 35
Region VI (Western Visayas) 133 123 10
Region VII (Central Visayas) 132 105 27
Region VIII (Eastern Visayas) 143 91 52
Region IX (Western Mindanao) 78 62 16
Region X (Northern Mindanao) 80 63 17
Region XI (Southern Mindanao) 68 66 2
Region XII (Central Mindanao) 53 33 20
CARAGA b/ 73 63 10
ARMM (Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) 87 37 50
Total 1630 1235 395
%  to Total 100.0 75.8 24.2
87 these are plans ra tified by the HLURB or the sanggun ian panla law igan (provincia l leg is la tive body) 
b/ cons is t o f the prov inces o f A gusan, S urigao and Butuan City 
Source: F ie ld O pera tions S upport G roup, HLURB
33 Aside from Metro Manila, highly urbanized cities includes Baguio, Olongapo, Angeles, 
Lucena, Bacolod, Iloilo, Cebu, Mandaue, General Santos, Davao, Migan, Cagayan de Oro 
and Butuan.
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In the NCR, although town plans are still to be approved and/or 
ratified, most municipalities have used their proposed CLUPs as basis for 
the approval of locational clearances and subdivision permits. On the other 
hand, since these plans have not been approved and in many cases not 
presented for public hearing, spot zoning or "piecemeal" rezoning tends to 
dominate land use controls. This system subjects the approval process to 
political maneuverings. Rezoning efforts of local governments have been 
marked w ith violations and public protests. There are cases when 
development permits issued by the LG U  have been revoked due to public 
protests. Also, the mayor has vetoed development permits approved by the 
sanggunian bayan. Political maneuverings in land use controls have been 
evident on the following zoning cases in Metro Manila:
1. The construction of a 10-story building along R-2 medium density 
residential zone in Quezon City. Under the R-2 zone the maximum 
building height should only be up to four floors. A  nearby housing 
association complained to the H LU R B  against the developer. 
However, H LU R B  simply told the residents to wait because they still 
have to investigate and study the matter although construction has 
already reached the 6th floor. The residents filed a case w ith the 
Ombudsman34 but the necessary clearances and permits from the 
LG U  were found to be in order after many hearing postponements. 
The developer was not reprimanded because according to the court 
the developer "acted in good faith." (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 24 November 
1995)
2. The approval of a subdivision development permit of a 20-storey 
condominium project in a medium density residential area in 
Quezon City. The sanggunian bayan reclassified the site into a special 
development zone to accommodate the development. However, 
there had been strong opposition by the residents and other 
institutions in the area. The opposition also got support from a 
sanggunian bayan board member. In one of the meetings of the 
sanggunian bayan, a cease and desist order was issued to the 
developer. (Interview with Administrative Officer, Quezon City Municipal Office, 
16 July 1998)
3. The construction of a 17-storey condominium in an R-2 zone in 
Mandaluyong. This was contested by nearby Homeowners 
Association who brought the matter to court. The ruling of the lower 
court favored the Homeowners. The court found the project a 
violation of the R-2 zone and the provisions for waste disposal and 
water system were found insufficient. The developer is preparing to
34 This is a special court created under Aquino’s administration, which had the powers to 
investigate and prosecute deplorable activities of government officials and employees.
appeal on the decision of the lower court to the Court of Appeals. 
(.Philippine Daily Inquirer, 01 November 1998)
4. The summary approval of "controversial" updated zoning plans by 
the sanggunian bayan of Parañaque without conducting the required 
formal hearings. In particular, residents of various subdivisions in 
Parañaque opposed the updated revised zoning plans prepared by 
the Office of the Mayor because this would convert areas along 
subdivision main roads into commercial zones and some parts into 
industrial zones. According to the Confederation of Homeowners 
Association, these land uses would aggravate the problem of water 
shortage, poor garbage collection and traffic congestion, which the 
local government could hardly provide. (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 01 June 
1997)
Aside from the absence of town plans or updated town plans, many 
town plans are not technically sound.35 The Town Plans are not land use 
plans but physical plans prepared for the built up areas. The focus of 
these Plans has been on the Poblacion (Town Centers) while areas 
outside the built up areas have not received adequate attention. These 
Plans also seem not to have been based on w ell conceived and valid 
land allocation criteria nor followed an effective and systematic 
planning procedure. For instance, although guidelines have been 
provided for land use classification, the extent to be allocated for non- 
agricultural uses has often been in excess of what was needed. In many 
municipalities thus part of the land zoned for non-agricultural purposes 
is presently either used for agriculture or is idle (Table 4.3).
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Table 4.3
Unutilized Lands in Areas Zoned 
for Non-Agricultural Uses
Province of Zoned Non-Agri Area % Built-up Area
Cavite Unutilized (hectares) (as of 1989)
Imus 282.0 16
General Trias 389.2 21
Dasmariñas 733.7 34
Naie 37.0 3
Source: M unicipal A grarian R eform  O ffices. W .P .T . S ilva (1993) 
“ Land Use Conversion: P resent P rob lem s and Possib le 
S o lu tions.“ C onsu ltancy Report, FAO, p.69.
Moreover, some guidelines to identify land uses are still to be 
completed. Although the Bureau of Soil and Water Management has
35 This was noted by Silva in his study. W.T Silva (1993). “Land Use Conversion: Present 
Problems and Possible Solutions.” Consultancy Report, FAO, p.62.
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already identified the N PA A  in zoning maps of municipalities, the 
guidelines for classifying lands as highly, moderately and conditionally 
restricted are still to be operationalized. Moreover, how these guidelines are 
to be implemented and monitored has not been addressed. Until these 
exercises have been completed, town plans are irrelevant as basis for 
guiding land use conversion and urban planning.
Conflicting Land Use Policy on Industrialization and Agrarian Reform 
In the 1990s, government started an industrialization program that 
intensified between 1992 and 1998 under the Ramos regime. The Ramos 
government specifically pursued policies and programs to fast-track 
industrialization in the countiy. This thrust called for an urban-based 
growth that raised stronger competing interest on land particularly between 
agricultural and urban use (e.g. industrial, commercial, residential, tourism, 
etc.). On the one hand, government has demarcated industrial zones (e.g. 
RA ICS, ECO ZO N ES, PIEs, etc.) in different regions to serve as the base for 
industrial growth in a particular area. On the other hand, there is the CA RP 
that aims to protect prime agricultural lands and agrarian reform 
beneficiaries from land conversion. However, there are cases when portions 
of the demarcated industrial zones fall on prime agricultural lands or on 
lands provided to agrarian reform beneficiaries.36 The question is which 
government program should prevail in these cases. The guidelines are not 
very clear. Under the land use conversion laws (AO  12 and 7), agricultural 
lands have been classified as highly, conditionally and moderately 
restricted for conversion. Of the total lands covered by the network of 
protected areas for agriculture (N PA A ) only about 30-35% is under the 
highly restricted category.37 This implies that 70-65% of agricultural lands 
are open to conversion. W hile the land conversion laws seems to be clear in 
protecting prime agricultural lands, the law is not clear on the guidelines on 
moderately and conditionally restricted lands including lands under the 
agrarian reform beneficiaries. For instance, the C A RP restricts the sale of 
agrarian reform land patents, (EPs, CLTs, CLO AS), but there have been 
cases when conversion was allowed in lands covered by these patents.38 
Sim ilarly, in areas demarcated as industrial zones some lands were
36 The Kauswagan PIE in Mindanao is known for its fertile agricultural lands. Also, 
Laguindian in Cagayan de Oro which is the proposed site for an international airport is a 
coconut area (C. Canias (1993). A corridor of broken promises. Farm News and Views, 
January-April, p. 6-9).
37 National Physical Framework Plan, National Land Use Committee, NEDA 1993. In Farm 
News and Views, 8 (4), July-August 1995.
38 The CARP law provides that lands handed over to farmer beneficiaries under the agrarian 
reform programs of the government cannot be converted into non-agricultural uses unless 
five years have elapsed after the award and the beneficiary has fully paid his/her 
obligation. Also, the land should have ceased to be sound for agricultural purposes.
converted via an exemption certificate while others through a conversion 
clearance. Decisions w ith regard to the conversion of moderately and 
conditionally restricted lands have become arbitrary. Cases below illustrate 
this point.
1. NDC-Manibem Case in Langkaan, Cavite. In November 1989, then 
Executive Secretary Macaraeg endorsed the National Development 
Corporation (ND C ) application for the conversion of a 230-hectare 
agricultural land in Langkaan to industrial use. This move was 
questioned by then D AR Secretary Florencio Abad on the basis of 
the C A RP provision that prime agricultural lands cannot be 
subjected to land conversion. Abad also ordered the conduct of a 
referendum to determine the farmers' w ill though he had legal 
authority to decide on the case by virtue of Executive Order 229. 
Under the referendum, 58 of the 79 affected farmers agreed to sell 
their lands. The farmers who voted to retain their lands were 
promised relocation. On the other hand, the farmers who get paid 
came back to government seeking for tilling space. The conversion 
application was later approved, however, this caused the 
deferment of Abad's appointment and later his resignation as DAR 
Secretary. (McAndrew, 1994; Scanning Scams Past, Farm News and Views, 
Philippine Peasant Institute, November-December 1992, p.5-15)
2. Laguna International Industrial Park (LHP) Inc. Case in Binan, Laguna. 
In 1990, a 114-hectare land in Biñan, Laguna, a sequestered 
property of President Marcos was parcelled and distributed by the 
D A R to 279 farmer tenants under CARP. In 1992, the farmer 
beneficiaries sold their lands to Elena Lim, owner of the L IIP , Inc. 
In the same year, the L IIP  Inc. applied for land conversion. 
Benjamin Leong then D A R Secretary approved the conversion 
application on the grounds that the area has become urbanized and 
the conversion w ill bring more economic benefits. Although 
Congress raised the illegality of conversion because the awarded 
lands were sold less than five years after the award (a violation of 
Section 27 of C A RP Law ), the conversion approval was still 
enforced. (Philippine Star, 24 June 1992; Manila Standard, 9 November 1992, Daily 
Globe, 16 October 1992)
3. W. Mosquera Case in Rodriquez, Rizal. In February 1995, Mosquera, 
et. al (stockholders of Capitol Golf and Country Club) filed an 
application for exemption for a 53.114 hectares of land located at 
Barangay Macabud, Rodriquez, Rizal on the grounds that the land 
is 18 percent slope and unfit for cultivation. However, before the 
filing of application for exemption, D AR has already issued a 
notice of acquisition in Ju ly 1994 for distribution to the tenants. The 
D AR Office denied the application for exemption on April 19,1995
C h apter 4: The L and D eve lo p m en t C on tro l Process: P erm its, L icenses an d  P lan n in g  S tra teg ies 97
and the motion for reconsideration in 09 Ju ly 1996. The reason for 
denial was because the land was developed and suitable for 
agriculture. An inspection conducted by the BSW M  showed that 
the entire area consists of three parcels of land, which are rolling to 
hilly. Narrow, small and isolated flat areas are planted to paddy 
rice during the wet season and to vegetables after the rice crop. The 
rest of the area is devoted to permanent crops like mango, guava, 
citrus, etc. About 41 farmers are actively cultivating the entire area. 
Detailed topographic map also showed that about 29.71 hectares 
(56%) of the total land area is below 18 percent slope. In 26 Ju ly
1996, the case was elevated to the Office of the President.39 And on
25 Ju ly 1997, Executive Secretary Torres reversed the decision of 
D A R  and issued a resolution exempting the land from coverage of 
CARP. The reversion decision was based on a special soil 
investigation report conducted by private persons upon the request 
of Mosquera. The special report identified the suitability of the land 
for agro-forestry. Executive Secretary Torres also based his decision 
on the provision of the C A RP law that exempts lands w ith slope of 
18% and over from land acquisition and distribution. Torres clearly 
ignored the information that only 44% of the land is on the 18% 
slope. Also, the exemption on lands w ith 18% slope and over 
applies only to lands undeveloped for agricultural purposes. (Case 
Brief of Conversion Cases Reversed by the Office of the President, Philippine 
Peasant Institute Resource Center; Report of Inspection, BSWM; Evaluation of the 
Reversal Case of Macabud Rodriguez Rizal, Office of the President)
4. Litton Property, Hermosa, Bataan. In April 1989, the Littons offered 
46 hectares of their 213-hectare land in Barangay Súmalo, Hermosa, 
Bataan under the voluiitary offer scheme (VOS) of C A R P .40 The 
parcel of land was formally covered under the VOS scheme on 16 
August 1989. A trust account was also deposited to the Land Bank 
of the Philippines for the purchase of the property. The National 
Irrigation Authority issued a certification stating that the land 
being offered under the VOS is not yet irrigated but is included in 
N IA 's  programmed areas for irrigation for 1998. In  between April 
and Ju ly 1994, the Litton's withdrew their offer for the VO S and 
instead applied for land-use conversion on the grounds that the 
land is not suitable for agricultural purposes anymore. According 
to the Littons, further attempts to use the land for agri-based
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39 By virtue of Administrative Code 20, the President can review decisions made by any 
member of his Cabinet.
40 The VOS is a scheme under the agrarian reform program whereby landowners themselves 
voluntarily offer their land for land distribution to tenants. The price of the land is based on 
DAR’s valuation ofthe property.
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projects were useless because of the soil's marginal condition and 
the high production inputs needed to make the land profitable. The 
DAR denied the conversion application of the Littons in M ay 1996 
and the motion for reconsideration in September 1996. The denial 
was based on the grounds that some 141 farmer-occupants tilling 
the land occupy the area. D AR Secretary Garilao also explained 
that the agrarian reform program is already taking shape in the 
area and the whole area was programmed for irrigation. Garilao 
also cited the opposition of all residents in the area for the 
proposed conversion. The Litton's appealed their case to the Office 
of the President and was granted conversion approval on 16 June
1997. The reason for reversion was that the conversion of the 
property would generate more employment and uplift the 
economic status of Hermosa. (Updated List of Land Conversion Reversal by 
the Office of the President, Philippine Peasant Institute Resource Center)
A summary of the land conversion reversal cases made by the Office of 
the President is provided in Table 4.4.
100 The U rban L and a n d  R eal E sta te  M arket in  M e tro  M anila: A  Socio-econom ic A n a ly s is
Table 4.4
Land Conversion Cases Reversed by the Office of the President, 1994-1998
Petitioner/ Nature of Area DAR Basis for Reversion
Applicant Case (ha) Location Decision by the OP
W.
M osquera, 
et al.
M oldex 
R ealty Inc.
Exem ption
from  53.11
CARP
Land
convers ion
108.50
Jam es Litton
Land
convers ion
213.61
Preciosa and
A gustina
Garcia
Heirs o f
Em ilio
A gu ina ldo
R epublic 
A sah i G lass 
C orporation
Land
conversion
Exem ption
from
C ARP
Land
conversion
Brgy.
M acabud,
R odriguez,
Rizal
Hacienda 
Sapang 
Palay, San 
Jose del 
Monte, 
Bulacan
W inne r Real ? ™ ption - io n ? «  P|a r¡del, i- » » from  120.26 _ .
Estate C A R P  Bulacan
Brgy.
Súm alo,
H erm osa,
Bataan
Q uisum bing , Land ^  gg Sum ilao,
et al. convers ion Bukidnon
64.07
188.52
34.40
Brgy.
Latian,
C alam ba,
Laguna
Silang,
Cavite
Brgy. San 
Andres, 
Bauan, 
Batangas
App lica tion
denied
4/19/96
A pp lica tion
denied
12/12/96
A pp lica tion
denied
11/24/95
A pplication
denied
9/18/96
A pp lica tion
denied
6/7/95
A pplication
denied
9/24/97
A pplica tion
denied
4/17/95
A pp lica tion
denied
6/10/97
Soil inspection  report by 
priva te persons hired by 
M osquera showed land m ore 
su itab le  for ag ro-fo restry  
C ertifica tion  from  the 
Provincia l P lann ing O ffice 
showed tha t the land w as not 
on the agricu ltura l zone based 
on the land use m ap approved 
by the sanggun ian  
pan la law igan  and not by 
HLURB. A lso  the com pany 
has a lready reso lved the 
c la im s o f m ost farm ers.
The land has been 
rec lass ified as industria l land 
a lthough the  land w as a lready 
covered by O peration Land 
T ransfe r and ce rtifica tes  have 
been issued to  farm ers
C onversion o f the property 
w ould  genera te  m ore em p loy­
ment.
Land has been rec lass ified as 
agro-industria l and w as ea r­
m arked as an educationa l 
cen -te r by the sanggun ian  
bayan  and a ffirm ed by the 
sanggun ian  panla law igan.
Land has been rec lass ified as 
early as 1981 from  agricultura l 
to industria l. The prem ature 
deve lopm ent o f the area (i.e. 
deve lop ing the land prio r to 
DAR c learance) and the 
presence o f fa rm er c la im ants 
in the area w as considered 
null and void.
Land fa lls w ith in  the m edium - 
industria l zone.
A lthough land is irrigated, the 
irrigation is natural and 
com m una l. The land has not 
been iden tified  as non­
negotiab le or h igh ly restricted 
fo r conversion.
Source: C ase B rie f o f O .P. R eversa ls by S ecre ta ry Aquirre , Philipp ine P easant Institu te  Resource 
Center, 1997
Updated L ist o f land C onversion Reversal by the O .P., Philipp ine P easant Institu te  Resource 
Center, 1998
subdivisions and commercial establishments. Arbitrary conversions which 
occur in these areas are often unrecorded.
Unclear Authority Between National and Local Agencies
The question of which agency should supervise or assume responsibility for 
specific permits has also created confusion in the development control 
process. One area of confusion is the issuance of environmental clearance. 
The type and location of projects determine the requirement of an EC 
and/or ECC. Generally, the rule of thumb is that projects w ith a small area 
and for residential use (including condominiums) require only an EC. In 
contrast, projects requiring an ECC are those occupying large areas and 
with significant impact on the locality (industrial, commercial complex, golf 
courses, etc.). In the urban fringes, conversions of agricultural lands to non- 
agricultural use (including housing subdivisions) require an ECC. This rule 
specifically applies to those lands whose proposed use conflicts w ith the 
approved zoning ordinances of LGUs.
Under the Philippines environmental laws (Presidential Decrees 984 and 
1586), the environmental regulatory function is vested on the EM B. 
However, the Local Government Code also provided local officials with 
environmental management functions. The LGUs are specifically tasked to 
evaluate projects denying or approving the environmental clearance 
applications for small projects. Local governments argue that an 
environmental clearance is not required for high-rise structures but only for 
large-scale projects such as warehouses and factories, which are the likely 
victims of pollution from wastes of such establishment. Thus, LGUs lim it 
the issuance of environmental clearances to large-scale projects. On the 
other hand, D EN R maintains that the clearance is an ultimate requirement 
before a project is approved for construction. By law, the EC and/or ECC 
has to be obtained before construction (i.e. diggings or excavation) can be 
started. In particular, Metro Manila (including other highly urbanized 
areas) is considered an environmentally critical area (Presidential 
Proclamation 2146 series of 1981). Despite these laws, however, developers 
can obtain the building permit without the environmental clearances. 
However, there are also cases when the local government may choose to 
impose the law. The D EN R  has no jurisdiction over local building officials 
and thus cannot impose on the local governments to be consistent with 
requiring an environmental clearance before approval of building permits.
On the other hand, real estate developers are aware that the building 
permit is a go-signal for them to start the construction. This is because the 
building permit is supposedly a final endorsement that a project is 
environmentally safe since this permit is also endorsed by several agencies 
such as the Department of Health. Moreover, the building permit also 
provides a project w ith excavation permit and locational clearance.
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Developers though still comply w ith the EC  or ECC. This is because 
H LU R B  requires an environmental clearance in the issuance of a license to 
sell. Also, D EN R  can impose the law on developers. Failure to secure an 
environmental clearance is subject to the following penalties (D EN R  EO  21 
series of 1992): On first offense, the fines range from 5,000 to 20,000 pesos. 
For second offense, the fine goes up to 50,000 pesos. Some developers 
violate the law for the following reasons:41 (1) they are on a contract that 
binds them to construct a building w ithin a fixed schedule; (2) some 
developers are ignorant of the process; (3) processing of ECC  is done 
simultaneously w ith construction.
The unclear authority among approving agencies also leads to confusion 
on which certification comes first. For industrial projects, for instance, LGUs 
w ill not issue a locational clearance without an ECC. On the other hand, the 
D EN R w ill not issue an ECC  without the locational clearance. Issuances of 
permits or licenses can thus be given conditionally, that is, permits are 
issued w ith the caveat "approved subject to an ECC or a locational clearance." In 
the case of the C ity of Muntinlupa, the local zoning administrator resolved 
the problem by issuing a certificate of locational viability42 in lieu of a 
loational clearance. Upon issuance of the ECC by the DENR, the local 
zoning administrator then issues the locational clearance.
The problem of unclear authority has also been depicted in land 
conversion cases. An example is the case between the Tamanli Development 
Corporation (TDC) and the General Mariano Alvarez Farmers Multipurpose 
Cooperative, Inc. (G EM A FA M C O ).43 The TDC owns a 39-hectare 
agricultural land in Cavite that the company intended to develop into a 
housing subdivision. TDC offered to buy the land from the 130 families in 
the area although these families are only tenants. However, negotiations for 
sale failed. The farmers wanted to hold on the land since the municipal 
D A R office indicated that the said land is under the CARP. On June 24, 
1995, TDC started bulldozing and fencing the land. Despite the temporary 
restraining order issued by the PARO  to the TDC, the TDC continued 
bulldozing the property. The TDC rationalized their bulldozing operations 
by stating that the municipal planning office has reclassified the land as 
residential since 1976. The housing project that was proposed iii the area has 
been approved under the development plan of the municipality. However, 
the municipal office of the D AR maintains that the land has long been 
classified as agricultural and included in the compulsory acquisition scheme
41 "High-rise Buildings: Basis for Restrictions”: Special Report, Business Daily, 29-30 
October 1996.
42 This is a permit stating that the land is viable for non-agricultural purposes but does not 
clear the land for development.
43 C. Flores (1995) David vs. Goliath. Farm News and Views, 8(4), July-August, p. 11-12.
of CARP. Conflicting records in different offices in the municipality makes 
it more difficult to check on the real classification of the land.
Reports of landowners "filling " their lands w ith gravel and sand with 
municipal officials turning a "blind eye" have been provided .44 In one case, 
a developer was issued a conversion clearance despite conflicting reports 
from the DA agencies. The DA reported the property to be "m arginally to 
not economically feasible for agricultural purposes." A report from the 
Bureau of Soils indicated that the property was "moderately to marginally 
suitable for agriculture." The report from the Philippine Coconut Authority 
showed that the coconut trees planted in the area were economically 
productive.
The local government code has empowered cities and municipalities to 
re-classify agricultural land into non-agricultural uses. This raise the 
question as to which agency is responsible for classifying agricultural land 
into non-agricultural uses. Some argue that D AR is no longer responsible 
because its powers have been devolved to the LGUs (1991 Local 
Government Code, General Primer 1992). On the other hand, others argue 
that D AR is still responsible because the Code merely confers to the local 
governments the general authority to re-classify agricultural lands 
consistent w ith the planning process and preserves and maintains the land 
use conversion authority to the D A R .45 Some authorities also feel that cities 
and municipalities now share the authority of the D AR but only to a limited 
extent because the authority applies only to a percentage of the total 
agricultural land area.46 There are laws that also tend to lim it DAR's 
authority. For instance, the DOJ Opinion 44 ruling (on exemption certificate) 
limits DAR's authority over land conversion applications. Under this law, 
DAR's authority is to validate whether the land in question has been 
reclassified before the C A RP took effect (i.e. before 15 June 1988). Moreover, 
the DA's charter of N PA A  and Administrative Order 20 are mere policy 
pronouncements that could hardly face up to the challenge posed by the 
Local Government Code. Backed by the Code and the N ED A 's nationwide 
blueprint for industrialization, the local governments have been hastily 
reclassifying lands and incorporating commercial industrial, tourism and 
industrial zones in their land use plans.
Unclear Standards in Providing Permits
The lack of definitive standards for some permits and licenses subjects the 
process to arbitrary decisions. For instance, the law on conversion of
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44 P. Gordoncillo, C. Aragon and T. Llorito (1998). A Study of the Impact of Land Conversion 
on CARP. Consultancy Report. UNDP/SARDIC Programme.
45 DAR - Note on ‘‘Significant Policy Guidelines on Land Use Conversion,” 1992.
46 M.S. Tabunda and M.M.Galana (1992) A Guide to the Local Government Code.
agricultural lands provides that disturbance compensation for farmers is 
fixed at " not less titan five times the average of annual gross value of the harvest 
on their actual landholdings in the last five years. In addition, the DAR shall exert 
all efforts to see to it that free homelots and assured employment for displaced 
beneficiaries are provided by the applicant/developer" (AO  12 Sec. 6(F)). 
Payments received by farmers, tenants, squatters, however, show significant 
differences. There are cases when beneficiaries have been w ell compensated 
while in other cases short-changed (Table 4.5).
The study done by Silva (1993) also showed that development permits 
issued after June 1988 were in areas demarcated as agricultural zones 
(Figures 4.4-4.5).47 The land use maps in the municipalities of Dasmarinas 
and Naie in the Province of Cavite showed that not only were development 
permits issued in agricultural zones but also that irrigated ricelands, which 
under the conversion law cannot be converted, had been converted. Cases 
of industriai developments in residential areas were also noted.
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47 The location of approved land conversions granted development approvals between July 
1988 and 1992 were plotted in existing land use maps of selected municipalities in Cavite 
with the aid of the municipal agrarian reform officers. See W.T. Silva (1993) Land Use 
Conversion, p. 70-74.
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Table 4.5
Cases of payment/non-payment of disturbance compensation, Batangas (as of 1998)
Minimum Amt. 
That Should Be 
ieceived Based 01 
AO (1990) (P)
70,000
Name of 
Farmer
Location of Farm
Area
Tilled
(Ha)
Crops
Planted
Annual
Production
(Volume)
Amount of 
Disturbance 
Compensation 
Received (P)
Lipa City
20 cavans (rice),
1. Emilio upland rice, P10.000 income
Olgado Inosluban 1.0 corn, from (corn) 200,000
(Tenant) cowpea cowpea (for home 
use)
2. Andres 
Montealto 
(Tenant)
Plaridel 3.0
upland rice, 
sugarcane, 
cowpea
102 cavans, 75 
tons, for home use
None; not yet 
given by 
landowner
3. Limaland 
(Tenant)
Bugtong na Pluto 1.3 Coconut 10,320 nuts 350,000
4. Rodolfo 
(Tenant)
Bugtong na Pluto 8.0
coconut,
coffee
16,800 nuts: 
P3.000 income 
from coffee
1.05 million
B atangas City
1. Pedro Irrigated
Magtibay (CLT Sta. Rita 0.5 rice/non­ 40 cavans 1.1 million
holder)b irrigated rice 
Coconut
2. Catalina de 
Castro
Pinamucan 0.5
atis, corn, 
bananas 
(home use)
coconuts: 3,000 
pcs.
90,000
Bauan
1. Antonio 
Dimatulac 
(Lessee)
Manghinao Proper 2.0 irrigated rice 812.5 cavans
None (not yet 
worked out)
2. Eufronio
Dolor (CLT
holder, San Andres 0.3 irrigated rice 93.89 cavans 259,000
cancelled in
his name)
3. Narcing
Dimalibot Manghinao 1.0 irrigated rice 250 cavans 300,000
(Lessee)
4. Nanding
Manalo
(Lessee)
Manghinao 2.0
Lanzones, 
irrigated rice
(no data) 
650 cavans
70,000 (did not 
accept)
5. Claro Agdan 
(Lessee)
Manghinao 0.4 irrigated rice 130 cavans 750,000
(not yet paid; was
6. Mauro forced to abandon
Beraña Manghinao 0.3 irrigated rice 62.5 cavans farm because he
(Lessee) was stopped by 
landowner)
7. Feliz
Cadivida Manghinao 1.0 irrigated rice 250 cavans 284,000
(Lessee)
8. Victor 
Dimalibot Manghinao 0.5 irrigated rice 125cavans 100,000
61,920
141.000
40.000
20.000
1,421.88
164,311.88
437.500
1,137,500
227.500
109,375
437.500 
218,750
311 cavan = 50 kilos
b/ land ow ner based on agrarian reform
Source: P. G ordoncillo , C. A ragon, and T. Llorito. (1998). “A  S tudy on the Im pact o f Land Use 
C onversion on C A R P .” C onsu ltancy Report, U N D P/S A R D IC  Program m e.
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Figure 4.4  
Location of Land Use Conversions 
Municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite
Land Use Plan
MUNICIPALITY OF DASMARIÑAS 
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Source: W.T.Silva (1993) Land Use
Conversion: Present Problems 
and Possible Solutions, p.71
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Figure 4.5 
Location of Land Use Conversions
Municipality of Naic, Province of Cavite
Source: same as Figure 4.4
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Unclear standard is also depicted in the issuance of environmental 
clearance. The issuance of an ECC is generally not restrictive. D EN R  usually 
does not reject projects outright. In case, a project has significant impact on 
the environment, D EN R usually suggests some technology adoption to 
minimize impact on the environment. For instance, if water supply w ill be 
depleted, D EN R would require the developer to obtain water from a 
different source. Also, if there are problems w ith waste management, D EN R 
requires sewerage treatment plants. However, since the standards on the 
acceptable environmental levels have not been definite (e.g. what is the 
acceptable water quality) problems arise when there are public protests 
about the project. The following examples illustrate this:
1. In 1995, a property in Batangas was to be developed into a socialized 
residential subdivision. One of the boundaries of the said property was a 
l iver. The company planned to reclaim part of this river. On the other side 
of the river, a Colonel was operating a public resort area. The Colonel filed a 
complaint to the D EN R  regarding the environmental effects of the project. 
This caused D EN R  to withhold action on the firm 's application for ECC. 
D EN R requested the company to settle w ith the Colonel. The Colonel 
demanded the following: (1) pay P2,000 for each fam ily that obtained their 
livelihood from the public resort; (2) construct a bridge linking the resort to 
the property so that the resort can have another access road; (3) provide 
sewerage treatment plant. The company felt that the first two demands 
were not environmental concerns. The third demand was not cost 
recoverable since the development was for socialized housing. The 
company suggested instead to build a drainage system that w ill not affect 
the resort. (Interview with n developer, 28 July 2997)
2. In 1994, a company proposed to develop a 677-hectare lot in Rizal into 
a residential and golf area. Of this area the plan was to have a built up area 
of only 300 hectares while the remaining area w ill be for forest cover and 
sanctuary. When the property was bought in 1992, the area was already 
cogonal and a landfill. A  Japanese topographic map of the area in the 1970s 
also showed that the area was mainly cogonal. The company was able to 
secure permits from the D AR and LG U  but their application for ECC  was 
rejected. The reason was that there were "illegal" occupants in the area who 
protested the development due to possible flooding. The company did not 
settle these "illegal" occupants because their demands were unreasonable. 
The company bought the property for a price between P17 to 50 per square 
meter. These "illegal" occupants wanted the company to pay them P300-500 
per square meter. The company brought these "illegal" claimants to court. 
However, despite the court's ruling in favor of the company, these "illegal" 
occupants continued to make demands and blocked the issuance of 
environmental clearance by putting pressure on the D EN R  on the 
environmental effects of the said project. Although the company had
already complied w ith the in-depth environmental study asked by the 
DENR, no ECC had been issued as of 1998. (in terview with a developer, 28 July 1997 
and 21 july 1998)
4.4 The Urban Developm ent of Metro Manila
The colonial governments had greatly influenced the w ay urban centers 
developed in the country. The Spanish and American ideals for urban and 
town planning were implanted in many regions of the countiy during the 
colonial era and it was from these ideals that urban centers grew. The 
Spaniards, in particular, introduced the plaza complex, which gave emphasis 
on open squares and the symmetrical spread of streets to the main squares. 
When the Americans came in the early 20th century, they integrated 
suburban living, high-rise architecture, well-articulated road system and 
modern port facilities into the existing developments.
The problem, however, w ith the early urban plans was their emphasis 
on the aesthetic value rather than on sanitation and environment. The city 
plans were not comprehensive. These plans only included the urban centers 
while suburban areas were not integrated in the formal planning. This 
planning system continued until the 1980s when government foresaw the 
need to provide more intervention in land use and development. As a 
result, the government created planning controls and adopted a 
comprehensive approach to urban development.
Although the attempt in the 1980s was for a comprehensive urban plan, 
urban planning appeared to have been used prim arily to control 
subdivision and housing developments. Planning controls focused mainly 
on setting standards for land and housing developments w ith special 
reference to low cost housing. Direct controls on land and housing prices 
were also instituted to make housing more affordable. Land use and 
environmental concerns were limited to the drafting of zoning maps, which 
like the previous administrations, focused on urban centers.
In the 1990s, government paid more attention to land use planning due 
to the increasing conflicts in land uses. These conflicts arose basically from 
the fast pace of urbanization in the countryside and the potential profits that 
had been realized from real estate developments. Existing subdivision 
controls and zoning maps had become insufficient tools for land 
management. The reason was that all undeveloped lands have become 
potential areas for urban development. Choosing between agricultural and 
non-agricultural land use was not only a matter of putting land in its most 
profitable use but also of creating environmental balance. Land use 
planning thus became a more pressing concern and the primary response of 
government was to revise rules on land conversion and zoning. The 
government also realized the need to draft comprehensive land use plans
C hapter 4: The L and D eve lo p m en t C on tro l Process: P erm its, L icenses an d  P la n n in g  S tra teg ies 109
110 The U rban Land an d  Real E sta te  M a rk e t in  M e tro  M an ila : A  Socio-econom ic A n a ly s is
for each municipality. Moreover, government decentralized the system of 
permitting and licensing to involve local governments and community 
associations in the development of their respective localities.
As of late 1999, however, government, has yet to approve the national 
land use code that aims to guide the allocation of land resources in the 
countiy. It is hoped that this code w ill clearly define the laws w ith regard to 
land use and allocation. The government has been obscure on the issue of 
land use. On the one hand, government wants industry to expand and 
improve housing. On the other hand, there are strong barriers due to 
agrarian reform and the continued dependence of a large proportion of 
population on agriculture. W hile this problem may be typical in many 
countries of the world, it seems that in the country, government is sending 
confusing signals. Development permission including land use approvals is 
being subjected to arbitrary decisions. In Metro Manila spot zoning has 
become prevalent. Areas that have been zoned for low intensity residential 
use are being mixed w ith high intensity developments, hi various cases 
industrial and commercial land uses have been giveii planning permission 
iii areas zoned for residential purposes. On the other hand, at the urban 
fringes, we find pre-mature conversion of lands or conversion of forestlands 
and irrigated agricultural and agrarian lands into non-agricultural uses.
W hile government has imposed stricter planning controls, rampant 
conversions and indiscriminate land developments have not diminished. 
Moreover, the system of permits and licensing has become more 
complicated and inefficient. Town plans or city plans, which are the basis 
for the approval of permits, are also technically inadequate and subject to 
manipulation. It has thus become difficult to determine which type of 
development project is negotiable or non-negotiable for a particular area. 
Moreover, developers are unable to know what their neighbors w ill do on 
their land since government has no clear plan for a particular area. The 
above difficulties increase uncertainty in the urban land market. First, the 
developer may have to bargain for the approval of his or her development 
permit. Second, future developments in adjacent lands may have negative 
consequences on earlier land developments. These uncertainties bring two 
possible actions from developers. One, there is an incentive to buy big tracts 
of contiguous land. This move would allow developers to influence or 
dictate the development of an area such that future developments w ill 
complement rather than contradict their planned developments. Second, the 
uncertainty in permits and licensing may cause players in the market to 
engage in relational contracting to obtain approvals. This action opens the 
permitting system to corruption and subjects it to personal biases and 
political patronage.
CHAPTER 5
Real Estate Activity 
in Boom and Slump Periods
Land and real estate activity is not only affected by physical and legal factors but is also strongly influenced by economic activity. The real estate market 
becomes ve iy active during periods of economic expansion while inactive in 
periods of recession. In economic expansion, rising demand on real estate 
expands supply and increases real estate values. On the other hand, recession 
brings a decline in demand, contraction of supply and increases in real estate 
values become more modest.
Economic upturns and downturns have been observed historically but there 
is much debate about the question whether these fluctuations constitute regular 
(or repetitive) economic cycles. There are several cycles (e.g. Kondratieff, Juglar, 
Kuznets, and Schumpeter) but one cannot expect that these cycles w ill always 
occur in the same way. There is even more discussion about the possible causes 
of these conjunctural flows. Economic trends in the Philippines show that the 
economy has been strongly influenced by economic and political shocks. It has 
also been ve iy susceptible to external shocks possibly a result of the countiy's 
import dependence and dependence on the US market for its major exports.
The time element thus plays a role in the real estate market. The investor 
should have a good perception of when to increase investments and 
subsequently when to reduce investments. Developers should be able to 
respond at the right time to increases in demand since the real estate sector is 
the initial sector that would feel the beginnings of a downturn.
In this chapter, we present an overview of the fluctuations in urban land 
values and real estate activity in the countiy. In the first part, we discuss these 
fluctuations given changes in the macroeconomic and political situation in the 
country. The second part looks into the effect of spatial development on land 
values and real estate activity. Real estate activity has been different across 
various regions in the countiy. In particular, the real estate market has been 
more active in Metro Manila than in other regions. The third part presents some 
evidences of land price movements in specific land markets. Price statistics 
used in the analysis are mainly those on residential land prices due to limitation 
of data from other land markets. These prices are the listed/posted prices of 
developed lands and not the actual transaction price.
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5.1 Fluctuations in Land Values and Real Estate Activity
When the Americans arrived in Manila in 1898, the city was still very small. 
Phil D. Carman who was among the first Americans arriving in Manila 
described the o  tv as follows:
"I d o n 't  know  m uch ab o u t M anila 's  g row th  prior to 1898 b u t it could no t have 
been v e n ' rap id  for it w a sn 't  m uch  of a  city a t  the end of 328 years of Spanish  
bu ild ing  operations w h en  I a rrived  in D ecem ber of th a t year. In 1900, the area 
betw een  M abin i an d  San M arcelino w as m ostly a large p ad d y  field w ith  Pasay 
and  Santa A na d is tan t villages. Some tim e later, in a  belated  m orn ing  a ttem p t to 
w itness the A m erican advance from  Caloocan, a  new spaper correspondent and I 
dodged  bullets for w h a t seem ed m any m iles of speed ing  on bicycle an d  horse 
th rough  u n p o p u la ted  w ooded  stretches a t  the righ t and  beach to tire left. All of 
th a t space betw een  L erm a P ark  and  cem enterio  del N orte-m idw ay betw een  
p leasure and  tire grave as it w ere- w as then  an  un im proved  and  u n p o p u la ted  
area." (P.D. C a rm an  (1922). R em arkab le G ro w th  of M anila  since A m erican  O ccupa tion . American 
Chamber o f Commerce Journal, 22 A u g u s tl9 2 2 , p.10).
From 1903 to 1922, Manila's built-up area grew about five times its size in 
1898 (Figure 5.1). This growth had tremendous effect on real estate values. 
W ithin a ten-year period (1912-1922) land prices in the City of Manila increased 
by 600 percent while the surrounding areas increased by about 1000 percent. 
The average yearly increase in both areas is computed at 22.86 percent (Table 
5.1).
Figure 5.1 
Manila's Growth Under 
the American 
Occupation
Source: P .D .Carman. 
“Manila Real 
Estate Values 
Show
Remarkable
Increase,"
Am erican
C ham ber o f
Com m erce
Journal,
1923, p 15
Pasig River
MAM LA BAY
Sau Juan Heights 
ADDITION
M a n ila  an d  S u b u rb s . 1X9X 
•i B u ilt-u p  A reas . 1922
City growth has usually been explained through an increase in population. 
Although the population of Manila between 1912 and 1922 increased by 2.60 
percent annually, such an increase in population cannot alone account for the
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percent annually, such an increase in population cannot alone account for the 
extraordinary growth of Manila in area and its effect on real estate values. 
Comparatively, population growth in the city was even more rapid in the 
succeeding periods 1956-66 and 1975-85 but such increases in population did 
not correspond to a higher increase in land prices than the period 1912-22. On 
the other hand, real estate activity shows closer association to macroeconomic 
variables. Between 1975 and 1985, real estate sales, construction and land prices 
displayed negative growth rates. This corresponds to a slow G N P and export 
growth. In contrast, high growth in real estate activity is noted during the 
periods 1912-22,1956-66 and 1986-96, which corresponds to high rates of GN P 
and export growth.
Table 5.1
Socio-economic Indicators, 1912-1996 
(in percent average annual growth rate)a/
1912-22 1956-66 1975-85 1986-96
Population Growth (%)b/
Philippines 2.05 3.04 2.65 2.52
NCR 2.60 4.29 2.86 2.70
Macroeconomic Indicators
Real GNP - 5.42 2.22 4.97
Real Exports d 6.22 9.81 7.07 11.10
Real Estate Activity d/
Real Estate Sales - 8.35 (10.10) 15.73
Construction Activity e/ 5.51 1.67 (4.24) 25.12
Residential land prices 22.86 22.15 (2.76) 20.36
( ) figu res in parenthesis indicate negative values 
no data ava ilab le  
a/ real va lues de fla ted by GDP IPIN base year 1985
“  1912-22 and 1956-66 population grow th rate estim ated based on the growth rate 
fo r the census years 1918-1939 and 1960, 1970, respectively. 
c/ 1912-22 export data deflated by im port price index base year 1913. 
d/ re fers to  real esta te activ ity in M etro Manila; grow th rates based on real values 
e' re fers to both residentia l and non-residentia l construction includ ing repairs and 
alterations; 1912-22 data deflated by im port price index base year 1913. 
Source: 1912-22 export and construction data see D .F.Doeppers (1981) 
C onstruction Cycle, appendix
1975 Integrated Census o f Popula tion, Philippines, NSO 
1985 and 1990 Philippine P opula tion Projections, NSO 
BSP Statistica l Yearbook, various years
P .D .Carm an. “M anila Real Estate Values Shows R em arkable Increase,” 
A m erican C ham ber o f C om m erce Journal. A ugust 1923, p .14.
A.H. H artendorp (1961) H istory o f Industry and Trade in the Philippines. Manila: 
P h ilipp ine Education C om pany, p. 509.
R eview  o f Real Estate Sales, M anila T im es Journal (news clippings), 1960-66. 
C uervo Far E ast land price data indices
Real Estate M onitor (m onth ly and w eekly  land price data). Econotec, Inc. 1989- 
96
A  study by Feeny (1988), which looked into land price movements during 
the late 19th century to the 1940s in Southeast Asian countries,1 showed that 
while increasing population density does lead to higher land prices (or land 
rents) such association becomes direct only in a closed economy. In an open 
economy engaged in large-scale international trade other factors intervene such 
that population density and land prices becomes less correlated. In particular, 
short-term fluctuations in land prices become more sensitive to prices of 
exported agricultural commodities grown on that land. So when the prices for 
these commodities drop, land prices w ill go down temporarily.
A  similar study by Doeppers' also noted the direct relationship between 
real estate activity and exports.2 However, this relationship was highly cyclical 
w ith real estate activity lagging closely behind the export cycle (Figure 5.2). For 
instance, the extraordinary increased in real estate sales and construction 
activity in 1919-20 and 1931-32 followed the 1918 and 1929 peak in real exports, 
respectively. Likewise, the export nadir of 1920 and 1931-32 was followed by 
profound inactivity in real estate. Doeppers' noted that the surges in earnings 
from exports during pre-war Manila led to higher financial ability and 
propensity to invest in real estate.3
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Figure 5.2
Real Exports in the 
Philippines and Real Estate 
Activity in Pre-War Manila
Source: D. Doeppers (1981). 
“Construction Cycles in Pre-war 
Manila,” Philippine Economic 
Journal, 20(1), p.47.
1 D. Feeny (1988 ). Development of Property Rights in Land: A Comparative Study. Toward a 
Political Economy Development: A Rational Choice Perspective. Edited by R.H.Bates. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, p.273-299.
2 D.F. Doeppers (1981). Construction Cycles in Pre-war Manila. Philippine Economic Journal, 
20(1), p.45-57.
3 Ibid, p.45.
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The Philippines has been largely dependent on foreign trade. From the 
early 20th century to the 1950s, the countiy has been enjoying favorable trade 
earnings arising prim arily from sugar exports to the United States. The land 
market has also been very active during this period. However, the increased 
activity in real estate has not been directly determined by the prices of 
agricultural commodities but by the buying power of sugar barons who 
invested in real estate in Metro Manila. Thus, even during the depression years 
of 1931-32 when sugar prices were just maintained (i.e. Philippine sugar 
exports was protected in the United States market), there was a boom in 
construction and real estate in Metro Manila. Aside from the gains in trade, the 
infrastructure program of the United States during the period may have 
contributed to the rise of real estate values. In particular, the American town 
planning introduced clearly articulated road network that improved and 
extended streetcar service and opened up large areas of unoccupied land in 
Metro Manila.
Impressive growth of real estate in Metro Manila was also noted during the 
early post-war years.4 Land prices were rising ve iy fast specifically in new 
suburban areas. Between 1956 and 1966, land prices grew by 22.15 percent. 
During this period export was not only favorable but that war rehabilitation 
funds were poured into Metro Manila. Government spending in construction 
and land development activities fuelled real estate activity during the period. 
Manila was then the recipient of enormous war rehabilitation funds from the 
United States. Construction was not only limited to reconstruction and 
rebuilding of old structures but that thousands of new buildings specifically 
housing structures were erected.5 For instance, government poured money into 
the Philippine Homesite Corporation (now the National Housing Authority), 
which had been veiy active in home building for the middle and low end 
housing markets during the period. On the other hand, the private sector 
concentrated on the construction of hospitals, schools and offices.6 Some 
American and Filipino industrialists also invested in the development of high- 
rise structures at the business core and suburban residential subdivisions.
Real estate growth exhibited a negative growth between 1975 and 1985. 
Land prices declined by 2.76 percent. The real estate market also slowed down 
posting a 10 percent decline in sales while construction activity declined by 4.24 
percent. These years corresponded to periods of slow economic growth. In the 
early 1970s and 1980s, the international economy was hit by oil crises. In 
addition, there had been domestic policy pronouncements that aggravated the
4 A.H. Hartendorp (1961). History of Industry and Trade of the Philippines: The Magsaysay 
Administration. Manila: Philippine Education Company, p.403. Realtors A. Varias and C.S 
Gonzales also reported this trend during the years 1960 to 1966 (Real Estate Review, Manila 
Times Journal).
5 Ibid.
6 The Philippine American Insurance Corporation (PHILAM) has been the most active 
participant in this type of developments. Ibid.
effects of the international crises. These developments brought about recession 
in the Philippine economy. In particular, the country's foreign trade 
deteriorated. Between 1980 and 1985, the countiy also suffered from financial 
and political crises. The former arose from the capital flight attributed to the 
Dewey Dee financial fiasco and the later from the assassination of Senator 
"N inoy" Aquino, President Marcos' most popular political opponent.
Following this period, the real estate industry rebounded to a new height. 
Between 1986 and 1996 land prices grew at an average of 20.36 percent. Steep 
rises in land prices at the later stage of city growth were generally not 
expected.7 Such increases usually happened in the early stages of city growth as 
land values tend to be exaggerated by constraints in space arising from low 
transport facilities. However, with the onset of the "automobile age," the 
"monopoly" value of sites tends to be diminished. This was not the case for 
Metro Manila as strong growth in land prices was registered during the 1990s 
when infrastructure development and better transportation facilities had 
overcome constraints in space.
The period 1986-96 has been one of high growth. Business optimism has 
risen during this period due to the globalization trend occurring in the 
international economy. This trend shows similarity to the openness and 
integration of economies in the 1900s, which has also been characterized by low 
rates of protection in much of the world and greater flexibility in the financial 
economy. It has apparently brought favorable growth in many economies. The 
Philippines, for instance, has exhibited positive export growth and high 
economic growth during the period. The good earnings from business activities 
have led to the higher financial ability and propensity to invest in urban real 
estate. It also stimulated investments in real estate not only in Metro Manila but 
also in other regions of the country.
An extension of Doeppers' analysis for the years 1950 to 1996 showed 
similar procyclical movements between exports and private strong material 
construction (Figure 5.3). Between 1975 and 1985 erratic movements in 
construction followed intermittent export growth. On the other hand, 
increasing exports starting 1986 coincided with increasing construction activity 
during the same period. In 1990-91, private construction dipped to a low level 
despite the increase in exports. This could be traced to the uncertain political 
climate and strong earthquake that hit the countiy during this period. In 1990, 
coup attempts by rightist m ilitary factions arose to destabilize the Aquino 
government. In the same year, volcanic eruption (Mt. Pinatubo) and the strong 
earthquake that followed after the eruption, hit the northern part of Metro 
Manila. This calamity had created devastating effects on land that temporarily 
set back real estate activity specifically in Metro Manila.
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7 H.Hoyt (1960). Changing Patterns of Land Values. Land Economics, 36(2), p.492.
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Figure 5.3
Exports ofthe Philippines and Private Construction in Metro Manila
* private construction refers to expenses in construction materials
* va lues in logarithm ic figures
The real estate sector, however, bounce back in a relatively short time. By 
1994-95, the real estate boom has reached its peak. This boom has been fuelled 
not only by export earnings but also by the surge in foreign capital flows8 and 
the increased demand for real estate arising from the globalization of 
production networks. Capital flows are part of international economic 
integration. These flows were also important in the early 20th century. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of capital flows between 1986 and 1997 was a 
quantum leap from the levels in the early years of the century. Net medium and 
long-term capital flows to the Philippines amounted to less than one percent of 
G N P in the 1970s. By 1986, this share increased to more than two percent 
reaching a peak of more than 20 percent in 1996 (Figure 5.4). The bulk of capital 
flows were bilateral and multilateral grants except in the years 1995 and 1996 
when private direct and portfolio investments exceeded that of public receipts. 
These years also saw the steep rise in composite indices of real property stocks 
that rose from 3,305 in 1994 to 18,457 in 1996.9 Capital flows to the real estate
8 For the effects of the global financial sector in middle income NIE countries see B.Renaud 
(1995). The 1985-94 Global Real Estate Cycle: Its Causes and Consequences. Policy 
Research Working Paper. The World Bank Financial Sector Development Department, 
May1995.
9 Philippine Stock Exchange Report, 1998.
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Figure 5.4
Financial Flows to the Philippines, 1970-1997
E Net Official Receipts 1  Net Private Roas
* Net O fficial Receipts refers to bilateral and multilateral grants and loans.
* Net Private Flows refers to  direct and portfolio investments.
Sources: M .Lamberte, et al. (1992) Philippine E xternal Finance, Dom estic R esource Mobilization and  
D evelopm ent in the 1970s and 1980s, PIDS and ISS; C. Corocaton (1995) S urge in  Capital Inflows, 
R esponse o f the G overnm ent and E ffects on the Econom y.The Philippine Case. P IDS D iscussion 
Paper 95-24; Department of Economic Research, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
initiated by a boom in the stock market. Profits from the steep climb in share 
prices in 1986 moved toward the residential property market.
W ith regard to global production networks, foreign affiliates of 
multinational corporations have been moving toward developing economies for 
price competitiveness. This move has increased the anticipation for higher 
demand for real estate to accommodate the housing needs of foreign investors, 
expatriates and higher income executives as well as the demand for industrial 
commercial sites.
5.2 Spatial Development and Real Estate Activity
The positive developments in trade and the international economy have 
been felt more strongly in Metro Manila than elsewhere. The picture given in tire 
early years of the American regime shows tire Philippine economy largely 
pivoting around export of traditional agricultural crops. Two patterns of
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economic development emerged simultaneously in the early 1900s. On the one 
hand, traditional agricultural regions (i.e. Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog, 
llocos, Bicol, Eastern, Western and Central Visayas) were gaining prominence 
in agricultural production. On the other, the City of Manila, which was the 
entrepot for the trading activities, was fast developing into an industrial and 
service region. In the 1903 census, three fifths of population and industrial 
employment can be found in the traditional agricultural regions. Industrial 
employment in the N CR was minimal. This pattern of development continued 
until the later part of the 1920s. In the 1930s, the Great Depression affected the 
development trends in the country. During this period, there had been 
overproduction in Asian commodity market caused by the expansion of 
acreage for the production of agricultural crops. Many businesses that got 
burned from this situation shifted to the production of manufactured goods. 
Thus, between 1930-40, the share of industrial output to agricultural output 
arose. Industrial output also became more diversified. W ith the decline of 
agriculturally based industries, the N CR exhibited its potential as the base for 
the impending industrialization.
The prominence of the NCR region further intensified during the import 
substitution period (1948-61). NCR was the main beneficiary of these reforms. 
Census data shows that NCR's share in industrial employment increased from 6.48 
percent in 1903 to 50.8 percent in 1960 (Table 5.2). Also, the number of service 
establishments rose from 4.8 percent to 54.8 percent from 1903 to 1990 (Table 5.3). 
The comparative advantage of the NCR in terms of location was being utilized to 
the maximum as the impact of policies that favored it became felt.
Table 5.2
Regional Employment Share by Economic Activity, 1903-1990 
_____________ (in percent of total Philippines) ______
NCR3 Metro Periphery (MP)b Central Industrial Region 
_________________________________________________________(NCR + MP)
Agri­
culture0
Industrial Service
Agri­
culture0
Industrial Service
Agri­
culture0
Industrial Service
1903 1.19 6.48 15.54 26.15 23.06 26.77 27.34 29.54 42.31
1918 1.58 7.53 9.18 20.99 22.10 24.85 22.57 29.63 34.03
1939d 0.99 14.65 17.93 19.24 14.46 17.44 20.23 29.11 35.37
1948 0.84 27.21 30.27 17.84 17.62 15.32 18.68 44.83 45.59
1960/61 0.63 50.87 42.18 19.29 13.96 13.97 19.92 64.83 56.15
1971/72 0.46 45.76 32.43 18.00 15.62 17.57 18.46 61.38 50.00
1980 0.19 18.55 39.74 16.88 31.36 16.42 17.07 49.91 56.16
1990 1.40 18.55 74.20 18.85 29.09 16.80 20.25 47.64 90.60
^  from 1903-72 includes Manila and Rizal “  refer to regions of Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog
c/ refer to number of farms
d/ from 1903-1918, establishments included household industries while from 1939 thereafter, non-agricultural 
establishments pertain only to business units.
Sources: E.M. Pernia, C.W. Paderanga, V.P. Hermoso. The Spatial and Urban Dimensions o f Development in the 
Philippines. Manila: Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 1983, p. 171-173; 1975 Census o f Establishments 
(manufacturing)-, Economic Census 1903, 1918, 1939,1948,1961,1967,1972: Census o f Agriculture, 1903,1918,1939, 
1948, 1960, 1971, 1980, 1991; Census o f Establishment, 1983, 1988.
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Table 5.3
Regional Share of Establishment by Broad Economic Activity, 1903-1990 
__________________ (in percent to total Philippines) _____________
NCR3 Metro Periphery (MP)b Central Industrial Region 
_____________  _______________________  (NCR + MP)
Agri­
culture1'
Industrial Service
Agri­
culture0
Industrial Service
Agri­
culture0
Industrial Service
1903 1.48 29.70 4.88 23.46 25.58 22.56 24.94 55.28 27.44
1918 1.57 3.51 5.02 22.15 33.37 21.50 23.72 36.88 26.52
1939d 0.95 3.01 7.90 23.69 11.10 21.61 24.64 14.11 29.51
1948 0.60 16.49 20.02 20.38 21.03 19.31 20.98 37.52 39.33
1960/61 0.51 27.38 30.65 19.02 20.53 18.97 19.53 47.91 49.62
1971/72 0.53 20.55 17.69 18.59 22.12 23.68 19.12 42.67 41.37
1980 0.38 15.68 37.65 18.56 30.59 16.95 18.93 46.27 54.60
1990 0.33 15.07 54.80 19.08 26.15 14.80 19.41 41.22 69.60
31 from 1903-72 includes Metro Manila and Rizal. 
b/ refer to regions of Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog 
c/ refer to number of farms
d/ from 1903 to 1918, establishments include household industries while from 1939 thereafter non- 
agricultural establishments pertain only to business units 
Source: (same as Table 5.2).
The growth stimulus also spilled over into NCR's periphery. In response to 
the increasing urbanization and industrialization in Metro Manila, Central 
Luzon and the Southern Tagalog regions became the catch-basin for the 
growing population and industrialization in NCR. Industrial establishments 
moved from NCR to the metropolitan periphery as high land values and 
limited space made it unprofitable for industries to locate in the NCR. Lands in 
the NCR also became too expensive for agricultural and industrial activities.
Consequently, the transformation and rearrangement of the regional 
patterns of growth have been reflected in real estate activity. In Metro Manila 
the development trend is toward more intensive use of land. Condominium 
living has become popular and there has been a marked increase in the number 
of condominiums developed. Between 1965 and 1991, there were only 1,104 
condominium buildings constructed in Metro Manila.10 On the other hand, 
between 1991 and 1996 about 1,105 buildings have already been constructed. 
Building height has also increased substantially. In the 1980s, a 10-storey 
building was already considered high-rise. In the 1990s, high-rise buildings are 
those above 30 floors. Industrial and subdivision developments have become 
expensive in the city thus, these developments are now more common in the 
CALABARZON region. Extensive conversion of agricultural lands into urban 
lands has been taking place in the CALABARZON. Most of these conversions 
have been for industrial and residential developments.
10 See chapter 2 footnote 5.
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Similarly, a spatial dimension of real estate prices is observed. Although 
there is no available long time series price data for areas in the metropolitan 
periphery, the data for 1991 to 1995 provide some important comparison into 
price movements in the NCR and CALABARZON regions. As indicated earlier, 
in the years 1990 and 1991, real estate activities specifically in Metro Manila 
have been temporarily set back by coups and natural disasters. These crises 
have been reflected in the real estate activity in Metro Manila. Not only did 
construction activity slow down but that land prices for residential, industrial, 
commercial and development lands declined (Table 5.4). On the other hand, 
land prices in the CALABARZON region for the same period posted strong 
gains. Prices in 1991 of commercial lots increased by 42.1 percent, residential 
lots by 21.9 percent and development lots by 12.9 percent from their level in 
1990. Apparently, the CALABARZON region has not been affected by the 
crises possibly because the volcanic eruption and earthquake took place at the 
northern part of Metro Manila. This situation may have boosted the 
attractiveness of CALABARZON or the southern part of Metro Manila for real 
estate investment compared to the northern areas. After 1991, price increases in 
the NCR posted higher growth than the CALABARZON regions. Metro Manila 
remained a popular choice for real estate investments.
Table 5.4
Comparative Price Performance, NCR and 
CALABARZON Area 1991-1995
Annual percentage Change (%)
Land Type 91/90 92/91 93/92a 94/93 95/94
Residential Land
NCR (3.2) 5.3 14.4 20.9 21.8
CALABARZON 21.9 7.5 23.5 5.3 6.2
Batangas 123.0 (7.3) 13.8 (7.2) 36.6
Cavite 21.1 10.6 29.5 25.9 11.7
Laguna 49.4 14.5 13.8 9.3 8.9
Rizal 11.3 6.2 12.3 11.5 2.8
Commercial Land
NCR (5.5) 10.1 15.9 7.1 17.9
CALABARZON 42.1 68.1 (2 .1) 4.2 8.7
Industrial Land
NCR (24.2) 4.0 8.1 32.5 25.3
CALABARZON (1.8 ) 19.3 (7.4) 102.2 90.7
Development Land
NCR (10 .1) (33.7) (29.2) 35.6 5.3
CALABARZON 12.9 12.0 6.9 10.4 27.9
Figures in parenthesis indicate negative values.
^ Starting 1993, CALABARZON figures include province of Bulacan 
Source: Based on 12-month average prices per square meter, Real Estate 
Monitor, 1990-95, Manila: Econotec, Inc.
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5.3 Price Trends in Residential Land Markets
The land market is highly fragmented and prices may behave differently 
not only across regions but also in specific locations within a region. In 
particular, the developed land market is differentiated according to the income 
level of targeted households. There is a market for high, middle and low- 
income households. The middle-income group, in particular, is quite diverse. 
This group can be divided into high-middle, middle-middle and low-middle 
income levels. Price movements within these specific land markets also vary 
significantly.
In particular, we examined the sale price trends in specific residential land 
markets in Metro Manila. Residential subdivisions in Metro Manila were 
classified according to the income level of households they cater to (i.e. high, 
middle and low-income subdivisions). From each income group, specific 
subdivisions were selected. The primary consideration for selecting a housing 
subdivision was the availability of monthly sale prices for the period 1990 to 
1996.11 Based on this criterion, the following subdivisions were selected:
1. High Income Subdivision: Forbes Park, Corinthian Gardens, Ayala 
Heights
2. Middle Income Subdivision: Loyola Grand Villas, Greenwood, Fairview 
Park, Green Park
3. Low Income Subdivision:12 Amparo Subdivision
The price trends for the specific subdivision lots are illustrated graphically 
in Figures 5.5-5.7. These trends represent moving averages of monthly sale price 
data obtained per residential subdivision.13 Moving averages are computed to 
eliminate seasonality of prices.14
Sale prices of land in high-income residential subdivisions show an upward 
trend between 1991 and 1996. Although there has been a general decline in real 
estate prices in Metro Manila between 1990 and 1991 due to natural calamities 
(see Table 5.4), sale prices of lots at Forbes, Corinthians and Ayala Heights show 
no apparent decrease. This price behavior is also noted in middle-income 
subdivisions. However, unlike the high-income subdivisions wherein similar 
land price patterns are observed, the middle-income subdivisions display 
different price behavior. This can be attributed to the wider income range in the
11 A private institution has gathered prices of real estate products in Metro Manila and major 
cities. These prices were obtained daily from major newspapers that advertise real estate 
properties on sale. These sale prices were collated and summarized in a weekly and monthly 
listing o fthe  Real Estate Monitor. Unfortunately, this effort of real estate price gathering was 
started only in mid-1990 and thus a longer time series data is not available.
12 The low-income subdivision does not represent the economic and socialized housing sectors 
since prices for these sectors are administratively rather than market determined.
13 There are cases when no sale price was posted for the succeeding month. In these cases, 
the previous month’s sale price was used as the price.
14 Based on statistical forecasting formula, real estate price seasonality was computed for every 
7- month period.
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middle strata. On the other hand, sale prices of lots in low-income subdivisions 
have been more affected by economic and political changes. It is, however, 
observed that for all income groups, there is a downward rigidity in land 
prices.
Figure 5.5
Sale Prices of Lots in High Income Residential Subdivision
Forbes .................. Corinthian Ayala
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Figure 5.6
Sale Prices of Lots in Middle Income Residential Subdivision
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Figure 5.7
Sale Prices of Lots in Low Income Subdivision (Amparo Subdivision)
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The data on prices further show that sale prices of lots in high-income 
subdivisions deviate more from their mean prices compared to the middle and 
low-income housing subdivisions (Table 5.5). Given the apparent downward 
rigidity of land prices, the higher deviation implies greater increase in prices. 
This will happen if there are significant positive externalities in the locality and 
that the subdivision facilities are well developed. For instance, Forbes and 
Corinthian Gardens are within the central business district of Makati. Strict 
subdivision zoning regulations have also enhanced the land values and 
protected the subdivision from urban congestion.
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Comparatively, the deviation of land prices is modest in middle-income 
residential subdivisions. These subdivisions have well-developed subdivision 
facilities but are usually located at suburban areas. Middle-income 
subdivisions, however, are of diverse types. There are subdivisions that cater to 
the higher middle-income class while others are for the low-end middle-income 
households. In the latter type, land prices move in small increments similar to 
the low-income subdivisions.
Low-income subdivisions are usually located far from the main 
transportation network. Subdivision facilities are low cost and zoning 
restrictions within subdivisions are lax. Prices also move in small increments.
Table 5.5
Mean Price and Price Variability in Selected 
Residential Subdivisions, Metro Manila, 1991-96a/
(7-month period moving average)
Subdivision Mean Price Standard Coefficient of(P/sq.m) Deviation Variation
High Income
Forbes Park 28,294 9634 0.3405
Corinthian
25,233
Gardens
10128 0.4014
Ayala Heights 12,635 7003 0.5542
Middle Income
Loyola Grand 
Villas
4,674 1808 0.3868
Green Wood 2,179 566 0.2697
Fairview Park 3,232 919 0.2840
Mapayapa Village 4,218 949 0.2178
Low Income
Amparo 1,186 283 0.2386
31 politically and economically stable years
Source: Real Estate Monitor, 1990-96, Manila: Econotec, Inc.
It is, however, possible that land price trends will differ from the general 
trend as observed in the period 1991-96. This may occur because land use and 
zoning in Metro Manila and its fringes are not clearly defined. In various cases, 
new developments in a particular area may not be consistent with existing 
developments. Thus, in localities that are still largely open to development or 
redevelopment, the potential change in prices of existing developments in the 
area (including low-income subdivisions) can be huge.
Land prices have also been affected by land titling or zoning disputes. 
There are cases when housing subdivisions become subject of claims or land 
controversy resulting from anomalies in land title and registration that can be 
traced back since the early 20th century. Land developments have also been 
hindered by disputes over zoning. Unless these land cases have been resolved,
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prices may not only be frozen but that urban land can be withdrawn from the 
market.
There are various factors that affect urban land prices in Metro Manila. The 
factors that have strong positive influence on prices are economic growth 
specifically export growth, the industrialization or commercialization of 
localities and the increase demand for housing. The trends in land prices, 
however, vary by type of development. Extreme cases of land development 
exist in the city. There are areas that are well developed and well planned while 
some areas are poorly developed, congested and surrounded by a colony (ies) 
of squatters. The magnitudes of price increments thus show a veiy wide range. 
Large price increments have been noted in high-income subdivisions while 
increases in low-income subdivisions are fairly small. On the other hand, price 
movements may also differ from what is expected silice property rights 
problems specifically disputes on zoning laws and "fake/illegal" titles that 
affect high, middle and low income developments can temporarily freeze prices 
or withdraw land from the market.
CHAPTER 6
Market Clearing in Competitive and Fixed 
Price Land and Real Estate Markets
There are different ways by which markets clear. Most economic analyses focus on how price clears markets. However, price cannot be the only 
mechanism that clears market. There are varied reasons for this. One reason is 
that there are information problems such that changes in supply and demand 
cannot be signalled instantly to buyers or sellers. Also, there is a fixed price of 
changing prices. Consumers may dislike price fluctuation. Prices may also have 
to remain in effect for some time if their "signal" is to be received. In the real 
estate markets, for instance, large increases in price may not be plausible due 
structural constraints in the market (e.g. insufficient buying power of target 
market). These factors imply that aside from prices, there are non-price 
responses to demand and supply changes. In some cases, these non-price 
responses rather than prices provide the equilibrating factor. Non-price 
mechanisms include activities such as, variations in product quality, 
inventories, delay in deliveries, classifying clientele (e.g. preferred, regular, new 
clients), facilitating finance, etc. The presence of these mechanisms implies that 
prices do not necessarily fluctuate according to the laws of supply and demand. 
A buyer and a seller can both be satisfied (or reach an equilibrium) without 
necessarily adjusting prices.
In this chapter market-clearing mechanisms in the developed urban land 
market are examined. The developed market is classified into two types based 
on how prices are determined. One type is the open and competitive land and real 
estate market. This market typifies the competitive market model where sellers 
are free to adjust their prices as determined by market forces. Under this 
category belongs the market for industrial and commercial lands including high 
and middle cost residential lands. Low cost residential lands whose sale prices 
are above the government determined price ceilings also falls in this categoiy.
Another type is the fixed  price land and real estate market. In this market, the 
government sets the selling prices for the low cost housing consisting of 
residential lots and /o r housing units. Changes in prices can only be done 
through legislative action. There are two classes of fixed price low cost 
residential developments, to wit: (1) the socialized housing development where lots 
are sold at prices not higher than 833 pesos per square meter; and (2) the
economic housing development where lots are sold at prices above the socialized 
lot ceiling but below 1,111 pesos per square meter.1
The chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, the principles 
of market clearing in the urban land market are explained. This section points 
to the problem of market clearing, why price alone does not clear market and 
why alternative mechanisms are necessary. The second section discusses 
structural factors that affect price adjustments in the urban land market. In 
particular, these factors limit price adjustments in both business upturns and 
downturns. The last two sections present evidences of how developers respond 
to conjunctural fluctuations. These sections examine various non-price 
mechanisms employed by developers to allow markets to clear in periods of 
economic upturns and downturns. The non-price mechanisms in the open land 
market and the fixed price land market are discussed separately.
6.1 The Principles of Market-Clearing in the 
Urban Land and Real Estate Market
Markets are characterized by information problems that create constraints 
in bringing together supply and demand. First, there is randomness of 
demand.2 Firms often do not know how much of their product will be 
demanded for a given price. The number of customers also varies per day. 
Second, time affects consumption and production patterns.3 A consumer faces 
many substitutes to consuming a product today or in the future. Likewise, a 
firm can substitute production today for production tomorrow. Third, 
information is asymmetric.4 It is common for a buyer to have different 
information than a seller. For instance, a buyer generally knows less about the 
quality of a house than the seller. Fourth, there is heterogeneity of demand.5 
Buyers have different preferences for when they want to transact, what they 
want to transact or where they want to transact. It is, thus, difficult to bring 
supply and demand in one place and create organized markets.
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1 Price ceilings are given based on a house and lot package. For socialized housing the 
maximum selling price for a house and lot package amounts to P150,000/unit. On the other 
hand, economic housing are those sold above P150,000/ unit but not to exceed 
P375,000/unit. In cases when lot only is offered in the market, the price should not exceed 
40% of the allowable maximum selling price with a minimum lot size of 72 sqm (single­
detached) or 54 sqm (semi-detached). Lots designed for rowhouses or duplex housing are 
required to have a house component (BP 220, Rules and Regulations on Socialized and 
Economic Housing).
2 D.W.Carlton (1978). Market Behavior with Demand Uncertainty and Price Inflexibility. 
American Economic Review, 68(4), p.571-587.
3 Carlton, The Theory and Facts o f How Markets Clear, p. 925.
4 Ibid. p. 934.
5 Ibid. p. 937.
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These information problems imply that prices in most markets cannot 
adjust at each instant of the day to balance supply and dem and .6 It takes time 
(most often long-term) before prices can make the adjustments. It may also be 
costly to change prices frequently.7 On the other hand, firms are concerned 
about overproducing or underproducing and customers (or firms in the input 
market) are concerned about obtaining a good or having an "assured" supply 
of inputs. Given these limitations in the market, it is plausible that non-price 
responses will be used to make adjustments to supply and demand changes. 
Thus, prices may remain unchanged or price changes may be minimal and 
adjustments to supply and demand changes in the short-run are mainly done 
through non-price mechanisms. For instance, an increase in demand may be 
met through changes in inventory. Also, a supply shortage may be met by 
classifying customers into regular and new clients where the product is made 
available to regular clients while new customers have to "wait."
Similar principles apply to the land and real estate market. The land and 
real estate market is faced with highly variable demand. It is observed to follow 
economic cycles but one cannot expect these cycles to occur in a regular pattem. 
Another characteristic of the market is the heterogeneity of demand. Real estate 
buyers want different types and quality of product. They have different needs 
and each buyer usually demands a slightly different product. Moreover, the 
presence of "fake" titles and the perceived arbitrariness of government 
regulations on land use and development magnify asymmetric information. 
There are also structural factors in the economy that limit price adjustments. 
The insufficient buying power of households and poor infrastructure 
developments are some examples.
When the price mechanism does not work, alternative mechanisms that will 
bring together supply and demand will be employed. In the real estate sector, 
non-price mechanisms have been used in response to supply and demand 
changes in the market. First, conjunctural fluctuations are met by intertemporal 
substitution patterns. Developers' speed up production while the market is 
active and slowdown or stop production during downturns. For instance, in 
subdivision projects, land development is done in phases.8 If sale of the initial 
phase is fast, the developer opens up another phase. If sale is slow, the 
developer postpones the development of additional phases. Moreover, when 
the market is active, we note the entry of new real estate firms in the market.
6 Carlton noted that price as the mechanism that would clear markets only works well when an 
organized market exists (e.g. auction and futures market). In this market all buyers and sellers 
gather at a specific place and time and prices are adjusted based on the demanders and 
suppliers present at that time. However, it is costly to create an organized market. Ibid. p.936- 
937.
7 Changing prices frequently is time consuming and costly. Ibid. p. 931.
8 This is not the case for condominium developments since condominiums are not livable 
unless completed. Also, buyers cannot get bank financing for condominium units unless the 
condo building is at least 70% completed.
On the other hand, when the market is inactive, real estate firms reduce 
investments on real estate or diversify into other businesses. It is thus common 
to see a glut or "overproduction" as the market starts to slowdown and a 
"shortage" when the market starts to peak up. Second, in periods of high 
demand, developers provide pre-selling options to buyers. They entice buyers 
to buy prior to actual construction. This practice allows the developer to obtain 
more funds to develop additional projects. On the other hand, a buyer obtains 
the product at lower price than the market. Third, if the government as in the 
case of socialized housing fixes prices, developers may adjust "quality" of 
housing. Offering a smaller area for the same price may be one method. Fourth, 
if financing becomes a problem in the sale of real estate, developers may create 
attractive financing schemes and easy credit. They may also bring in 
government to facilitate things, provide subsidies, guarantees, etc. They may 
also bring in foreign partners, tie-up with financing institutions to provide 
ready credit for its clients. Fifth, if there are structural constraints in the market, 
classifying buyers by income levels is one way of minimizing the effect of these 
constraints. The land and real estate market is highly segmented with a 
different market for high, medium, and low-income households. This 
segmentation allows developers to adjust prices according to income 
constraints. For instance, price increments in low cost housing are constrained 
by the affordability level of households. Moreover, since low-cost 
developments are generally of "low" quality (i.e. land areas are small, location 
is far from major roads and transport routes, housing materials use are of low 
quality, etc.) large increases in land and real estate prices will not be justified. 
On the other hand, high and middle-income developments are generally 
located in areas with substantial positive externalities that would allow for 
large increments in pricing. Sixth, the developer may also respond to changes in 
demand by targeting a different market. If low cost developments are not 
selling well, the developer may produce for the high and middle-income 
market. The developer may also shift from residential and condominium 
developments to development of memorial parks or sports centers. Seventh, if 
there is too much competition in one area, the developer may develop in other 
areas or come up with "new" designs in the market.
The presence of non-price mechanism thus implies that rigid prices do not 
necessarily mean that markets do not clear. Non-price mechanisms may have 
worked better in bringing together supply and demand in the market.
6.2 Structural Factors in the Urban Land and Real Estate Market
Adjustments in land and real estate prices may be limited by structural 
factors within the economy. In the Philippines, for instance, increments in land 
prices tend to be limited by the following factors: (1) laws of foreign land 
ownership; (2) limited number of families with sufficient buying power; (3) lack
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of infrastructure development; and (4) zoning regulations.
The Philippine Constitution limits land ownership to Filipinos or to natural 
bom Filipinos with foreign citizenship. Foreigners are only allowed to lease 
lands or to own condominium units up to 40% of condominium ownership. 
Given these restrictions on foreign ownership, the demand for land or real 
estate mainly comes from domestic buyers who have limited buying power.
The insufficient buying power of most households in the country is another 
constraint. About 50% of households have incomes that fall within the low- 
income quintiles (first and second quintiles). These households receive only 
about an average of 12.8 % of total income in the country (Table 6.1). Some 26% 
of households are on the third quintile (i.e. middle income) while 24% belong to 
the fourth and fifth quintile. The latter obtain more than 70% of total income in 
the countiy. Income data also shows that income share of the middle and low- 
income quintiles posted no significant change between 1961 and 1997.
Table 6.1
Percentage Distribution of Total Family by Income Quintile
1961-1997
Incom e Group 1961 1965 1971 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997
First Quintile 4.2 3.5 3.6 5.2 5.2 4.7 4.9 4.4
Second Quintile 7.9 8.1 8.1 9.1 9.1 8.5 8.8 7.7
Third Quintile 12.1 12.8 13.3 13.3 13.3 12.7 13.4 12.0
Fourth Quintile 19.3 20.1 21.0 20.3 20.7 20.2 20.9 20.0
Fifth Quintile 56.5 55.5 54.0 52.1 51.8 53.9 51.9 55.8
Source: Family Income and Expenditures Survey, National Statistical Office, 1965-1997
This structure of demand is depicted in land and real estate price increases. 
In commercial, industrial and upscale residential subdivisions, which target the 
high-income groups and foreign market,9 land prices exhibited higher increases 
and fast rising trends. On the other hand, in low and medium cost land 
developments price movements are in small increments. For instance, in the 
low cost residential subdivisions, monthly land prices appreciation ranged 
between one and two percent (Table 6.2). In contrast, monthly appreciation of 
land prices ranged between four and 7% in high-income subdivisions.
9 A survey of buyers in major Central Business Districts (CBD) shows that the foreigners make 
up a considerable portion of the market. These foreigners invest mainly in selected high 
grade real properties as follows:(1 ) Makati area: 20-30% of buyers are foreign investors; (b) 
Ortigas Pasig, Greenhills: 60% of buyers consist of Taiwanese, Japanese, Americans, 
Australians; (c)Roxas Boulevard: 50% of buyers consist o f Taiwanese, Chinese, Americans. 
Center for Research and Communication, Staff Memo #28, 1993, p 3.
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Table 6.2
Monthly Price Appreciation3 in 
Residential Land Markets, 1994-1996
Average Monthly
Residential Subdivision Price Increase (%)
High Income
Forbes Park 5.24
Corinthian Garden 6.03
High-Middle Income
Loyola Grand Villas 4.20
Ayala Heights 4.22
Middle Income
Mapayapa Village 2.59
Fairviewpark Subd. 2.75
Greenwood Executive Subd. 2.32
Low Income
Amparo Subdivision 0.20
Rainbow Subdivision 0.90
a Based on 7“’-month moving average price trends 
Source: Price data obtained from monthly and weekly 
prices listed at Real Estate Monitor, Econotec, Inc.,
1994-1996
Another limiting factor is the infrastructure development in Metro Manila. 
Comparatively, prices in Metro Manila are low vis-à-vis other ASEAN 
countries (Table 6.3). The margin for a real estate price increase is large. 
However, the inadequate infrastructure system in the countiy (e.g. telephone 
lines, sewerage, roads, water system, etc.) limits the maximum use of the land. 
For instance, the growth of the Ortigas Center Central Business District (CBD) 
in Pasig has been initially stalled by the poor telecom facilities. Only a few 
companies have located in the area because the number of telecom lines was 
limited. Only after the Philippine telephone company rehabilitated the telecom 
lines did commercialization of the area started.
Table 6.3
Office Space Rentals in Selected Asian Cities
Citv Ave. net rent(US$/sq.m./year*l City Ave. net rent (US $/sa.m./vear*)
Tokyo 1711 Taipei 387
Hong Kong 1076 Kuala Lumpur 140
Australia 603 Jakarta 269
Bombay 1566 Manila ** 108
Singapore 484
* Annual rental rates for all cities except Metro Manila are from a 1989 survey conducted by Colliers 
International for creditworthy clients occupying 1,000 square meters in a prime downtown location.
** Metro Manila data based on 1991 (1st quarter) survey of rental rates in Makati conducted by Econotec, Inc. 
Source: Real Estate Monitor, 3 (4), April 1991.
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Developers are largely dependent on the government for major 
infrastructure development. A prominent developer expressed this dependence 
as follows:
"Real estate projects are very expensive. No m atter how small or big the project, 
we need governm ent support (for instance, for low cost housing the costs of 
installing a w ater system can be a limiting factor). In some instances, developers 
have found it impossible to start a project because of the costs involved. Many 
real estate projects have come to fruition because of governm ent infrastructure 
support. Were we to rely solely on our resources, m ost real estate ventures in 
the country' w ould have never been completed." (M a n i la  Chronicle, Mar 1,1994, 
pi 4)
The government zoning strategy has also some implications on land prices. 
Although there are no conclusive benefits of zoning on land prices, the study by 
Wai-chung Lai10 in Hongkong provides evidences that zoning has beneficial 
effect on land prices. In the country, comprehensive zoning has been 
implemented only in the 1980s mainly in Metro Manila. Most cities have also 
failed to update their zoning laws. Thus, "spot zoning" has become the trend in 
many localities. The differences in land prices due to zoning may be gauged 
from the relative price ratios of non-industrial land to industrial land. 
Industrial land can be use as the primary gauge on the level of urban 
development as this land use is the least intensive among all urban uses. Land 
developed for industrial use can be re-developed into more intensive uses such 
as residential and commercial developments. Correspondingly, the prices of 
residential and commercial lands should be in proportion to that of industrial 
land prices.
The price ratios of commercial and residential lands to industrial lands can 
be used to compare relative residential and commercial prices in different areas 
of Metro Manila. We should note that there are significant differences in the 
valuation of residential and commercial lots among Metro Manila's sectors. 
Price ratios of residential and industrial lands are noted to be lowest in the 
West sector (1.03) which consist of the City of Manila while highest in the South 
sector (1.98) which comprise the cities of Makati, Parañaque, Mandaluyong, etc. 
(Table 6.4), On the other hand, price ratios of commercial land to industrial land 
are highest in the east sector (7.90) while lowest in the north sector (3.41). These 
differences may be attributed to zoning restrictions in the area. In areas where 
zoning is stricter, the difference in prices among more intensive land uses tend 
to be higher than in areas where zoning is less strictly enforced.
10 Lawrence Wai-chung Lai (1997). Zoning and Property Rights: A Hong Kong Case Study. 
Hong Kong University Press, p. 113.
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Table 6.4
Ratio of Average Residential and Commercial Land 
Prices to Industrial Land Price, Metro Manila, 1990a
Residential Commercial Industrial
W est Sector 1.03 3.87 1.00
North Sector 1.84 3.41 1.00
South Sector 1.98 4.39 1.00
East Sector 1.77 7.90 1.00
Total Metro Manila 1.84 4.60 1.00
a Based on twelve-month average weighted real estate prices for the 
period July 1989 to June 1990.
Source: Real Estate Monitor, 2(11) November 1990, Manila: Econotec Inc
The above constraints on land and real estate prices imply that price 
increases can be limited by structural factors within an economy. Thus, firms 
have to employ some non-price mechanisms to capture or obtain a larger share 
of the gains in real estate trade during business upturns.
6.3 Non-Price Mechanisms in Open and Competitive Urban Land and Real 
Estate Market
How does the urban land and real estate market respond to conjunctural 
changes in demand and supply? In competitive markets, prices are free to 
adjust. However, as discussed above, price adjustments do not work at all 
times and that non-price responses are also employed to equilibrate demand 
and supply. The alternative mechanisms employed by developers in 
competitive and fixed price markets during periods of high and low demands 
are discussed below.
In particular, developers assess demand based on the rate by which lots are 
sold in the market. There is a sale when the booking fee (i.e. down payment) 
that is between 25% and 30% of the total cost of the land has been fully paid. 
The number of lots with fully paid booking fees at a particular period thus 
determines the rate of sale. An indication of the rate of sale in real estate is 
expressed in the following:
"Between the period 1993 and 1996, the country has been enjoying a boom in 
real estate. New subdivision projects would be sold out soon after its launch. In
1997, a slowing down of the real estate market was noted as the effects of the 
Asian crises spread to the Philippines. During this period, real estate projects 
put on the market for six months were only 50% sold." (Asiaweek, 16 May 1997, p54-57)
Period of High Demand
After about two decades of inactive real estate trade, the Philippines entered 
into a buoyant property market toward the end of 1980 reaching a peak in the
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1990s. This boom brought about strong expansion in the real estate market both 
in terms of more products and greater choices of products. Licenses to sell 
issued by the government between the periods 1981 to 1997 show a substantial 
increase m lots or real estate units placed on the market starting 1990 (Figure 
6.1). Between 1981 and 1989, developers were mainly involved in residential 
development specifically, simple subdivision. In the 1990s, non-residential land 
developments such as industrial and commercial condominiums, memorial 
parks, and sports centers were developed.
Figure 6.1
Total number of residential and non-residential lots/units 
placed on the market for sale, Philippines, 1981-96
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Non-Residential Developments
Another effect of the boom was that previously untapped areas had been 
developed. Although the bulk of land developments were still centered in 
Metro Manila, urban centers in other regions and in areas identified by 
government as economic growth zones showed signs of increased land 
development activities (Table 6.5). Land markets in these areas also became 
active. Starting 1987, development activities were highest in Region IV 
particularly in areas comprising the CALABARZON.
Table 6.5
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Average Annual Number of Residential Lots/Units on the 
________ Market by Region, Philippines, 1981-96________
Average Number of Lots/Units per Average Growth 
Year ai Rate (%)
Region 1981-1986 1987-1992 1993-1996 1981/87 1987/96
I/CAR 208 1571 2,706 655.3 72.2
II 184 368 2,024 100.0 450.0
III 5,638 11,051 28,975 96.0 162.2
IV 10,606 29,414 79,456 177.3 170.1
NCR 13,975 17,804 34,144 27.4 91.8
V 381 1,964 4,789 415.5 143.8
VI 1,258 3,262 8,517 159,3 161.1
VII 241 1,443 6,048 498.8 319.1
VIII 189 724 445 283.1 -38.5
IX 204 660 1,675 223.5 153.8
X 139 1,518 6,878 992.1 353.1
XI 2,068 3,374 10,197 63.2 202.2
XII 261 7,225 1,762 2668.2 -75.6
Philippines 35,352 80,378 187,616 127.4 133.4
a/ Annual number of lots/units placed on the market per period was obtained by dividing 
total number o f units/lots per period by the number of years.
Source: Plans and Programs Division, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
The land and real estate markets have also become more specialized and 
stratified. Metro Manila is being developed into more intensive commercial 
and residential uses while those at the urban fringes are being developed into 
residential subdivisions especially for low cost and mass housing projects 
(Table 6.6). On the other hand, the market stratification is noted in the 
classification of the residential land markets. Based on the posted prices of 
properties, the low cost segment has been further classified into low cost, low- 
medium cost, and socialized. We also find similar classification in the high cost 
segment (e.g. low-high, medium-high and high cost developments).
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Table 6.6
Developed Urban Lands Placed on the Market for Sale, NCR and 
______ CALABARZON 1981-1996 (in number of units/lots)______
Open Socialized Mass- Residential/
Commercial/
Condominium
Industrial
Year Market
a1
Housing 
(BP 220 RA 7279)
Housing
(NHA))“
Condominium/
Townhouses
Commercia
Subdivisioi
NCR (All Years) 160,539 91,470 95,588 78,241 8,205 369
1981 3,609 - - - - -
1982 13,403 856 - 47 - -
1983 17,669 4,697 444 - .
1984 11,116 2,412 73,417° 1,486 - .
1985 12,707 5,858 - 19 - .
1986 3,166 6,359 9,371 - - -
1987 9,050 4,841 9,301 1,301 - -
1988 9,773 5,992 16,716 3,511 - .
1989 13,532 4,863 8,546 5,764 - -
1990 6,665 4,320 13,859 5,512 - 17
1991 8,045 5,352 5,866 4,352 - 49
1992 8,604 4,029 8,248 1,141 1,222 63
1993 6,696 2,300 5,252 1,299 746 .
1994 8,151 10,504 3,549 7,453 299 .
1995 11,154 14,005 4,658 16,772 1,774 158
1996 17,199 14,902 10,222 2,914 4,164 82
Annual Growth Rate (%) 11.0 22.6 0.9 64.0 35.9 48.2
CAI ARAR70N
(All Years)
284,023 263,479 46,869 10,441 200 1,592
1981 2,428 . . . .
1982 8,427 538 2,916 - .
1983 8,889 2,656 2,792 - .
1984 13,074 1,274 - 797 - .
1985 4,984 3,037 - 1,670 -
1986 5,139 4,666 - 348 . .
1987 9,799 5,527 1,743 311 . .
1988 17,533 11,628 1,356 -
1989 21,614 7,975 3,759 - . .
1990 15,189 14,136 9,157 81 . 311
1991 23,392 9,668 9,241 165 . 304
1992 21,773 17,671 5,498 24 - 103
1993 32,407 27,709 3,501 13 50 98
1994 28,679 36,924 5,229 . 168
1995 35,222 52,737 4,148 500 . 274
1996 35,474 67,333 3,227 824 150 334
Annual Growth Rate (%) 19.6 41.2 7.1 (10.9) . 1.2
NCR + CALABARZON 444,562 354,949 142,457 88,682 8,405 1 „961
PHILIPPINES, TOTAL
690,336
826,626 343,852 91,308 9,775 3,808
% NCR + CALABARZON . . . .
to Philippines
b4.4U 42.94 41.43 97.12 85.98 51.50
Figures in parenthesis indicate negative values 
“ indicates none or zero.
a includes all subdivision developments which are not under the socialized housing law (BP 220 or RA 7279)
6 includes NHA housing programs for the families In the lowest 30th percentile (e.g. a resettlement sites and services, slum 
upgrading) 
c Includes CALABARZON area
Source: Plans and Programs Division, HLURB. NHA Annual Reports, 1989 and 1996. NCR Regional Office, HLURB.
The above expansion in production has been achieved through an increase 
and diversification of real estate firms. Between 1987 and 1995, the number of 
registered real estate development firms doubled from 775 firms in 1987 to 
1,548 firms in 1995!1 Firms primarily into manufacturing, insurance or banking 
have put up real estate subsidiaries (Table 6.7). Some exporters have also 
ventured into real estate. Moreover, development firms that have been in the 
real estate business before the boom have diversified into other real estate 
markets or embarked on an expansion program. For instance, pioneer real 
estate development company, Ayala Land entered into housing development 
for middle income earners. C & P, which started as a developer of low cost and 
socialized housing, diversified into middle and high-end markets. Joint 
venture projects among local firms or among local and foreign firms also 
surfaced in both small or big scale real estate projects. Developers who have no 
vast tracts of land to develop go into joint ventures or minority partnership 
with landed families. On the other hand, there are also "fly-by-night" 
developers who have joined the bandwagon to obtain part of the gains. These 
are developers who consider the business a "one-shot" affair with no plans to 
stay long in the business. They tend to default on promises to deliver land 
developments to buyers creating mistrust in the industry. These firms are able 
to come and go, as there are few restrictions in the entry and exit of firms into 
the industry.
The developers nowadays think about real estate as various products meant 
for different segments of the market. They are not only into residential 
developments but also commercial, leisure and sports. Moreover, they may also 
develop projects for the high and low-income households at the same time. This 
is possible because construction technology is so flexible that developers can 
easily switch between different types of housing or real estate products. 
Marketing different products is also not a problem. There is a wide selection of 
real estate brokers in the country with expertise in selling different products. 
These professional brokers can be tapped or accredited by any developer to sell 
their products.
Although developers are highly flexible in their business, they maintain a 
"niche" status in the market. The market is veiy buyer-specific, e.g. upper and 
middle income group, students, top of the line investors, that a market can be 
created for specific buyer characteristics. Developers also establish a "brand" to 
remain competitive in the market. The brand may be in terms of quality 
developments, new innovations, design and concept of the project (e.g. 
condotels), etc.
The expansion of production during boom years has to be supported by 
financing. Real estate sales are primarily dependent on availability of financing 
since most buyers in the developed land or real estate market are installment
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11 Securities and Exchange Commission, 1996
buyers. Financing thus is an important instrument to facilitate market clearing. 
In the 1930s, real estate booms had been accompanied by greater credit 
availability at low interest rates and longer terms from the formal channels.12 
During this period the excess money in the economy, which were generated 
from exports, flowed to the real estate industry. A similar process may hold for 
the 1990s. Less investment opportunities in industry and commerce may have 
enticed financial institutions and investors to place their monies in real estate 
investments.
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Table 6.7
Companies that Diversified/Expanded into Real Estate Business 
During the 1990 Real Estate Boom
Company
Ayala Land
Filinvest Land
C & P Homes
Gatchalian Companies 
Urban Bank 
Science Park of the 
Philippines, Inc.
RFM Company 
Pamana, Inc.
PCIB
JV William
Cathay Metal Company
Megaworld Properties
Fil-Estate
Primetown
Jose Go Company
Pryce Property Corp.
Kuok Property
Basic Exploration 
Asian Petroleum
Principal Activity/Market
Commercial, industrial high-end 
residential subdivision
middle and high end residential 
subdivision
low cost and socialized residential
subdivision
plastic manufacturing
banking
industrial/techno parks
food manufacturing, agri-business
insurance
banking
exporters
steel manufacturing
commercial/residential condominium
residential village development
condotels/medicai hotels
Hardware retail business
high end commercial and residential
properties
commercial/residential condominium
condos
oil exploration
oil exploration
Expansion
middle income residential subdivision through a 
wholly owned subsidiary (Laguna Property 
Holdings)
low cost and socialized housing, commercial, 
industrial developments and golf course
middle and high end residential subdivision
Orient Properties 
Urban Corp. Properties
Mass housing, (Regatta Corp. as subsidiary)
RFM Properties 
Pamana Property, Inc.
PCIB Property, Inc.
JV Williams Realty and Development Corp. 
Cathay Land, Inc.
Middle/low cost housing subdivision (Empire 
East Land Holdings subsidiary) 
high rise condo, golfcourses, commercial center 
medium scale residential subdvision (Billion 
Homes, Inc. subsidiary)
Ever Gotesco Properties
middle income residential subdivision
high end residential subdivision
tie-up with Pyrce Properties 
APC Property
There are, however, constraints in mortgage financing from the formal 
channels. First, the law sets a limit on banks' investments on real estate to about 
20% of their loanable funds. Second, banks are also selective in providing 
mortgage financing for low cost developments. Third, the government housing
12 D.F Doeppers.(1983) Mortgage Loans and Lending Institutions in Pre-war Manila. Philippines 
Studies, 31, p. 189-215.
finance programs have limited funds and competition for these funds is tight. 
And fourth, financing from the formal sector (i.e. banks and government) 
involves long processing time and tedious loan requirements. Approval of bank 
credit takes on the average at least six months. Financing from the social 
security system and other government-financing program, takes longer. On the 
average, it takes about a year to have a loan approved. Sometimes one has to 
wait for a year only to be informed that requirements are lacking or that one 
has to wait due to lack of funds.
While access to formal channels for creditworthy borrowers is not a 
problem, the constraint lies among the greater number of middle and low- 
income households. Developers, however, have come up with mechanisms to 
facilitate financing for the real estate sector. One scheme is in-house financing 
whereby the developer provides or allocates some funds to finance buyers of its 
projects. This scheme has also served as interim financing while buyers "wait" 
for mortgage approval from the formal channels. In-house financing also 
provides the buyers a second real estate mortgage whereby the buyer pays the 
down payment on instalment terms to the developer while the rest of the 
contract price is borrowed from social security funds or from other government 
financing program.
For more established developers, subsidiary banks have been established to 
lend support to their real estate business. During the real estate boom of the 
1990s, real estate subsidiary banks have emerged. Filinvest Land has 
established its East West Bank. The Active Realty has also set up the Active 
Bank. Other developers with existing subsidiary banks (e.g. Ayala Land and 
the Bank of the Philippine Islands) extended bank services to consumer retail 
housing loans. Some developers also made special arrangements with banks to 
give priority to their clients.
The private sector also launched an asset securitization scheme whereby 
Contract-to-Sell receivables of developers can be sold in a secondary market. 
The primary bank that launched this scheme is the Philippine Commercial and 
Industrial (PCI) Bank. The program operated as follows: (1) PCI Bank and 
HIGC provide a fund for its asset securitization program; (2) developer's 
receivables are securitized with the HIGC; (3) securitized assets are sold to 
investors to generate real estate funds; (4) PCI Bank provides take-out liquidity 
to investors through the creation of a secondaiy market for the asset-backed 
securities; and (5) real estate buyers pay their monthly instalments at PCI Bank.
Developers through its various organizations (e.g. CREBA, NREA, SHDA, 
etc.) have also worked with government to facilitate financing specifically for 
the low-income sector. These organizations have assumed a proactive role in 
advocacy and policy-making. For instance, CREBA has lobbied for the 
enactment of the Comprehensive and Integrated Shelter Finance Act (CISFA) .13
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This Act, which has been approved in 1994, aimed to infuse more funds from 
various sources into middle to low cost housing developments. CREBA has also 
actively participated and lobbied for the creation of secondary mortgage market 
for low and middle-income housing .14 This secondary mortgage market is a 
liquidity mechanism where private financial institutions can sell their loan 
papers, which are extended to economic and socialized housing. The 
mechanism allows a continuous purchase of mortgages originated by the 
financial institutions on a cash basis. The idea is to relieve the financial 
institutions of the risks involved in long-term financing, thus assuring faster 
turnover of loan funds. Government through the National Home Mortgage and 
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) buys these loan papers using funds from the 
social security programs and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), a 
government housing finance program. The scheme to avail of the secondary 
market is provided in Figure 6.2. Upon the buyer's payment of full down
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O O w n er/d ev e lo p e r subm its subdivision p lan  and bill of m aterials of housing units for HIGC 
appraisal. HIGC inspect project site a n d  housung units.
© Developer subm its com plete docum ents to orig inating  bank for the prelim inary approval, 
the developer transfer the title to buyer's  nam e and gives it to the orig inating  hank.
© The o rig inating  bank  gives the prelim inary  approval and subm its buyer’s loan docum ents 
and  title to the NHM FC.
O HIGC gives the final app ra isal o f the subdiv ision  lots and  the indiv idual housing un its  and 
title  to the NH M FC a n d  the Developer.
© NHM FC a pproves  b u y e r's  loan.
© N H M FC releases b uyer’s loand  am oun t to the orig inating  bank.
© O rig inating  b ank  gives loan take o u t to tine developer.
© U pon the loan take out, the  developer a n d  the  orig inating  bank inform  the buyer to sta rt the 
m onthly p aym ent for h is /h e r  loan either to the NHM FC or any participating collections 
bank for the UHLP.
Source: E.L. Tan (1997) Real Estate in the Philippines, Manila: Solar Publishing, p. 30.
payment and submission of necessary papers, the developer submits loan 
papers to accredited banks of the NHMFC. Once the developer has obtained 
approval of the loan from the bank, the property title is transferred in the name 
of the buyer. The bank then submits the documents to NHMFC who gives the 
final approval and release payment for the buyer's loan amount. The HIGC 
takes care of appraising the property and providing loan guarantees. The buyer 
pays his or her loan amortization to either the NHMFC or any NHMFC 
accredited collecting banks.
14 Ib id
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Period of Low Demand
The downturn in Philippine real estate in the last two decades was observed to 
have occurred in two periods: one, from 1984 to 1986 and two, from mid-1997 
to 1998. In these periods, a slowdown in real estate sales was noted. The years 
1984 to 1986 were years of economic crises for the countiy: interest rates shot 
up, there was capital flight, the peso value plunged and business confidence 
was low. During these years, the number of developed lots/units placed on the 
market for sale decreased from 55,545 units in 1983 to 27,7784 units in 1986 
(Table 6.8). The decline was more apparent in the high and middle-income real 
estate markets. Residential lots in the open market declined by 28,855 lots 
(71.6%) in 1986 from its level of 40,255 units in 1983. Also, residential 
condominium units on sale in the market decreased from 3,266 units in 1983 to 
only 348 units in 1986 (a decrease of 85.2 %). On the other hand, the number of 
socialized housing lots/  units placed on the market increased by 2,953 units 
(about 25%) during the same period.
Table 6.8
Type of Real Estate Products Placed on the Market for Sale, 
Philippines, 1981-98 (figures refer to number of lots or units)
Year Open Socialized Residential Simple Industrial Commercial TOTALMarket Housing Condo Subd. Subd. Condo
1981 8,839 0 0 0 8,839
1982 30,177 1,926 2,992 0 35,095
1983 40,255 12,024 3,266 0 55,545
1984 35,364 8,841 2,349 0 46,554
1985 22,306 14,212 1,771 0 38,289
1986 11,400 15,111 348 925 27,784
1987 24,774 14,977 1,667 3,433 44,851
1988 38,410 27,989 3,541 4,947 74,887
1989 48,343 23,660 6,040 4,577 82,620
1990 30,240 26,832 5,879 4,191 403 0 67,545
1991 46,011 23,709 4,557 6,106 549 0 80,932
1992 43,747 44,263 1,231 6,769 203 1,421 97,634
1993 56,355 58,295 1,330 8,828 242 796 125,846
1994 58,294 84,644 7,585 4,056 247 476 155,302
1995 64,974 137,839 17,521 5,213 754 1,790 228,091
1996 77,079 132,304 30,776 4,637 1,410 5,292 251,498
1997 60,077 171,300 23,547 5,265 745 7,989 268,923
1998 46,329 82,621 11,915 5,763 987 1,385 150,000
Total (all yrs.) 742,974 880,547 126,315 64,710 5,540 19,149 1,839,235
Source: P lans and P rogram s D ivision, Housing and Land Use R egulatory Board.
The second period of real estate slump in the countiy was the period in 
mid-1997 to 1998. After the boom years of 1993 to 1996, the Asian crisis, which 
affected the Philippines in mid-1997, slowed down the real estate sector. Similar 
to the period 1983-86, the decline in the number of units on sale had been 
apparent in the high and middle-income real estate markets specifically the
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residential and commercial sectors. In 1997, the number of residential lots in the 
open market placed on sale declined by about 10,000 units from its level in
1996. It was further reduced by 14,000 units in 1998. Residential condo units 
placed on the market also showed a declining trend from 1996 to 1998. Foi- 
commercial condominiums, the number of units placed on the market increased 
by about 2,000 units from 1996 to 1997 but declined by 6,604 units from 1997 to
1998. The number of socialized housing units also increased between 1996 and 
1997 but declined by more than 80,000 units in 1998. On the other hand, simple 
subdivisions displayed an increasing trend from 1996 to 1998.
Some remarks of developers on how they cope during a downturn are the 
following:
1. C & P: "I just stopped selling and concentrated on collecting my 
receivables. I did not abandon my business but waited and struck when 
I sensed an opportunity ."15
2. Active Realty: "We concentrated on middle income housing. We sold 
some of our lands to finance our projects.1'1
3. Ayala Land: "We had trouble in selling our condominium project iii 
Makati. Our projected high-end buyers did not materialize thus, the 
company is reconfiguring the project to cater more to the middle- 
income market."17
The trend in the number of lots/  units on sale in the market shows that firms 
can speed up or delay deliveries of real estate projects. Developers tend to 
speed up deliveries when sales are brisk and conversely to delay deliveries 
when sales are slow. An important question is how readily can developers 
respond to these conjunctural fluctuations. This depends on what phase of the 
development process will a downturn occur. In general, the land development 
phase consists of a series of steps, which starts with raw land acquisition 
followed by the conceptualization and planning phase, then by the permits and 
licensing phase and lastly construction. When the conjuncture goes down, it is 
rather unlikely for the developer to abandon a project when development 
permits has been obtained or when construction has started. A development 
permit has a validity of only one-year (that is, development has to start within 1 
year). Given the time spent on this permit it may be costly to abandon project 
although the developer can slow down the construction activity. The validity of 
a DAR clearance is longer (i.e. five years) thus, it provides the developer longer 
time to re-plan its strategy. Likewise, if projects are on the construction phase, it 
is unlikely for developers to stop the project specifically if some lots/units have 
been sold. However, developers can slow down construction activities or in
15 This remark referred to the downturn in 1984-86. Philippine Inquirer Special Report Series. 16 
May1997.
Ibid1 This remark referred to the downturn in 1997-98. Licuanan, ALI President. Philippine Inquirer 
Special Report Series, 05 May 1997.
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some cases developers may be force to temporarily stop construction due to 
shortage of funds (this can happen if the developer is largely dependent on 
buyers' equity to finance project). Thus, in cases of a downturn, developers 
respond in two ways: one, to put on hold projects that are still on the acquisition 
or planning phase; and two, to slowdown the construction phase. The effect of 
the slowdown seems to be immediately apparent on the market.
Aside from a decline in production during a downturn, developers provide 
facilitating finance to perk up sales. Some of the financing programs that arise 
during the downturn in 1997 are provided in Table 6.9.
Table 6.9
Program
Pabahay
Express
Program
Perfect 10 
promo
Lite Values 
Ownership 
Plans
Easy
Financing
Schemes
Buyer Power 
Advantage
Ground Zero
Financing
Program
Rent-to-Own
Developers’ Facilitating Finance Programs
Firm Design
Overseas offices have been set up in Asia, America and European countries to provide a 
RGV Real one-stop-shop trading venue for overseas contract workers who may want a home In the 
Estate Philippines. Buyerscan avail ofamaximumloanofUS$1 million from the accredited bank at
competitive rates and easy instalment plans.
The promo which covers the period October 1998 to April 1999 provides the following: (a) 
relaxed payment schedules; (b) low 10 percent down payment against the current 30% down 
payment; (c) second real estate mortgages through in-house financing available at zero or 
low Interest; (d) fixed interest rates at 10% for the first two years; and (e) loan maturities of 10 
years.
The program covers buyers of the company's residential and commercial lots in selected 
areas. The features of the program include the following: (a) zero Interest scheme for one 
year; (b) reduced reservation fees; (c) lower down payment ( 15%) which Is half of the current 
Industry level; (d) 10% discounts on full payment of down payment; (e) 15% discounts on 
cash buyers; and (f) in-house financing at fixed interest rates for 10 years.
A flexible financing package specifically for the company's lots located at Corinthian Hills, 
Quezon City. The program provides for longer repayment period, interest free loan terms, 
and varied payment terms of down payment and amortization. In addition, buyers have the 
benefit to start construction on their lots even before full payment. They can also avail of free 
consultation on architectural designs.
A financing scheme that provides liberal terms to all projects of the company including club 
shares. It has the following features: (a) 10 % down payment within 60 days; (b) balance of 
down payment payable over a period of two years at zero interest rate; and (c) term loans of 
up to 20 years maturity at competitive fixed interest rates. To allow easy access of buyers to 
bank financing, the company also forged tie-ups with eight banks in the country, to wit: Bank 
of Commerce, Equitable Bank, United Coconut Planters Bank, Philippine Bank of 
Communications, Standard Charter Bank, China Bank, International Exchange Bank and 
Rizal Commercial Banking Corp.
A financing scheme introduced for buyers of the company's low and medium costs house 
and/lot units. It provides no down payment plan and in-house financing at a term of five years 
at zero interest rate.
A financing scheme whereby buyers can initially enter into a lease contract with the seller and 
rent payments can be accumulated and used as down payments based on the old price of 
the property. The company for its Townhouse project (house and lot) in Pasig is offering this 
scheme.
Ayala Land
Sta. Lucia 
Realty
Megaworld
Properties,
Inc.
Fll-Estate, Inc.
Laguna 
Properties 
Holdings, Inc.
L.A.Realty and
Development
Corp.
Source: Advertisements in Manila Bulletin, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Buy and Sell Magazine, various issues 
on the last quarter of 1997 and first quarter 1998.
Developers also seek the support of government perhaps even more so 
during a downturn. On various occasions, real estate organizations have 
actively lobbied for better funding mechanism and other institutional reforms. 
For instance, they have been pushing for the approval of a legislative bill 
seeking to ease land ownership restrictions to foreigners. Also, these
organizations have lobbied for the full implementation of the CISFA and the 
retention of the Unified Home Lending Program of the government despite its 
bankrupt status.18
The above activities of developers during period of low demand show that 
slowdown in sales may not necessarily result in a downward adjustment of 
prices. A review done by a prominent real estate broker during a similar tight 
economic situation of the early 1960s speaks of the "unrealistic" behavior of real 
estate sellers:
" .....m ost businessm en were quite disappointed at the way things had turned
out in the economy: Credit w as never more tight, im porters were caught in a 
squeeze under the new exchange rate, and m any business houses found 
themselves in overextended position. The stock m arket w ent dow n and lost 
volume; capital formation contracted and there was a noticeable im pairm ent of 
industrial developm ent.... In the real estate sector, prices have maintained fairly 
well although in some areas like Makati, Quezon City and Parañaque, prices 
had gone up from 10 to 25 percent. M any sellers were unrealistic and continued 
to ask m uch higher prices than w hat their properties were really worth. Brokers 
found it difficult to sell m any listings. Good income properties were scarce and 
whenever they come into the market, the asking prices in m ost instances were 
beyond the reach of buyers." (C.S.Gonzales, The Manila Chronicle, 08 January 1963)
In sum, conjunctural fluctuations do not necessarily lead to adjustments in 
prices. The real estate industry comes up with alternative mechanisms to clear 
markets. For instance, real estate developers are able to change markets (i.e. low 
to high-end clientele, residential to commercial real estate) as well as to speed 
up or delay deliveries. Moreover, developers are able to provide facilitating 
finance using both private and government resources. The presence of these 
non-price clearing mechanisms implies that the price fluctuations that are 
predicted to clear markets given changes or shifts in demand and supply may 
well be lower than expected. In particular, the ability of the sector to change 
markets and speed up or delay deliveries over time may have substituted for 
large price changes in the market.
6.4 Non-Price Mechanisms in Fixed Price Urban Land and Real Estate 
Market
This market arises from government intervention in the housing market. 
Government believes that the provision of housing is a social undertaking, thus,
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18 Recently, government stopped lending under the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), a 
major homebuyer finance program, due to liquidity problems. This scheme has not been 
sustained due to poor collection. Between 1988 and 1995, collection efficiency was pegged at 
63.7%. The findings showed that some borrowers were non-existent. Also, some developers 
submitted mortgages supported by defective documents. (NHMFC Board Committee Findings, 
1995).
it intervenes in the housing market by way of subsidies, guarantees, financing 
or by regulatory measures.
Government intervention in the housing market has undergone significant 
changes. During the American regime, intervention in the housing market was 
mainlv carried out in forms of slum clearance and relocation. In the 1930s, more j ' 
direct intervention in housing started with the creation of government housing 
agencies. From the 1930s to the early years of the 1970s, the government tried to 
solve the housing problem through the production and provision of housing 
and financial services. In 1978, government adopted a national shelter program 
(NSP) that consisted of three components, to wit: production, finance, 
regulation.
1. Production: This component entailed the development of site or service 
homelots and the construction of residential buildings that are sold to 
low and middle-income households. The National Housing Agency 
(NHA) was the main agency assigned to undertake housing production 
of the government. This agency was formed in 1975 from the merging 
of the Philippine Housing and Homesite Agency (PHHC) and the 
National Housing Corporation.
2. Finance: The shelter finance system operated under two major schemes,
i.e. development financing and homebuyers or end-user financing. The 
former provided financial assistance to developers engaged in 
socialized housing programs while the latter extended financial 
assistance for the purchase of a lot and /o r house and for the 
construction of houses. In particular, the homebuyer financing schemes 
served not only buyers of socialized and economic housing but also 
buyers of other low to middle income housing units.
3. Regulatory: The regulatory component involved the implementation of 
measures to regulate land and housing developments including real 
estate trade in the country. The regulatory function was performed by 
the Human Settlements and Regulatory Commission (HSRC) which 
was later reorganized into the Housing and Land use Regulatory Board 
(HLURB). Two basic laws are of importance: one, Presidential Decree 
957 (PD 957) governing land developments in open or competitive 
land/  housing markets; two, Batas Pambansa 220 (BP 220) governing 
economic and socialized land developments. In particular, BP 220 of 
1982 formally distinguished the fixed price housing market from the 
open and competitive real estate market. This law defined the 
boundaries of economic and socialized land and real estate markets as 
follows:
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Parameter BP 220 Economic Housing
BP 220 
Socialized Housing
Maximum Selling Price 
(House & Lot Package)
Cost Ratio
Above 150,000-375,000 pesos 150,000 pesos and below
House: 60% of selling price 
Lot: 40% of selling price
House: 60% of selling price 
Lot: 40% of selling price
These ceilings have remained unchanged up as of end 1999 although there 
are recent moves to increase the ceiling for socialized housing to P180,000 and 
economic housing to P500,000.
The NSP remained as the main housing strategy of government although 
some changes were introduced between 1986 and 1998 that affected the 
administrative structure and orientation of the program. Among the changes 
were the following:
1. The decentralization of the HLURB regulatory functions to the local 
government units (Local Government Code of 1991).
2. The abolition of the Ministry of Human Settlements and the creation of 
the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) 
which provided oversight functions over the activities of the different 
government housing agencies.
3. The creation of new shelter finance schemes specifically the Community 
Mortgage Program (CMP).
4. The greater participation of the private sector in economic and 
socialized housing development. This was achieved through the 
following: (a) joint venture projects; (b) additional tax benefits and 
financing incentives; and (c) mandating developers of non-socialized 
subdivision developments to allocate 20% of the total project costs for 
socialized housing development (R.A 7279 of 1992 or the UDHA).
Figure 6.3 presents the current structure of the national shelter program. The 
current structure has maintained the three components of the NSP namely: 
regulation, production and finance. However, as indicated in the above 
changes, the HLURB and the local government units are now sharing the 
regulatory function. On the other hand, production is still a function 
performed primarily by the NHA although joint ventures with the private 
sector or the local government units are being encouraged. The housing finance 
schemes introduced in the past (e.g. mortgage trading, individual mortgages, 
financial and tax incentives) have been continued up to the present. The basic 
change introduced in housing finance was the idea of community programs.
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Figure 6 3
National Shelter Program, 1986-1998
Period of High and Low Demand
The demand for economic and socialized housing in the countiy is huge. It is 
estimated that about 73% of the population can afford only low costs housing.19 
This demand is also perceived to be impervious to real estate busts since it is 
based on need rather than the overall investment climate. Government 
estimates of housing need in the sector have continually been increasing from
1.0 million units for the period 1983-1987 to 3.7 million units in 1993-1998.20
However, there is an affordability problem. Most households are unable to 
save substantial capital to pay for booking fees and equity portions of mortgage 
loans. Banks and other private lending companies also consider these 
mortgages as "lousy" credit risks. Moreover, funds from the normal financial 
intermediation process cannot provide the easy payment terms (i.e. low interest 
rates, long-term maturities of 20 to 25 years at fixed interest rates) that are 
possible through social security and government funds. The government thus is 
the major source of facilitating finance for this market.
Government has been involved in housing finance for a long time. Initially, 
the social security funds (i.e. GSIS and SSS) have been the major sources of 
housing loans. In the 1980s until the 1990s, many innovative credit schemes 
have been instituted. A list of these programs and their major features is 
provided in Appendix A. These programs have been created with different 
objectives. Some programs increase loan funds for homebuyers while other 
programs are used for development financing or as guarantee funds to get 
better access to formal credit channels. The private real estate sector, in 
particular, has actively participated in the creation of some of these funds. As
19 National Statistics Office (NSO), 1994.
20 Ministry of Human Settlements, 1983 and Housing and Urban Development Coordinating 
Agency, 1996
mentioned earlier, CREBA pushed for the creation of the NHMFC and the 
enactment of the CISFA. In addition, CREBA provided the idea of a housing 
fund system that resulted in the creation of the HDMF (or PAG-IBIG Fund) in 
the 1980s.
Since a large part of the population does not have sufficient buying power 
to buy houses, the demand on government funds becomes very competitive. 
Moreover, most government housing finance programs suffer from liquidity 
problems that magnify constraints on financing (e.g. UHLP). Developers 
continue to actively look into more sustainable housing finance loan funds. For 
instance, real estate organizations have lobbied for the full implementation of 
the Comprehensive and Integrated Shelter Finance Act (CISFA). In particular, 
this Act provides for the following: (1) increase contribution of SSS, GSIS and 
HDMF to the UHLP; (2) increase capital of NHMFC and HIGC; and (3) housing 
finance included in yearly budgetaiy allocation. So far, these provisions have 
not been fully complied with. CREBA has also sponsored a legislative bill 
recommending the creation of a housing bank network. This network envisions 
encouraging private banks to reserve a percentage of lending portfolios to 
housing through legislative incentives. Also, SHDA in collaboration with the 
HUDCC proposes a special housing fund. This fund, which aims to augment 
funds for low cost developments, will be raised from proceeds of securitization 
of mortgages in the NHMFC and from other assets or mortgage securitization 
schemes by the HDMF.
In addition to facilitating finance, developers adjust quality to account for 
increases in costs of socialized and economic housing developments. Unlike in 
the open and competitive markets, price changes in the fixed price markets 
require legislative action. Thus, adjustments to supply and demand changes 
will obviously be done through non-price mechanisms. For instance, the design 
features of government housing projects have undergone substantial changes. 
Government housing units built between 1950 and 1970 were of the finished 
type with provisions for one or two bedrooms (Table 6.10). Floor areas were also 
comparatively bigger. Starting the 1980s up to the 1990s, NHA housing is 
basically a housing core (or bare) type. Partitioning and finishing have to be 
shouldered by the buyer. The average lot or floor areas as well as provisions for 
open spaces have also become smaller.
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Table 6.10
Design Features of PHHC Housing Projects, 1949-673'
Dwelling Type No. of Bedrooms
Location Year Built Total Units Single Twin Multiple One Two Three Ave. Floor (sq m)
Quezon City 1949-51 996 134 862 722 274 40
Quezon City 1951-52 1086 1086 1086 43
Quezon City 1952-53 1194 468 726 1176 18 45
Quezon City 1953-54 2991 2278 713 2507 484 48
Manila 1954-55 469 469 69 356 44 55
Quezon City 1954-59 1269 395 316 558 934 335 63
Quezon City 1954-59 1004 30 974 178 651 175 48
Quezon City 1956-59 407 407 92 315 62
Tagaytay City 1956-59 63 63 42 21 73
Tacloban City 1956-59 195 135 4 56 141 54 57
Iloilo City 1957 275 275 100 175 72
Bacolod City 1957 228 228 118 110 59
Roxas city 1957 190 190 120 70 61
Caloocan City 1965-67 250 250 94 156 53
Tondo, Manila 1963-65 670 670 670 32
Taguig, Makati 1965-67 670 670 370 32
Quezon City 1966 32 32 32 74
TOTAL 11,989 2,107 5,988 3,894 2,651 7,691 1,957
31 The People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) was the major government housing agency from 
1950 to 1968. It was reorganized into the National Housing Corporation (NHC) in 1968. The NHC became 
the National Housing Authority in 1975.
Source: R. Ocampo (1977). Historical Development of Philippine Housing Policy: Postwar Housing Policy and 
Administration. (1945-59). Occasional Paper No. 7. University o f the Philippines, College of Public 
Administration.
The change in "quality" has also been reflected in the revised minimum 
standards of BP 220 as shown below. In addition, developers have been seeking 
reduction in open spaces and parking provisions.
Parameters 1982
Socialized Housing
1994
Socialized Housing
Minimum Lot area
Single Detached 75 sq m 54 sq m
Single Attached/Duplex/Semi-detached 75 sq m 54 sq m
Rowhouse 54 sq m 32-36 sq m
Minimum Lot Frontage 8 meters 6 meters
Source: Revised Rules and Standards for Economic & Socialized Housing Projects to Implement BP 
220. HLURB 1995.
Developers also bring in government to provide subsidies for inventions 
that allow for cost-saving techniques. Among the technologies introduced in 
the market are the following: (1) use of prefabricated steel and concrete 
"boxes"; (2) use of wood wool cement board from wood wastes, industrial tree
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plantation species, agricultural and industrial refuse such as coco husk fiber 
and coco coir.
Under the fixed price land market, the availability of low cost financing 
largely influences how this market clears. Such financing can be mainly 
obtained from the government thus developers to some extent adopt a pro­
government attitude even with preference for populistic and socialistic attitude 
for the poor. On the other hand, the problem with fixed price markets is that 
quality is sacrificed to account for increases in cost of land development. This 
makes government susceptible to providing more subsidies not only in 
homebuyers' financing but also in production.
CHAPTER 7
Market Clearing in Lands 
with Insecure Property Rights
In the preceding chapter, market clearing was discussed on the assumption that the lots sold on the market are freed from any encumbrances that would 
constraint a buyer to obtain fee simple rights on the land. In this chapter, we 
focus on how markets clear when land rights are insecure. Insecure land rights 
arise from fraudulent activities in acquiring ownership to land. This may be 
done by fraudulent activities of citizens via the courts and land registration 
offices. The result is a "fake" title, double titling or overlapping titles. Likewise, 
illegal or forced occupation of private and public lands (squatting) also leads to 
insecure property rights. Lands occupied by squatters may have perfect 
property rights but the presence of squatters limits the marketability of land, as 
politicians adopt a populist attitude toward squatters.
It has been commonly assumed that lands with insecure rights are 
withdrawn from the market. However, markets may still clear although rights 
are insecure. Insecure rights caused by fraud are being traded because buyers 
(and sometimes sellers) are unaware of the fraud. The reason is that the court 
and /o r  the land registration office are part of the fraud. Public officials and /  or 
employees are enticed by "bribes" to facilitate titling and registration of 
documents that have been faked. On the other hand, lands occupied by 
squatters are less likely to be concealed. Buyers are generally aware of the 
presence of squatters or illegal occupants. The market clears through a 
bargaining process between the buyer, the landowner, and the squatters. In 
many cases, the government is either directly or indirectly involved in the 
process.
The chapter starts with a discussion of how sale of fraudulent land titles are 
undertaken in the countiy. It focuses on why these frauds are difficult to detect 
and the response of government and the private sector to such frauds. In the 
next section, market solutions to lands occupied by squatters are presented. 
Both government and private sector solutions are examined. The discussion 
also points to some cases when bargaining alone is not sufficient to clear the 
market. The last section discusses the implications of these market-clearing 
mechanisms in the urban land and real estate market.
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7.1 Sale of Lands with Fraudulent Titles
A caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) warning when buying a piece of real 
estate in the country is not something to be taken for granted. This warning is 
not baseless given the crafty way in which "fake" titles are "manufactured" and 
sold in the market. Even the learned and educated citizens can be victims of 
"fake" titles.
Case histories of some celebrated “fake” land title cases that have found 
their way in the market are provided in Box 7.1.
Box 7.1
Sale of Fake Titles in the Market
1. The Tala Estate Title Case
In the 1980s, Biyaya Corporation, a real estate development firm, developed a 
110-hectare property covering Barangay Camarin in Caloocan and Barangay 
Pasong Putik in Novaliches, Quezon City. Residents in the area call the developed 
property, Maligaya Park. However, long before Biyaya Corporation came in, there 
were settlers in the area who were turned out when Biyaya Corporation claimed 
ownership ofthe land. In 1995, Biyaya’s title was discovered and pronounced illegal 
by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Biyaya’s three transfer certificates of title 
were considered null and void since the original sale of the property was not 
consummated. The area occupied by the Maligaya Park was part of the Tala 
Estate, a government property that could be alienated and disposable. However, 
the original purchaser of the property did not fully pay or belatedly paid for the 
acquisition of the land, thus there was no sale or transfer of property that took 
place. Although the sale has not been perfected, TCTs were issued on the property 
in the name of owners of the Biyaya Corporation. In 27 December 1996, the 
solicitor general’s office started reversion proceedings against Biyaya’s title. Biyaya 
Corporation, however, insisted on its property rights. On the hand, numerous 
buyers confront the Corporation with threats of lawsuits because they want their 
money back. The case is now with the regional trial court of Quezon City. (Regional 
Trial Court, Quezon City)
(Continued next page)
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Box 7.1
Sale of Fake Titles in the Market
(continued)
2. The Maysilo Land Estate Scam
Two original certificates of title (OCT) 994 were made to appear by the registry 
of deeds in Calolocan to have been issued to the Maysilo Estate, covering the cities 
of Caloocan and Quezon. The estate was later partitioned and re-partitioned, sold 
and resold and different transfer certificates of titles (TCTs) were Issued on the 
subdivided lands from OCT 994 bearing different registration dates. In 1987, a 
certain Jose B. Dimson filed a case against the Metro Manila Water and Sewerage 
System (MWSS) for allegedly occupying its land. The land that was indicated in Mr. 
Dimson’s transfer certificate of title overlapped that of MWSS. Mr. Dimson’s TCT 
was derived from OCT 994 dated 19 April 1917 while that of MWSS was derived 
from OCT 994 dated May 3.1917. The regional trial court in Caloocan in its decision 
dated 03 April 1988 upheld the TCT in the name of Mr. Dimson and declared the 
TCT in the name of MWSS as void. The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the lower court in January 1992 and November 1992, 
respectively. The Supreme Court also ruled that two OCT 994 exist but with different 
dates, to wit: 19 April 1917 and 03 May 1917. Following the general land titling 
concept that whoever registers it first has better claim to the land, the title with the 
earlier date (19 April 1917) was declared the rightful OCT 994. This decision ofthe 
Supreme Court has raised concern among all land buyers and titleholders whose 
TCTs bear as mother title OCT 994 dated 03 May 1917. The government also 
stands to lose some 1,254 TCTs covering 450 hectares of land.
An investigation of the case by the Senate committees on justice and human 
rights and on urban planning, housing and resettlement as well as the Department of 
Justice showed that the Maysilo Estate consisting of 1,528 hectares was split into 5 
titles that were issued to co-owners. One such title was OCT 994 covering an area 
of 1,331 hectares. OCT 994 consisted of 34 lots with 32 co-owners. The ownership 
of the applicants for the OCT 994 was confirmed in land registration case no. 4429 
on 03 December 1912. A decree to this effect was then issued by the Land 
Registration Court on 19 April 1917 and the date that the OCT 994 was entered or 
registered at the registry of deed was 03 May 1917. The result of the investigation 
showed that there is only one OCT 994 and this was registered in 03 May 1917. 
Under the land registration law, the date of entry at the registry is the date in which 
the certificate of title takes effect. Original copies ofthe decree and OCT 994 bearing 
the three important dates are on file at the LRA and the office ofthe registry of deeds 
of Caloocan City.
However, the result o fthe Supreme Court ruling has made the syndicate ofthe 
“fake” TCTs to be more aggressive. These falsified TCTs have been used to oust 
landowners whose titles were derived from the legal OCT 994. Also these TCTs 
have been traded to unsuspecting buyers who were also able to register the transfer 
of title through members of the “fake” titling syndicate employed at the Caloocan 
registry of deeds. Some of the controversies are now in trial courts or on appeal to 
the Court of Appeals.
This anomaly on OCT 994 started in 1961 when a group headed by a certain 
Bartolome Rivera petitioned to then Court of First Instance of Pasig for the transfer 
______________________________________________________________(continued next page)
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Box 7.1
Sale of Fake Titles in the Market
(continued)
of the property assigned to Maria Concepcion Vidal, a co-owner of OCT 994. The group 
claimed that they were heirs ofthe late Ms. Vidal. On the strength of documents showing 
that Ms. Vidal has been dead and a witness who professed to know Ms. Vidal and 
husband, the petition to substitute the name of the surviving heirs to the name of Ms. 
Vidal in Oct 994 was granted by the court in May 1962. Mr. Rivera then executed a Deed 
of Transfer and Conveyance in favor of Jose B. Dimson whereby he agreed to transfer 
25% of whatever land he is entitled as attorney’s fee. In 1965, Jose B. Dimson petitioned 
to the Pasig CFI for the said transfer. The approval of conveyance was granted in June 
1966. However, the court also ordered that the final approval of conveyance be subjected 
to a duly approved subdivision plan by the then Land Registration Commission. There 
was no record of such compliance and ofthe court’s final approval ofthe LRC subdivision 
plan. On record, however, was a court order dated August 16,1966 denying the motion of 
Jose Dimson. The motion was denied on the grounds that “whatever portions o f the 
property covered by OCT 994 that had not been disposed of by previous owners have 
already been assigned and adjudicated to Bartolome Rivera and his assignees and thus 
there is not a portion left to be given to Jose Dimson. ” However, prior to the August 16 
decision, Dimson filed a petition to the CFI Caloocan City that titles are to be issued to 
him in the implementation of court order June 13,1966 ofthe Pasig CFI Branch. Dimson 
also submitted a subdivision plan although the record bears no approval from the Bureau 
of Lands or the Land Registration Commission. Moreover, although the CFI Caloocan 
had no jurisdiction over the confirmation ofthe order ofthe Pasig CFI, the court granted 
the petition in October 1967 directing the registrar of Caloocan to issue titles to Dimson. 
On the basis of this court order, Dimson was issued four TCTs from OCT 994 involving 
191.29 hectares of land. Mr. Norberto Vasquez, who was the acting registrar of deeds of 
Caloocan, issued these TCT’s on 08 June 1978. The registrar certified that these TCTs 
were derived from OCT 994 registered on 19 April 1917. On 16 May 1978, Mr. Vasquez 
also issued a TCT to another person derived from OCT 994 registered on 03 May 1917. 
These were not the only TCTs issued based on OCT 994 registered on 19 April 1917. In 
August 1979, Mr. Capistrano, the new registrar of deeds in Caloocan also issued 22 
TCT’s to one of the heirs of Maria Vidal. These TCTs were issued upon the orders of 
Judge Ubay of then Caloocan CFI.
In 1981, a complaint of overlapping titles with those issued to Jose Dimson led to 
the investigation of Dimson’s TCT by the Land Verification Committee of the LRA. 
The investigation found the following anomalies. First, that the claim of Bartolome 
Rivera, et.al., as heirs of Maria Concepcion Vidal was physically and genetically 
impossible as Ms. Vidal was born at a later date than Mr. Bartolome. Second, the 
four Dimson’s TCTs were found to be duplications of existing titles and thus were 
null and void. These findings were forwarded to the office of solicitor general but 
were not acted upon. On the other hand, Jose Dimson also filed an action for 
“quieting of title, ” on grounds that the TCTs were under investigation by the regional 
trial court. This prevented the government and other complainants to file a case 
against the ownership of the land covered by the TCTs. The case did not surface 
again until the later part of 1980.
(continued next page)
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Box 7.1
Sale of Fake Titles in the Market
(continued)
In the early 1990s, another alleged heir of Ms. Vidal filed a motion for the 
partition and segregation of several lots that used to be a part of the Maysilo Estate. 
In the proceeding of this motion one ofthe documents presented was a letter written 
by Deputy Registrar of Deeds Norberto Vasquez claiming that OCT 994 filed in his 
Caloocan City office was issued on 19 April 1917. In 1996, Judge Discaya issued a 
court order directing the registrar of deeds of Caloocan City to issue new TCTs to 
the alleged heir. Registrar of Deeds Yolanda Alfonso issued three new TCTs 
covering 1.9 hectares of prime land. In these TCTs, Alfonso certified that OCT 994 
was originally registered on 19 April 1917. However, prior to this Alfonso has also 
issued a TCT for a 530-meter lot in the names of her five children based on a TCT 
from Jose B. Dimson. But in 1993, Alfonso also certified on the titles of Phil-Ville 
Development and Housing Corporation that the lands were derived from OCT 994 
registered on 03 May 1917.
The anomaly started to surface when a certain Cecilia Yabut whose property is 
overlapped by one ofthe new TCTs issued to the alleged heir, filed a complaint with 
the Ombudsman stating that the space on which April 19,1917 was written on the 
new TCT issued bears some erasures. Deputy Registrar Vasquez admitted the 
erasures. Registrar Alfonso also stated that “it was a minor inadvertence and could 
not caused any damage to any party, for, if worst came to worst, and the factual 
issue o f original registration o f OCT 994 be a crucial issue, the best evidence would 
naturally be OCT 994 and not the subsequent TCTs where a different date appears”.
This complaint started a series of complaints from landowners who have been 
affected by the new TCTs. They argued that the mistake was not a minor 
inadvertence since the Supreme Court’s decision on Dimson vs. the MWSS was 
misled by false information fed by the Office of the registrar of deeds. The act has 
also caused the doubling or possibly tripling of land titles in the area.
The problem, however, is that there were also landowners who bought their 
property from the alleged heirs or whose TCTs were based on OCT 994 dated 19 
April 1917. These buyers verified the TCTs with the registrar of Deeds in Caloocan 
and were able to obtain a certification that the title was “clean.” For instance, one of 
the alleged heirs sold her TCT to a realty corporation. The Corporation checked with 
the Caloocan register and was expressly guaranteed that the title was “free from 
any existing lien or encumbrance of whatsoever kind.” However, after the 
Corporation paid the land and sought to register the property, the Corporation found 
that there were annotations on the title. The registrar revealed this herself. In 
addition, one o fthe claimants to the property who holds a different TCT number on 
the same lot filed for a “quieting Of title.” (V.B.Foz, The Maysilo Estate Story, Special Report, 
Manila Bulletin, July 21, 22, 24, 25, 30 and August 2, 1997)
What is being peddled in the market are "fake" transfer certificates of title 
(TCTs), which have been falsified in different ways (see Chapter 3). These "fake" 
TCTs bear the official stamp of the register of deeds. In various cases, the 
registrar of deeds also certifies on the correctness of the "fake" TCT. Thus, to an 
unsuspecting buyer, the sale transaction is legitimate.
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The registration of "fake" TCTs cannot be done without help from the office 
of the registrar of deeds and courts since subdivision and segregation of titles 
require court order or approval from the Bureau of Lands. In addition, 
documents presented in court or for registration have to be consistent with 
previously registered titles. Thus, "fake" titles are manufactured and traded 
because "syndicates" connive with officials in courts, the registry of deeds or 
the Bureau of Lands. It is possible for the registry of deeds to provide false 
information. Title tracing thus becomes important. Buyers must not simply rely 
on the registrar of deeds but should also obtain information from other sources 
such as the LRA.
Transactions to manufacture and sell "fake" titles do not come free. The 
extent of "fees" or "commissions" given to the officials is not known. Some 
indications though may be obtained from the Maysilo case. For instance, Jose 
Dimson, attorney-in-fact, of the alleged heirs received a 25% share of the land 
obtained by the heirs. In the same case, records from the office of the register of 
deeds in Caloocan have shown that on 12 August 1996, Register Alfonso issued 
a TCT involving about 530 square meter of prime land in Caloocan in the 
names of her five children. In this TCT she certified that the land was 
previously registered under OCT 994 on "19 April 1997." This TCT was 
previously issued to a daughter of Jose Dimson.1
7.2 Sale of Lands Occupied by Squatters
In the last attempt to do an accurate count of squatter population in Metro 
Manila in 1980, the National Housing Authority placed 1.65 million people in 
415 colonies. Succeeding figures on squatter population since then were 
estimates based on the 1980 data and annual population growth rate. In 1990, 
the estimated squatter population in Metro Manila was placed at 1.99 million in 
385 colonies.2 Of the total number of squatter colonies in 1980, government 
identified 245 areas for priority development. These priority squatter colonies 
occupied an area of about 638 hectares or 1.1% of Metro Manila's total built 
area. The lands occupied vary in size from a veiy large area covering hundreds 
of hectares to small squatter settlements of less than a thousand square meters.
Private and public lands in Metro Manila degenerated into squatter colonies 
in different ways (Table 7.1). Some squatter areas had their origins from a 
landlord-tenant relation. The squatters were previous tenants of agricultural 
lands. When Metro Manila became urbanized and the landowner wanted to use 
the land for purposes other than agricultural, the tenants refused to vacate the
1 “Senate hits Caloocan land registration officials’ flip-flopping over OCT 994” The Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, 14 July 1998.
2 Fast Facts on Philippine Housing and Population, NHA, August 1994. The number of colonies 
also took into consideration squatter areas that were developed through programs of the 
government.
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land. Other squatter areas started with few families acquiring leasehold 
contracts from the landowner. These families paid rents for occupying the land. 
Later other families also came to occupy the land rent-free without consent of 
owners. There were also cases of illegal entry whereby a group of "homeless" 
families invaded idle lands, in particular, public or government lands or private 
lands with multiple claimants.
Table 7.1
Historical Origin of Squatter Areas, Metro Manila
Site/Location
Tondo Foreshoreland
Railway Tracks (Caloocan 
City to Makati City)
Juan Luna, Tondo, Manila 
Manggahan, Pasig 
Apitong, Marikina
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
Tangos, Navotas
Maricaban, Pasay 
H ub, Mandaluyong 
Barangka, Marikina 
San Maring de Porres, 
Quezon City
Capri, Novaliches, Quezon 
City
Tramo Lines/Pasay_______
Year of 
Settlement
1947
1950
1952
1986
1960
1976
1940
Landowner/ Land use
government/reclaimed area for port 
expansion
Philippine National Railway (PNR) Co./danger 
zone
private owners/ residential 
MMDA/open land 
private owner/residential land
1960 overlapping land claims
1900 public land and private owners/low-lying area
1950 
1903 
1950
Bureau of A ir Transportation/ open land 
Manila Railroad Co./provincial government 
private owner/agricultural
1945 private owner
local government and Integrated National 
Police/open land
PNR/open land________________________
Nature of Entry
temporary 
occupants/lessees 
temporary 
occupants/lessees 
Lessees 
illegal entry 
illegal entry 
ownership through 
conflicting legal and 
quasi-legal 
arrangements 
lessees on private 
lands
illegal entry
lessees
tenants
lessees
emergency 
relocation center 
agricultural lessees
Source: “A Review of Land Acquisition Issues,” Corporate Planning Division, National Housing Authority 
Land for the Urban Poor, Ministry of Human Settlements and the National Housing Authority
In agricultural areas outside Metro Manila, the "squatters" were either the 
landlord's tenants or "katiwalas" (i.e. overseers) who were unwilling to vacate 
the land. In the 1920s and 1930s, land grabbing was prevalent in agricultural 
regions in the Philippines. The refusal of tenants to vacate the land could be 
traced, in some cases, to land grabbing incidents in the past whereby ancestors 
of landlords grabbed the land from the tenants' ancestors. The urbanization of 
the CALABARZON area had raised various cases of landlord-tenant disputes 
over land.
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Squatters do recognize that they are illegal occupants of a property. 
However, they also recognize certain rules of conduct that are binding and thus 
regulate their behavior according to these rules. Those who occupied the land 
by virtue of agricultural activities claim their rights under the agrarian reform 
law. On the other hand, squatters in urban lands claim their rights as long-time 
lessees or occupants of the land. The populist leanings of politicians during 
election time have strengthened these rights.
Finding a market solution to lands occupied by squatters has been difficult.3 
Court settlements can drag on for years and eviction is generally not acceptable 
to society. Bargaining (i.e. out-of-court settlement) is the most common way to 
bring about transfers of land rights. This method may not work at all times 
since there are cases when the negotiating parties could reach no agreement.
The government and the private sector have employed different bargaining 
agreements to clear this market. Squatters are either provided substantial 
amount of cash and /o r a source of livelihood. Some squatters are also given 
house and lot within the area or locality. Initially, the government and private 
sector have done settlement with squatters separately. Toward the later part of 
the 1980s, joint venture schemes between the private and government sector 
have become popular.
Government Solution to Squatter Areas
Government has been involved in finding solutions to squatter areas as a social 
policy. Until the 1970s, the government's main strategy on squatter areas in 
Metro Manila was relocation. Squatters of private and public lands were 
transferred to relocation sites usually outside the metropolitan area. This 
scheme, however, did not work out in many cases. Relocated squatters 
returned to the city and again squatted in other areas. Studies on squatters' 
relocation reveal the following:4
1. North Bago Bantay Resettlement Si fe/government provided each relocated 
family a 250-meter lot. However, drainage facilities and roads were not 
available. Employment opportunities were also scarce. By the 1960s 
many original settlers sold their rights to migrants.
3 By market solution I refer to transfer of rights recognized by the formal system. An informal 
land market usually exists in squatter areas whereby a squatter household can sell its 
occupancy rights over a piece of land in the colony. However, this exchange is not recognized 
by the legal system.
4 P.Q. Makil (1983) Slums and Squatters in the Philippines. A paper prepared for the Institute of 
Developing Economies, Tokyo, Japan. P. Jimenez and E. Javier (1986) The Philippine Urban 
Situation Analysis. A Report submitted to UNICEF.
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2. Carmona Resettlement site: Of the resettled households, only one-third 
could continue their jobs in Metro Manila. One third succeeded in 
finding new jobs but with some period of unemployment. The relocated 
squatters sold their lands and went back to Manila to squat on another 
property.
3. Sapang Palay Resettlement Site: Only 20% of the relocated squatters 
remained.
In the 1970s, slum upgrading or on-site developm ent strategy was 
initiated and given priority over relocation. Under this program, the 
government acquired the land occupied by squatters and provided on-site 
development.5 The land was either developed into a subdivision (i.e. the land 
was subdivided into many small sized lots) or as a site for tenement housing. 
For land subdivision, squatters may put up their own houses but more often 
core houses were already provided. For housing tenements, medium rise 
houses6 were constructed whereby each squatter family was given "occupancy 
rights." Squatters acquired these lots or housing units through available long­
term financing programs from government housing agencies. Initially, 
government's strategy on upgraded slums was to grant squatters the right of 
leasehold instead of legal land titles. This strategy was, however, rejected by 
the squatters, who preferred a more secured tenure.
Slum upgrading was not only limited to construction of housing. This 
scheme provided a total community approach in which commercial, 
recreational and some educational needs of the settlers were planned. Many 
slum-upgrading projects were started during President Marcos' administration 
(see Appendix B for the list of slum upgrading programs of government). 
Included in these projects were those initiated by previous administrations that 
had to undergo redevelopment (e.g. Vitas, Tondo).
A major problem encountered by the government in buying lands occupied 
by squatters was pricing. Disagreement between the landowner and the 
squatters about the price of land results in a deadlock of bargaining 
negotiations. In 1978, an Urban Land Reform Act was passed (PD 1517) which 
provided the government greater powers to control and manage urban land 
vise. A consequence of this law was the proclamation of Metro Manila as an 
Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). Under the ULRZ, Areas for Priority
5 Slum upgrading provides the following: "basically introducing community facilities and 
services such as roads, footpaths, drainage, sewerage, water and power systems, school, 
barangay centers, community centers and clinics with complementary socio-economic 
programs... particularly the provision of employment among resident families" (Letter of 
Instruction (LOI) 555, June 1977).
6 Until the early part of 1960s, the few examples of tenement housing (e.g. Vitas, Santa 
Ana/Punta, Leveriza, etc.) reached up to 17th floors. It was later realized that this resulted in 
very poor maintenance. Access to the top floors was a problem due to the absence of 
mechanized gadgets (e.g. elevators). Under the present Building Code, low-cost medium-rise 
buildings were limited up to 5 floors. Beyond this level, elevators have to be provided.
Development (APDs) were identified as sites of government housing programs 
(Table 7.2). There were 264 APDS identified for Metro Manila of which 245 were 
proclaimed in the early 1980s while 19 were proclaimed between 1986 and 1989 
through NHA Board approval. These APDs were selected mainly because of 
their blighted condition. In these APDs, land sales and development required 
the approval of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In 
cases when the landowner is a private individual or artificial person (e.g. 
corporation, partnership), the government expropriated these properties.7 The 
existing occupants were given the right of first refusal to purchase the land 
within a reasonable time and at a reasonable cost to be decided by the HLURB. 
In the 1990s, government discontinued the practice of identifying APDs due to 
opposition from landowners.
Of the 264 APD areas, about 80 were developed through NHA programs, 
49 by local government units and 29 through private sector initiatives.8 Only 
about 106 APD areas remained undeveloped. However, not all of the identified 
developed APDs were fully developed. Some portions of identified developed 
colonies remained undeveloped due to ownership problems and failure 
between the landowner and squatters to agree on the price of land.
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7 In expropriation, the government decrees that private land rights revert to public ownership.
8 APD Status Report, Corporate Planning Office, NHA, 1995.
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Table 7.2
Area of Priority Development (APD)a, NCR 
Status Report as of June 1995
No. Direct For
City / of Develoced Areas Purchase by Pending Development Drop­
Municipality APD NHA LGUs Community ping “
Planning Stage/For For Land
------- -------- Validation/ Site Research/
Other Inspection/Land With court
ZIP CMP Program0 Negotiation case
Manila 41 11 3 1 2 2 17 2 3
Quezon City 68 6 3 3 23 0 15 3 15
Kalookan City 12 3 4 2 1 0 2 0 0
Pasay City 28 6 6 0 0 0 11 5 0
Makati City 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0
Mandaluyong City 10 0 1 1 5 0 1 1 1
Muntinlupa City 14 0 0 0 4 0 6 0 4
Pasig City 18 1 0 1 10 0 4 0 2
Las Plñas 6 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0
Malabon 13 1 1 0 1 1 10 0 0
Marikina 9 4 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Navotas 9 0 7 0 0 0 2 0 0
Parañaque 8 0 3 0 0 0 5 0 0
Pateros 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
San Juan 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taguig 7 0 3 0 1 0 3 0 0
Valenzuela 7 0 1 0 1 0 5 0 0
TOTAL 264 35 35 10 49 3 94 12 26
al There were a total of 284 APDs proclaimed for the entire Philippines distributed as follows:
Proclamation No. 1967 (1980) 244 Metro Manila 
Proclamation No. 2284 (1983) 1 Metro Manila 
Proclamation No. 1810 (SIR Sites) 19Regional 
NHA Board Approved (1986-89) 19 Metro Manila; 1 Regional. 
b/ Flagship projects, medium rise and resettlement housing (e.g. Smokey Mountain, North Triangle, Pabahay 
sa Riles).
c/ These sites have been found free from Informal settlers or that the sites have long been utilized for 
purposes other than residential.
Source: Corporate Planning Office, NHA.
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The most popular slum-upgrading project in Metro Manila was the Tondo 
Foreshore Dagat-Dagatan Project. A discussion on this project is provided 
below (Box 7.2).
Box 7.2
Slum-Upgrading: Tondo Foreshore Dagat-Dagatan Project
The Tondo Foreshore project was the government's first effort at comprehensive 
slum upgrading program. It was started in 1974 with funding assistance from the 
World Bank amounting to US$32 million. The project site was a 137-hectare land 
reclaimed from Manila Bay in the 1940s. It was intended to be an industrial port 
complex. However, the place became attractive to migrants from the countryside who 
settled in the area soon after the war. In 1973, President Marcos planned to revive 
the complex. About 27,600 families had already settled in the area with a population 
density of 2,000 persons per hectare. The site was considered the largest blighted 
community in Metro Manila and Southeast Asia.
Series of attempts to relocate the squatters did not succeed. On October 1974, 
the Tondo Foreshore Development Authority (TFDA) was created to implement a 
comprehensive development plan in Tondo Foreshore. TFDA (which was later 
merged with NHA) proposed for an urban renewal program that called for massive 
reblocking and reclamation.
The Zone One Tondo Organization (ZOTO) first raised resistance to the project. 
ZOTO is the umbrella organization of community-based organizations (CBOs) in the 
largest barangay of Tondo Foreshore. These CBOs are small tenant groups that 
existed since the 1950s. They are bound by the common objective to acquire 
individual homelots and resolve the land issue in the area. ZOTO was formed in 1970 
arising from earlier efforts of CBOs to have an umbrella organization. It was ZOTO 
that initiated forming an alliance with other organizations in the area to be a stronger 
lobby group. This alliance came to be known as the Ugnayan ng mga Mamamayan 
ng Tondo Foreshore land (Council of Community Organizations in Tondo Foreshore). 
Specifically, the Ugnayan pressured the government and international organizations 
(e.g. World Bank, NGOs) to meet the demands of the group. The main issues that 
provoked resistance were the following: first, the price that had to be paid for the 
legal land titles. On the part of government, cost recovery was considered the basic 
principle in setting the prices thus the land had to be sold or leased at prevailing 
market price. ZOTO wanted to buy the land at the price set under the Tondo 
Foreshore Act of 1956 which granted the occupants the right to purchase the land at 
five pesos per square meter. The second issue is security of land tenure. In 1975 
President Marcos issued PD (Presidential Decree) 814 that provided right of 
leasehold but offered no security of land tenure to the occupants. ZOTO, however, 
wanted legal land titles. The third issue is on the relocation-eviction. Only 18,676 lots 
can be provided under the urban renewal project. This implies that not all 27,600 
families in the area can be accommodated. ZOTO wanted on-site improvement as 
alternative to distant relocation sites.
A series of mass actions staged by ZOTOIUgnayan changed the original plans of 
the World Bank. One part of Tondo was allowed to be reserved for housing. Those 
occupants who were to move out were offered a lot in the nearby Dagat-Dagatan.
(continued next page)
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Dagat-Dagatan Project was simultaneously developed as resettlement site. This site 
has an area of 410 hectares reclaimed from fishponds. Land at Tondo Foreshore 
was sold at P5 per square meter to the beneficiaries. In addition, occupants had to 
pay P0.95 per square meter per month for the development cost.
Development of housing under the urban renewal project involved upgrading of 
substandard housing and introducing basic community facilities and amenities and 
livelihood programs. Specifically, the following changes were undertaken: (1) 
realignment of existing irregular placement of houses based on a detailed block 
layout vyherein each block was provided roads and community facilities (e.g. schools, 
health centers, barangay centers); (2) redefinition of lot boundaries by occupants; 
and (3) subdivision of the land into homelots that were sold or awarded to bonafide 
occupants. Average lot size of 48 square meters was provided. Families were also 
given materials for house improvement and loans for cottage industries.
Source: Ministry of Human Settlements
National Housing Authority, Philippine Assistance for Rural and Urban Development
While the slum-upgrading program had been successful in terms of 
government buying the land for the squatters, the transfer of rights from the 
government to the squatters created many problems. There were cases of 
"double awardees" and repayment rate of loan amortization was low. 
Moreover, the sale contract between the government and squatters was that the 
land or housing "rights" could not be sold or transferred to another person 
except through heirs and with the approval of the NHA. This created a problem 
to families who wanted to go back to the province or transfer to another 
location for various reasons. However, the restriction imposed by the 
government on the squatter' rights to alienate land or housing did not prevent 
these families to sell their rights without obtaining approval from the NHA. 
This resulted m an informal land market whereby the squatter household 
waived its rights over the property by signing a "quit" claim. Due to the 
prevalence of this practice, the government in the mid-1980s formalized this 
practice. The awardee wanting to sell his or her rights issues a notarized waiver 
in lieu of the buyer. The transaction is then registered with NHA upon payment 
of the parties of a transfer fee. The transfer fee and paper works, however, have 
discouraged some awardees to notify the NHA on their sale transactions.
Slum upgrading continued to be a strategy on lands occupied by squatters. 
However, this strategy proved to be expensive for the government. Housing 
needs in the country had ballooned and there are competing demands on the 
government's housing funds. In 1987, the Community Mortgage Program 
(CMP) was launched by the NHMFC. This program provided financial 
assistance to residents of blighted and depressed areas to purchase and develop 
a tract of land under the concept of community ownership. The tract of land 
maybe the land presently occupied (on-site) or a vacant lot in another location 
(off-site). This scheme enabled the squatter community to buy the land they 
occupy from the legal owner through financial assistance from the CMP.
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The financial assistance from the CMP works as follows: first, the NHMFC 
lends the squatter an amount that would enable the association to buy the land 
from its owner; second, the landowner transfers the title of the property to the 
association but said property is mortgaged to the NHMFC. The loan is payable 
in 25 years at low interest rates. This financial scheme, however, requires that at 
least 90% of the squatter households in the area agree to the conditions of the 
sale. In large squatter colonies, the land may be divided into smaller areas or 
zones to have manageable community organizations. It is possible that one 
zone with less recalcitrant squatter households can obtain a loan ahead of the 
other zones. In some cases, the landowner may agree to be paid only for the 
area occupied by the non-recalcitrant households and file ejectment cases for 
the recalcitrant squatters. The success of the program basically depends on the 
cooperation of the households since the loan is a community loan. This loan 
becomes individualized only when the community exhibits good repayment 
performance. Individualized loan is also subject to an approved subdivision 
plan for the particular land. This implies that the community have to hire a 
surveyor to provide the subdivision plan.
Between 1987 and 1997, a total of 55 land parcels occupied by squatters9 in 
Metro Manila were placed under the CMP (see Appendix C for a list of these 
projects). Private individuals owned most of these lands. Many of these lands 
were also taken out by the NHMFC. This implies that the landowner has been 
paid, the land title has been issued under the name of the community and the 
land has been mortgaged to the NHMFC. On the other hand, there are still 
areas wherein the CMP has not succeeded in clearing the market. The problem 
usually emanates from the lack of unity between members and the lack of 
leadership of the organization's officers. NGOs generally provide the assistance 
to organize the communities. Some specific cases of how the CMP facilitated (or 
failed to facilitate) market clearing is provided below (Box 7.3).
9 This does not equate to the number of squatter colonies since large areas are divided into 
several zones. The zone that meets the requirements of the CMP could avail of financing 
ahead of the other zones.
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Box 7.3
The Community Mortgage Program as a Market Clearing Mechanism
1. The NAPICO Manggahan Squatters10
In February 1986, a day after the People Power Revolution, a group of 20 
landless families occupied a vacant government property at Manggahan, Pasig. Ka 
Lando, a former barangay11 investigator led this group. Each family selected a 
parcel of lot defining the lot boundaries with a rope. The families cleared their lots 
and built temporary shelters. By word of mouth, other landless families came to 
settle in the area. By the end of 1990 there were about 5,000 households occupying 
the 38-hectare land.12
The squatter families were organized as early as 1987 through Ka Lando's 
initiative. Their group was known as the Association of Landless Residents of 
Manggahan (ALARM) and was registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). During this time the group approached the MMDA (formerly 
Metro Manila Council), the legal owner of the land, to express their interest in buying 
the land. In response, the MMDA Chairman issued Resolution 41 that provided the 
residents the right of first refusal to purchase the land. Resolution 41 according to 
the residents provided them legal claim on the property.
In 1990, the group was initiated to the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) 
through NHA's support.13 Since the area was large, it was subdivided into 13 
independent zones. Smaller grouping would also facilitate loan releases. Each zone 
elected its own set of leaders and all the 13 zones were under an umbrella 
organization or federation. This federation was known as the Ninoy Aquino Pilot 
Community (NAPICO). It was registered with the Home Insurance Guarantee Fund 
(HIGC) in 1990.
To determine the fair market value for the property, NHA made a study of the 
surrounding area. The site is a residential zone. In 1990, the surrounding residential 
areas were selling at P1,200 per sq.m. Since the site was considered raw land a 
price of P600 per square meter was proposed by the NHA. This price was 
acceptable to both the Federation and the MMDA.
Eight years have passed since the group’s initiation to the CMP but only one 
zone was able to get financing. Many residents were ambivalent on the success of 
the CMP in their case. The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the MMDA 
and NAPICO remained unsigned to date. This MOA effectively assigned to NAPICO 
ownership of the land upon payment of the agreed price. In the absence of this 
MOA, the Foundation's officers were unable to assure the residents on MMDA's 
action. The number of recalcitrants in the area thus continues to increase. 
______________________________________________________(continued next page)
10 Interview with Mr Jimmy Cruz, Board Member, NAPICO, 04 January 1998
11 smallest political unit or geographical subdivision of cities or municipalities
12 the total land area ofthe property is 41.1 hectares however, when the squatters settled in the 
area, about 3 hectares were already developed for BLISS Housing.
13 The CMP became a component of the government-housing program in 1988. To avail of 
financing, the squatters, landless households or the urban poor should be organized and 
accredited with SEC or the HIGC. NHA and/or the accredited NGOs act as originators, who 
organize the squatters and facilitate approval of financing.
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Moreover, in 1994, “professional squatters” infiltrated the site. At least two 
groups surfaced to claim ownership of the land. These "professional squatters" 
have been creating division among groups reducing the CMP’s chances to succeed.
2. Apitong Neighborhood, Marikina, Metro Manila14
The Apitong neighborhood is situated some ten miles from the center of 
Marikina. The original settlement was formed by a group of 14 families that squatted 
on vacant private land in the early 1960s. The settlers were mainly construction 
workers coming from various parts of the country. These families paid rent to self- 
appointed "caretakers" in exchange for the privilege of being allowed to remain in 
the place. In 1987, the PCUP extended assistance to the community by helping 
them negotiate for the sale of the land. The Center for Community Assistance and 
Development (CCAD), an NGO, helped the group organize and acted as the 
group's negotiator for the purchase ofthe land including facilitation of financing from 
CMP. In March 1989, the Apitong Neighborhood Association was formed and 
accredited with the PCUP. The association consisted of 87 households whose 
principal occupations were carpenters, construction workers, drivers and security 
guards. Between March and April 1990, a reblocking survey was carried out on the 
land and individual lots were demarcated. The landowner was paid in November 
1990.
The community has a 99.9% collection rate on its loan. Partly, this is due to an 
unorthodox penalty scheme (e.g. get appliances or remove parts of the roof) for 
non-payment. A contingent fund has also been put up for members who are unable 
to pay their loan amortization on time. Money for the contingent fund has been 
raised through various fund raising activities (e.g. dances).
Although the land has yet to be individually titled, "rights" are being sold. These 
rights are sold through a lease purchase agreement. Around 10 cases of land sales 
have been reported between 1991 and 1992. Most common reason for selling was 
relocation of the previous grantee. Others sold their rights because they were 
unable to pay the dues because of illness in the family or the "breadwinner" has lost 
his job. Where possible, the community encourages sale within family, that is, sell 
the "rights" to another family member. In some cases, the lot is sold to the 
association who finds a new grantee.
3. Nazareth Homeowners, San Isidro, Parañaque15
The Nazareth Homeowners' Association is a community of 350 households who 
are mostly self-employed. Many of the members have been occupying the area for 
more than 20 years. They were part of the struggle in the 1970s against eviction 
procedures initiated by the landowner, BF Homes Realty Corporation. In 1989, the 
squatters were given the chance to own the land through the CMP. With HIGC as 
the appointed originator, the community formalized its association and registered 
with the SEC. The land was bought for 10 million pesos from the Central Bank. The 
Central Bank was holding the land title by virtue of the closure proceedings of the 
Banco Filipino Group of Companies.
(continued next page)
14 Planning and Development Collaborative International (PADCO), Inc. Assessment o fth e  
Community Mortgage Program, vol. 3, USAID May 1993.
15 Ibid.
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Three years after financing was provided, the association had only an average 
collection rate of 23 percent. In February 1993, a foreclosure notice was sent to the 
association. The low collection was attributed to the existence of recalcitrants. 
Recalcitrant households already existed at the start of the program. Only 285 
households (or 80% of total households) became members. The 20% recalcitrant 
households have created division among members persuading some member- 
households not to pay their dues. Poor collection efforts were also another reason 
cited for the poor collection performance. The association had no collectors. 
Monthly statements of accounts were sent to every member household who were 
then asked to pay at the Treasurer's house. The delinquents were only reprimanded 
on Board meetings. Moreover, the association cannot advance payments since 
there were no contingent funds.
The association feels that the government particularly the NHMFC should have 
taken active participation in the eviction of recalcitrants who were disrespectful of 
the officers and are causing division within the community. There is lack of support 
from the government in resolving the issue over factions within the association, 
evicting recalcitrants and defaulters and providing livelihood assistance to the 
members. The association feels that providing individual land titles may allow the 
program to succeed. This will give assurance to paying households that their 
properties will not be foreclosed. It will also give the association a freehand to 
substitute defaulting members and strengthen loyalty to the association.
A study of the CMP program in 199316 showed an overall loan repayment 
rate of only 55%. The collection efficiency improved considerably specifically in 
Metro Manila whereby a collection rate of 74.86% as of 1997 was recorded 
(Table 7.3). The poor collections of some community associations in Metro 
Manila were due to the following reasons. First, the cooperative organization is 
weak. Leadership in some cooperatives is weak. Meetings are seldom 
undertaken and collection of loan amortizations is not well monitored. The 
officers of the cooperative are also unable to engage in activities that will raise 
funds for temporary "relief" of households who are unable to pay the 
amortization due to poor busmess or temporary loss of income by the 
household. It is also possible that a large organization is more difficult to 
manage than a small community of about 20-30 households. Second, the failure 
of the CMP may also be due to technical problems relative to the site. For 
instance, the "right of way" on the property has remained unsettled or that a 
portion of the property has encroachment problems. There are also cases when 
a land survey cannot be carried out since not all households are able to pay for 
the survey fees or that surveyors paid by the community failed to deliver the 
survey plan. These technical problems create long delays that discourage some 
households to continue paying their loans and create doubts on the success of 
the program. "Professional" squatters usually capitalize on these problems to
16 Ibid.
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infiltrate the community and create dissension among households.17 There are 
also cases when "professional" squatters themselves create the technical 
problem on the site. A common scheme is to raise uncertainties about the 
ownership of the land. These "professionals" claim that other landowners are 
contesting the property and produced "fake" titles on the land. Third, there are 
many recalcitrant households on the site. This may be due to the unwillingness 
or inability of households to pay for the land. It is also possible that 
"professional" squatters have already infiltrated the community" prior to 
negotiations under the CMP.
On the other hand, some CMP projects have been successful enabling them to 
go beyond purchasing the land. For instance, United LICO and Maligaya HOA 
communities in the city of Manila have also been qualified to avail of development 
financing from the NHMFC. This financing will enable the communities to improve 
existing facilities (e.g. sewerage, drainage, playgrounds, etc.) in the area.
17 Professional squatters offer protection against eviction to squatter households for a fee 
These squatters gain if there are more number of recalcitrant households in the area.
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Table 7.3
Collection Efficiency of CMP, Metro Manila (as of December 1997) 1
Project Name/Location Collection Efficiency (%)al No. of Households
District 1 : Citv of Manila
Valenzuela Teresa 39.3 774
United LICO 158.1 26
Sambahayan Tenants 56.2 173
Samahang Bo. Banana 72.3 130
Mendoza Tenants 63.2 36
Meding Eden San Andres Tenants 101.2 45
Maligaya HOA b/ 128.3 23
Kapisanan Haligi ng Nayon 91.8 265
Kahilim 111 118.2 96
Damart 88.2 37
Central San Andres Bukid 145.5 6
Bo. San Roque HOA 47.5 100
Balikatan sa Pag-unlad HOA 95.8 9
Jose Quiogue HOA 88.4 28
Manuguit HOA 90.2 232
District 2: Caloocan Citv, Malabon. Navotas
Samahang Magkakapitbahayan sa Bagbaguin 94.4 84
Samahang Magkakapitbahayan ng Tambalen 90.8 140
Ordonez HOA 59.9 126
Hulavi HOA 127.6 70
Concerned Citizen of Calamansian 87.0 227
Camarin, Civic Organization 98.1 215
Capitol Parkland HOA 65.8 186
Ventures HOA 66.9 55
San Binigkis ng Pagkakaisa 55.0 216
Pabiayan HOA 56.7 70
T. Policarpio HOA 91.7 109
Lakas ng Pagkakaisa HOA 73.1 107
HOA ng Bangkulasi 113.2 92
Daing ng Maralita HOA 100.0 7
Riverside Rivera HOA 98.6 26
District 3: Pasia, Quezon Citv, Marikina
Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Sumilang 104.6 19
Sandigan ng Mahihirap sa Balara II 75.3 51
Sandigan ng Mahihirap sa Balara I 96.9 19
Samahang Kapitbisig ng Waterhole A 97.8 152
Samahang ng Pagkakaisa ng Garcia Heights 72.8 137
Castro Compound HOA 86.4 50
Samahan para sa Katiyakan ng Paninirahan 30.7 175
Pinag-isang Tinig HOA 97.8 26
Upper Balite HOA 101.0 154
Zamora Compound HOA 43.2 21
Mountainville HOA 69.5 26
Tanguile HOA 100.0 153
District 4: Pasav, Las Piñas, Taquiq, Parañaaue
Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Medina Compound 75.6 99
Samahang Kapitbahay sa Santos Compound 120.1 66
Kapisan ng Pulo , Balite 87.1 73
Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Aroma 92.7 115
P. Pandan N-Hood 100.0 48
B. Mayor HOA 81.6 94
Doña Josefa Estate HOA 62.4 226
Interior Dimasilang HOA 58.8 72
Akabayin N-Hood HOA 101.4 23
Bagong Tanyag HOA 69.4 472
Bagong Pag-asa ng Taguig 100.0 166
Gloria Residents Association 46.6 284
Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Purok HOA 100.0 96
NCR 74.9 6527
“  collection efficiency higher than 100% implies that some com m unities paid in advance of their amortization payments. 
b/ H O A  re fe rs  to  H o m e o w n e rs  A s s o c ia t io n
Source: N H A
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Private Solutions to Squatted Lands
While government pursued its own programs for squatter areas, the private 
sector has also come up with their own solutions (or arrangements) to the 
problem of illegal occupants. A leading developer provided this insight:
"If w e encounter squatters on the land we w anted to buy, we go beyond w hat 
the law m andates. We relocate them  and give them land and seed money. Only 
when our com pany is unable to arrive a t an agreem ent w ith the squatters do we 
settle the m atter in court." (Interview w ith a developer, 06 June 1997)
The law entitles squatters to a due process. Eviction and demolition require 
a court order. Litigation, however, is a slow and tedious process in the country. 
The litigation process for squatters usually takes three years at the minimum 
(see C h a p te r  4 ) . In addition, before demolitions are to be carried out a relocation 
site has to be available. Under the law, if the property occupied is a government 
land, the national or local government takes charge of finding a relocation site. 
On the other hand, if the property is privately owned, the owner is not 
compelled to provide a relocation site but the local government who 
implements the demolition should be ready with relocation sites. Often, the 
local government turns to the National Housing Authority for assistance. Given 
the requirements and bureaucratic procedures involved in eviction, it is thus 
not surprising that the private sector prefers "out-of-court" settlements in 
dealing with squatters.18
The price or value of land to squatters varies. At the minimum, developers 
are guided by what the law requires. Under the most recent housing act 
(UDHA of 1992), squatters evicted from the land they occupy should be given 
disturbance allowance plus an adequate relocation site. Another possible option 
is the "b a l ik -p r o b tn s iy a " scheme in which the developer pay for the evicted 
families' travel costs to the province plus "seed" money to start a new 
livellilo od project.
These types of arrangements are nothing new to the squatters or the real 
estate developers as these schemes have been used even prior to the UDHA. 
Squatters have been known to organize themselves to avoid eviction silice the 
1950s. These organized squatters with the support of religious and civic 
organizations on human rights can put landowners in a tight bargaining 
position.
Below are some cases of how private developers settled or negotiated with 
squatters on private lands.
18 These types of settlements are also referred to as private ordering whereby people resort to 
designing and enforcing contracts without recourse to courts but by informal arrangements, 
self-help and avoidance. M. Galanter (1981) Justice in many rooms: courts, private ordering 
and indigenous law. Journal o f Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 19, p. 1-47.
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Box 7.4
Private Solutions to Squatted Lands 
1. FVR Project19
The FVR project located in Guirayan St, Quezon City is a low cost 5-storey walk- 
up condominium built in 1995. The project was conceived by New San Jose Builders 
(NSJB). Inc.. which named the project after President Ramos. The land where the 
project stands was previously a squatter area owned by a family. Squatters who have 
been residents o fthe area for more than 20 years occupied the land. In 1994, NSJB 
saw potential of the land and submitted a proposal to the landowner for the 
development of the area. The proposal was to subdivide the land into four parcels. 
One parcel was to be developed into medium rise housing for the existing squatters 
(FVR Project). Each unit had an area of 15 square meters with complete sanitation 
and basic facilities (water, electricity and access roads). The units built were more 
than enough to accommodate the existing squatters thus, some units were sold to 
squatters who were not from the area. The company as payment for the development 
of the land plus profits obtained another parcel. Two land parcels remained with the 
landowner.
After the landowner agreed to the proposal, NSJB sought the help of Quezon City 
Congressman Belmonte to sponsor the project and facilitate
development and financing from the HDMF. Most units in the medium rise condo 
were financed through HDMF. For other units, the company provided in-house 
financing. The landowner was paid the cost of the land from the loans obtained from 
HDMF.
2. Filinvest Batasan
Filinvest saw potential in a privately owned land around the Batasan area of 
Quezon City. Upon the survey of the land, Filinvest found that squatters have settled 
in the property. In 1973, Filinvest offered to buy the property from the landowner. The 
landowner agreed to sell the property at a price of P30 per square meter on condition 
that clearing the land from squatters will be the responsibility of the company. 
Filinvest negotiated with the squatters and the agreement was that part of the 
property would be developed for the squatters' housing. In 1978, Filinvest started 
developing the property into high-end residential subdivision. The company 
developed a portion of the property for the affected squatters. Titles to the land were 
provided to each squatter household. Financing was obtained from the NHA.
3. SMILE CITIHOMES I20
The project is a five-storey medium rise housing located in Novaliches, Quezon 
City. It was developed by the PHINMA company in collaboration with the city 
government of Quezon City. Squatters previously occupied the land. Part of the 
condition of the sale was for the company to identify the project as a housing project 
mainly for employees of the city government. In turn the city government will take 
care of relocating the existing squatters and facilitate funding release under the 
NHA’s housing program for local government units.
19lnterview with an officer of NSJB, 31 July 1997. FVR stands for (President) Fidel V. Ramos.
20 Interview with an officer of PHINMA Properties, 16 June1997.
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Joint Venture Schemes in Squatter Areas
A joint venture scheme is an undertaking that entails sharing by the joint 
venture partners of resources as well as profits and risks for a specific 
development project. The government in the development of squatter areas has 
recently adopted this scheme with the private sector as its partner. Until early 
1980s joint ventures with the private sector were limited to construction of 
dorm itory/apartm ent houses. By the 1990s, the government has encouraged 
joint ventures with the private sector in the development of squatter areas. In a 
joint venture scheme, the NHA acts as the government representative while the 
real estate developers represent the private sector. In many cases, these 
schemes have been undertaken in public and government lands. Aside from 
being the landowner, NHA also provides technical assistance such as 
facilitating the release of the necessary permits and licenses.
The joint venture arrangements in two major projects in Metro Manila are 
illustrated below (Box 7.5). These projects were undertaken between 1990 and
1997.
Box 7.5 
Joint Venture Projects 
1. Smokey Mountain Project
Smokey Mountain is the biggest dumpsite in the country that has become the 
symbol of the "Sick Man of Asia." It covers an area of 15 hectares covering two 
barrios in Balut,Tondo, Manila and the nearby fishing town of Navotas. Since 1954, 
the area was the dumping site of garbage from various areas of Metro Manila. 
Approximately 3,000 families (20,000 individuals) lived in Smokey Mountain with 
typical household size of eight to 12 members. Considering the total area and size of 
household, each member occupies an area of two to three square meters.
The idea to clear the Smokey Mountain from garbage was conceptualized in 
1987 during President Aquino's administration. However, the project only took off in 
1995 when President Ramos who took over from President Aquino made Smokey 
Mountain a major flagship project of his administration. The government envisioned 
of developing the area into an interisland port facility that includes passenger and 
cargo terminals and hotels. About 180 hectares of land will be reclaimed from 
fishponds.
R-ll Builders is the real estate company that won the bid for the development 
and reclamation of the area. In the joint venture, R-ll Builders is the Management 
Consultant and developer while NHA is the landowner. NHA is also the lead agency 
to foresee the development of the property. The developer, on the other hand, 
provides funds for garbage clearing and the purchase of an incinerator plant. Part of 
the reclaimed area will be granted to R-ll Builders as payment for its services.
Development of the land has two phases. The first phase was completed in 
March 1996. It involved the clearing ofthe 20-meter deep garbage and construction 
of permanent housing for the squatters. Forty-four medium rise housing 
condominiums each consisting of 88 units were constructed in 22 hectare lot. The
(continued next page)
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The beneficiaries of these housing units were the squatters. On the 79 hectares of 
land reclaimed, 15 hectares were developed as port facilities, 16 hectares as 
industrial zone, five hectares as shopping center zone, 12 hectares as wholesale 
zone and eight hectares as central business district. For the second phase, 
construction of an incinerator plant that will handle the garbage of Manila will be 
undertaken. This phase will also involve the reclamation of 119 hectares of land. 
(Source NHA)
2. Pabahay sa Riles Housing Project
This is a housing and infrastructure joint venture project between the 
government represented by the Philippine National Railways (PNR), HUDCC, NHA 
and a developer, the New San Jose Builders, Inc. (NSJB). The subject land of 
development is along the PNR's railway tracks that traverse from Caloocan City to 
Makati City. Squatters have occupied this land since the 1950s and various attempts 
to eject them from the area did not succeed. In 1994, NSJB submitted its proposal 
for a joint venture to develop the area whereby medium rise housing projects and 
commercial establishments will be constructed. Specifically, the housing project will 
accommodate 15,000 squatter families in the area. An elevated tollway will also be 
built above the railroad tracks for easier traffic.
The joint venture agreement was signed in December 1995 with the following 
resource sharing scheme: PNR as the landowner; the NHA to facilitate the release 
of financing from the NHMFC Abot-Kaya Program; the local governments of Manila 
and Makati to facilitate the approval of development plans; and the NSJB as the 
developer. NSJB will also assist in marketing and loan collection.
Development of the project has now started. However, the company is 
constrained by bureaucratic problems. First, some city mayors are uncooperative. 
The company has yet to obtain the cooperation of the City of Makati. Second, the 
Memorandum of Agreement between the PNR and NSJB has yet to be signed. This 
prevents the company from obtaining titles to the land and providing individual 
Condominium Certificate of Titles (CCT) to the beneficiaries.
(Source: Sariling Bahay sa Riles Program Office, Sta. Ana Manila)
7.3 Implications of Insecure Property Rights on the Urban Land Market
Insecure property rights due to the presence of "fake" titles and the 
prevalence of squatting create uncertainties in the urban land market. These 
uncertainties are translated into higher transaction costs in the market. In the 
case of fake titles, sellers and buyers have to spend time and monies for title 
tracing. Title histories have to be checked. The real estate industry also supports 
seminars on how to detect "fake" titles Moreover, the industry has been 
providing support in the computerization of the registry of deeds. The presence 
of fraud titles also limits the market as buyers become veiy selective of whom 
to trade with. In the extreme case, title frauds can cause the market to 
disappear. The Torrens title loses its indefeasible character and distrust in the 
system becomes so high that nobody would want to trade in the market. The
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government should thus discourage market-clearing mechanisms for "fake” 
titles.
In the case of squatters, uncertainties result because of weak governance. 
Squatting is not a property rights problem but it "lessens" the security of 
property rights.21 Transactions cannot proceed smoothly because of the 
presence of a third party that has no legal rights over the ownership of the land 
but claims quasi-legal or de facto rights over use of the land. The presence of 
squatters increases transaction costs in the land market because it takes time to 
resolve squatting cases in court. There can be professional squatters in the area 
and "out-of-court" settlements can be difficult. Lands occupied by squatters 
can thus be withdrawn from the market.
However, innovative mechanisms have risen to facilitate market clearing in 
lands occupied by squatters. These mechanisms have involved terms and 
conditions that are reasonable and acceptable to the squatters, landowners, 
developers and the government. For instance, squatters have been provided 
resettlements in areas near the land presently occupied. Resettlement within 
the land itself and allowing squatters to buy the land they occupy have been 
made possible through the Community Mortgage Program (CMP). This 
program provided financial assistance to organized squatters' community to 
buy land for housing purposes. A similar concept has also been supported by 
funds from non-government organizations. The CMP program has been 
successful in various areas although there are cases when the program did not 
work out. In large areas and in areas where there are many recalcitrant 
households, the scheme failed to clear markets.
No specific strategy works for all squatter cases. The stumbling block is 
usually the so-called "professional" squatters who create dissension in squatter 
communities. Their objective is to increase the number of recalcitrant 
households and to strengthen their position as "protectors." The modus operandi 
is to plant doubts on the minds of the squatter households either by sowing 
suspicion on the ability of the government to cariy out its programs or by 
creating confusion on the legal ownership of the land .22 These actions make 
settlements costly and hinder market clearing.
A question of efficiency, however, arises in the schemes used to clear 
markets on lands occupied by squatters. Many squatters generally refuse to be 
relocated. They would rather buy the land presently occupied. The "efficient" 
use of land resources thus becomes an issue. This is based on the economist's 
efficiency concept that resources should be placed in its most productive use. 
This concept applies on the assumption of a "perfect" world where exchanges 
have zero transaction cost. In the real world, however, there is a problem with
21 Squatting also results from a property rights problem. Lands with multiple ownerships attract 
squatters who take advantage of ownership disputes.
22 Rightful ownership of the land is relevant in the settlement of squatters since bargaining 
agreements only become valid among legal personalities.
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general rules and the implementation of rules. In this case, a "second-best" 
policy may work better. Clearing markets may be more efficient than lands 
being withdrawn from the market.
CHAPTER 8
Transaction Cost, Land Development 
Multipliers and Relational Contracting
HPhe land development process represents a major activity in the urban land
market. This process technically starts from the time a developer decides to 
buy raw land up to the construction phase. It covers three specific transactions 
in the urban land and real estate market starting from buying raw lands to 
obtaining permits and licenses and contracting of builders, architects and 
suppliers. In particular, buying raw lands (or obtaining rights) and obtaining 
permits are the difficult transactions in the market. As pointed out in Chapters
3 and 4, the difficulties arise from the weaknesses of organizations supporting 
property rights, the fraudulent activities in land titling and registration and the 
confused state of government regulations on planning permission. Developers 
experience these difficulties as transaction costs. These costs are expressed in 
terms of time resulting in direct money costs.
Developers perceive transaction costs to be high in the urban land market. 
However, they are not passive participants in the market. Instead, they find 
ways to minimize these transaction costs. These attempts of developers to 
reduce or circumvent transaction costs have affected the organizational form of 
the urban land and real estate market. In particular, arms length transactions 
are rare. Instead, relational contracting is more prevalent. The nature of 
transaction costs in the market has also affected the structure of real estate 
firms. Firms move toward greater specialization rather than expansion.
In this chapter, we examine transaction cost, land development cost and 
transaction-cost economizing strategies in the urban land and real estate 
market. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section explains the 
nature of transaction costs in the land and real estate market. The second part 
presents the transaction costs economizing strategies employed by developers. 
Some evidences may be impressionistic given that information is fragmented 
and sensitive. The third section provides measures of transaction costs and 
evaluates how these costs are reflected in macro and micro level analyses.
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8.1 The Nature of Transaction Cost in the Urban Land and Real Estate
Market
What are the transaction costs in the urban land and real estate market? 
Williamson refers to transaction cost as the "cost of running the economic 
system ."1 This cost tends to be high under the following conditions: one, the 
frequency of transactions is low; two, a high level of uncertainty to which 
transactions are subjected; and three, a high degree of asset specificity.2 In the 
urban land and real estate market, all these conditions are present.
There are onlv few transactions in the property market. The reason is that 
each property is "unique." Each land or property consists of different sets of 
characteristics such that similar exchanges are rare.
Land is also a site-specific asset. The location of the land influences the type 
and cost of development. Land becomes even more site-specific for certain 
needs such as the expansion of previous projects or for a "right-of way." 
Moreover, rights and permits are also specific. They can be obtained only from 
the government. Property rights refer to a particular person or legal entity as 
well as for a particular land boundary and size. Likewise, permits are for a 
particular land, project design and development. Once issued, these permits 
stipulate specific terms and time periods. High asset specificity increases 
transaction costs since specificity creates bilateral dependency that requires 
more coordinated and cooperative efforts between buyers and sellers.
On the other hand, the uncertainties in real estate transactions mainly come 
from the problems in obtaining rights, permits and licenses from the 
government. These problems have caused in the land development process. 
Weak property rights have caused delays in the transfer and verification of land 
ownership. The presence of "fake" titles, the long tedious process of litigation 
involving land ownership disputes and the populist leanings of government 
toward squatters and illegal occupants have created mistrust in the system. 
Buyers thus have to be more cautious in buying land. Title tracing has also 
become a necessity.
The confused state of government regulations on permits and licenses, on 
the other hand, have not only delayed the land development process but also 
created uncertainties on whether the proper documents (i.e. permits, licenses, 
clearances, etc.) will be obtained at all. The uncertainties as early noted (see 
Chapter 4) arise from the following factors: (1) the inadequacy of town plans; (2) 
the conflict in land use policy with regard to industrialization and agrarian 
reform; (3) the unclear authority between local and national government
1 Williamson adopts this definition from K.J. Arrow (1969) The Organization of Economic 
Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market and Non-market Allocation. Analysis and 
Evaluation o f Public Expenditure,1. See Williamson (1991). Comparative Economic 
Organization, p. 269.
2 O.E.Williamson (1979) Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations. Journal o f Law and Economics, 22, p.233-261.
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agencies; and (4) the unclear standards for the issuance of permits.
Low frequency of transactions, asset specificity and uncertainties increase 
transaction costs in the urban land market. In particular, low frequency and 
asset specificity arise from the inherent nature of land. In contrast, uncertainties 
are of legal and bureaucratic origins. The legal and bureaucratic problems lead 
to time-consuming procedures that can significantly delay the land 
development process. Developers are concerned about delays since it directly 
affects time. Timing in the real estate market is important. Developers respond 
to changes in demand and supply through intertemporal substitution patterns 
(see Chapter 6). Thus, rights and permits have to be obtained at the right time. 
Otherwise, negative consequences may occur, that is, capital invested will not 
yield enough profit or developed land and real estate will come up at the 
wrong moment in the boom-slump cycle. Developers have to speed up the 
process of getting rights, clearances, and permit in order to place the final 
product on the market within a reasonable time.
8.2 Transaction-Cost Economizing Strategies
The central theme of the new institutional economics is that firms will 
economize on transaction costs through different institutional arrangements. In 
particular, Williamson goes further by identifying specific actions of firms; i.e., 
make or buy. Williamson argues that in a high transaction cost environment, 
firms will decide to make things themselves, that is, to bring production under a 
hierarchical arrangement rather than buy in the market. However, in the case of 
the real estate firms, the road to expansion is not chosen. Instead, real estate 
firms divide up into small units of highly specialized functions. For instance, 
Ayala Land, Inc. consists of different companies that target different types of 
real estate markets or clientele (e.g. industrial parks, middle-income residential 
markets). The company also consists of separate companies providing specific 
professional real estate services (e.g. leasing, construction, property 
management, etc.), (Table 8.1). This trend is apparent in other less prominent 
development firms such as the Burgundy Realty Corporation, Active Group, 
Inc., Primetown, Inc., RGV Development Corporation and LANDCo, Inc. For 
instance, the Active Group, Inc. has also established a landbanking firm that is 
mainly concerned with raw land acquisition and investments. Moreover, 
LANDCo, Inc, in its initial operation in 1990, was already organized into 
different companies for specific real estate services. Under this set-up, the 
development firm (LANDCo Management, Inc.) draws up the Business Plan. 
When the project is ready for implementation, the different professional 
companies take over. These specialization trends among real estate 
development firms show that they go into a lot of contracting and sub­
contracting.
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Table 8.1
Real Estate Development Corporations and their Subsidiaries
Name of Company 
Ayala Land, Inc.
Subsidiary (ies)
Laguna Properties Holdings, Inc.
Buklod Bahayan Realty and 
Development Corp.
Laguna Technopark, Inc.
Aurora Properties, Inc 
Makati Development Corp.
Ayala Theatres Management, Inc
Ayala Property Management 
Corp
Ayala Infrastructure Ventures 
Concorde Building System 
Vesta Property Holdings 
Ayala Hotels, Inc.
Filinvest Development Corp. Filinvest Land, Inc.
Filinvest Alabang, Inc.
Filinvest Asia Corp..
H.B. Fuller, Inc. (affliate) 
Hocheng Philippines (affiliate)
Fil-Estate Land, Inc.
LANDCO, Inc.
Burgundy Realty Corp.
Fil-Estate Builders Corp. 
Fil-Estate Realty Corp./Fil-Estate 
Marketing/ Fil-Estate Sales 
Fil-Estate Golf and Development 
Inc.
Fil-Estate Properties 
LANDCO Management, Inc. 
LANDCO Centers, Inc.
LANDCO Theaters, Inc.
LANDGOLF, Inc.
LAND Professionals, Inc.
LANDCO Technical Services, 
Inc.
Sphere Holdings Company
Burgundy Builders & 
Development Corp.
Canon Cycle Marketing, Inc.
Principal Activity
Development of middle-income 
residential subdivision 
Low-income residential 
developments
Development of industrial parks
Development planning for Makati 
Business District 
Technical planning and mgt of 
theatres,
General management and 
administrative services 
Infrastructure development 
Construction
Broker-agent; land banking 
Hotel management and 
development
Residential property
development
Commercial property
development
Joint venture commercial
development
Construction materials
manufacturing
Manufacturing of sanitary wares
Real estate construction 
Real estate marketing; broker- 
agent
Golf course development and 
operation
Property management
Business planning & conceptual 
development
Planning, leasing and mgt.of 
shopping centers 
Technical planning of theatres, 
theatre management and film 
booking
Development, marketing, & 
operation of golf courses and 
country clubs
Broker-agent, provide marketing 
services for residential projects 
Provides engineering and 
architectural design, bidding and 
project mgt.
Development of residential 
subdivisions
Commercial and residential 
condo development 
Marketing services
(Continued next page)
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Real Estate Development Corporations and their Subsidiaries, continued
Active Group, Inc.
RGV Development Corp.
C & P Corporation
Primetown, Inc.
Megaworld Properties
Turalba & Associates 
Professional Design Firm, Inc. 
Active Construction, Inc.
Active Realty and Dev’t Corp.
San Agustin Realty Corp.
Active Bank
First Active Capital Corp.
AGC Insurance Consultants, Inc. 
Active Property Holdings Corp.
RGV Realty, Inc.
Jabel Realty Development Corp. 
Sphere Oriental Development 
Corp.
Veritas Realty Marketing, Inc. 
DWIM Westchester Realty Corp. 
Naujan Resources Development 
Corp.
Palmera Homes, Inc.
Camella Homes, Inc.
Crown Asia, Inc.
Primetown, Inc.
Billion Land, Inc.
Albenson Enterprises Corp.
Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. 
First Centro, Inc.
Eastwood Property Holdings, Inc. 
Gilmore Property Marketing, Inc.
Architectural design
Property construction 
Property development 
High-rise residential and 
commercial development. 
Savings and lending bank 
Financing company 
Non-life insurance 
Land banking corporation
Low-end residential subdivision 
development
Low-end residential subdivision 
development 
Middle-income residential 
development.
Condominium and vertical 
development 
Residential horizontal 
development
Steel trading & construction 
supply
Property development
Residential subdivision 
development
Marketing services_____________
Source: Mahal kong Pilipinas Foundation, Inc. Philippine Company Profiles 1987.
Philippine Business Profiles, Inc. Top 7000 Corp. 1997-98
Annual Reports of companies (Filinvest, Active Group, Burgundy, LANDCO, Inc., Primetown)
Expansion in the real estate industry is only evident in the landbanking 
activities of developers. Landbanking refers to the buying and keeping of raw 
lands. Urban economists sometimes view this practice as speculation, that is, they 
assume that developers hoard land and sell the land when prices are rising. 
However, speculation may not be the primary reason for the land banking 
activities of developers. Tan (1997) provided the following insight: "Investing in 
raiv land is not for the typical real estate investor. There are many things to tal<e into
consideration for one to be successful in this activity. The risks are high.... "3
What are the risks of raw land investing? First, most raw lands are idle. It
3 E.Tan (1997). Real Estate in the Philippines. Metro Manila: Solar Publishing Corporation, 
p.101.
does not produce any regular income. If raw land was bought through 
financing, there is the risk of high interest rates specifically in unstable 
economic and political environments. Second, where organizations protecting 
private property rights are weak, one has to incur costs on caretakers' salaries 
including fencing and patrolling costs to prevent squatting on idle land. Third, 
the lack or failure of government to implement land use plans increases 
uncertainties in the market. Developers are not clearly guided on what their 
neighbors can do with their lands. This is relevant because future developments 
can have a substantial impact on planned developments.
Despite these risks, developers still buy or hold raw lands in advance of 
their development. The extent of raw land holdings seems to spell the 
difference among major developers in the countiy. Table 8.2 provides an 
overview of the raw land holdings of some developers in the countiy. Top 
developers like Ayala Land, Fil-Estate, C &  P, Megaworld and Filinvest have 
land holdings of more than 1,000 hectares. On the other hand, less prominent 
developers such as PhilRealty, Robinson's, and SM  Pmne have land holdings of 
only a few hundred hectares.
Table 8.2
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Landbank of Major Real Estate Development
Firms (as of 1995)
Developer Landbank Percent
(Hectares) to Total
Ayala Land Inc. 2,164 12.45
Fil Estate Properties 3,300 18.98
Filinvest Inc. 1,500 8.63
Megaworld Properties 2,800 16.11
C & P Properties 2,351 13.52
Orient Properties 2,000 11.50
Active Realty 1,300 7.48
Robinson's Properties 74 0.43
SM Prime 990 5.69
KUOK Philippines 
Properties 424 2.44
Belle Corp. 224 1.29
Pryce Realty 244 1.40
Phil Realty 14 0.08
Total 17,385 100
Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, August 10, 1995; 
Philippine Star, October 11,1995
The law prohibits corporations to own big tracts of agricultural lands. 
However, land hoarding is made possible through different arrangements. One 
way is option sale. Under option sale agreement, the developer buys only a 
portion of the land and draws a contract of future sale with the landowner for
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the remaining portions. This contract provides the developer the right of first 
purchase within a specified period and at a specified price. In another scheme, a 
developer buys the land but the title is still registered with the previous 
landowner. The previous land owner, however, signs a waiver and a Special 
Power of Attorney transferring to the new landowner the legal right to transact 
or make decisions with regard to the piece of land on his or her behalf. A third 
scheme is for corporations to convert agricultural lands into non-agricultural 
lands. The law does not lim it ownership by corporations of non-agricultural 
land specifically for industrial and commercial use. Grantees of public lands 
mav also convey their lands to corporations for commercial and industrial 
purposes (Presidential Decree 763, 1975).
Land banking essentially brings the raw land under the developer's control 
or authority. This implies that the land can be readily available to the 
developer. This is necessary as real estate trade works within cycles of boom 
and bust. In a boom, the developer speeds up production. The availability of 
raw lands at this time is crucial. Buying raw land takes time. Normally, this 
cannot be done in a single transaction. There may be transactions that have 
been accomplished in a short time particularly if the buyer knows the seller and 
the land title is "clean." Most often, however, raw land buyers have to trace the 
histoiy of land titles issued on the land and to check on the presence of 
squatters or tenants. Transactions can become more difficult if the area desired 
bv the developer have to be acquired from different landowners. For instance, 
in the periphery of Metro Manila, specifically Bulacan, Cavite, and Laguna, 
land properties in rice-producing areas have been divided into small farms 
ranging from less than one hectare to five hectares under the 1972 agrarian 
reform law .4 In these provinces, developers usually require big tracts of land 
since land developments are mainly subdivision projects. Data on land 
conversion in these areas show that the lands converted have been for projects 
that require contiguous large areas such as residential and industrial 
subdivisions and memorial parks (Table 8.3). Buying raw lands in these areas 
would thus involve consolidation of titles and transactions with different 
landowners.
4 P.F.Moya, et al. Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Urban Uses: Who Gains and Who Loses? 
Social Sciences Division Staff Paper, International Rice Research Institution, Los Baños, 
1993.
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Table 8.3
Agricultural Areas Converted to 
Non-Agricultural Uses, NCR and 
CALABARZON,a/1988-96
Purpose of Area Converted Percent to
Conversion (Hectares) Total (%)
Residential 2,078.26 64.0
Commercial 315.92 9.7
Industrial 542.86 16.7
Institutional 131.14 4.1
Memorial 88.17 2,7
Tourist Spot 53.89 1.7
Agribusiness 36.77 1.1
Total 3,247.01 100.0
31 excludes Quezon but includes Bulacan 
Source: DAR-CLUPPI Office
The amount of time needed for land consolidation varies. In some cases, 
farmers band together and make collective decision on their lands. The strategy 
of some developers is to buy land by parcels. For instance, a real estate firm 
bought 500 parcels of contiguous land in Batangas. It took the company 3 years 
to acquire all parcels.5 In Cavite, the same firm planned to buy 250 land parcels. 
The firm has bought half of the parcels in a span of two years.
The presence of tenants or squatters can also significantly delay transactions 
in the market. A Makati Law  Office stated that it would take at least three 
years to settle squatters in court.6 The time involved does not end there since 
the eviction order by the court is dependent on the availability of relocation 
sites. Although the landowner is not responsible for the relocation site, the local 
government who is responsible for acting on the eviction order almost always 
does not ha ve an available relocation site. Likewise, agricultural tenants have to 
be settled. These tenants cannot be evicted due to property rights provided 
under the land reform laws.
Given the time it may need to consolidate titles and to settle squatters or 
tenants, land banking is a plausible mechanism to reduce transaction time. This 
implies that if a developer plans a project, raw land acquisition should be done 
at least within a period of five to 7 years prior to actual development.
Contracting activities in the real estate industry, on the other hand, are 
evident in several schemes undertaken by developers in the land and real estate 
market. These schemes are as follows: (1) grease/speed money; and (2) 
procedural short cuts.
5 Interview with an official from a real estate company, 29 July 1998.
6 Y.G.Arpon. Metro Manila’s Squatter Problem: Counting the Costs. Business World. 05 
November 1996.
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"Grease"/Speed Money7
Informal contracting that involves "grease" or speed money has been a 
common strategy in the land and real estate market. In particular, this method 
is applied in the bureaucratic maze of the development control process. The 
confused state of government regulations pertaining to permits and licenses has 
created a need to engage in relational contracting to obtain the permits and save 
on tune.
The practice of speed money seems evident on the following cases.
1. A lawyer-developer had been pushing since 1994 the conversion of a 45- 
hectare agricultural property in Dasmariñas, Cavite. He never gave in to 
grease money. Practically agricultural lands in the surrounding areas 
had been converted to other uses but only his lot remained 
unconverted. Had he given in to some people's wishes, the conversion 
could have been pushed through. The developer appealed his case with 
the Supreme Court. (Interview  w ith  an Officer o f C R EB A , 19 January 1996)
2. A real estate developer stated that he had no complaints about the land 
conversion process. It took him about a year to obtain conversion 
clearance. The company boasted of having the "technology" to facilitate 
conversions. "They know the proper channels, the papers to submit and 
the persons to approach." The company did not deny that grease 
money was given but the cost was a veiy small percentage or 
component of development costs. The company also did not ask for 
"too big favors" thus grease money was also minimal. (Interview  w ith  an 
officer o f a developm ent firm , 15 A pril 1996)
3. An official of a prominent real estate development firm stated the 
following strategy for land conversion: "W e first settle qualified 
tenants/ farmers and also non-government organizations so that there 
w ill be no complainants. Then we settle the mayor, the Sangguniang and 
sometimes even their congressman. W e then talk to the D AR personnel 
and present to them the support of the local government on the project. 
We also have budget allocation for people in the DA, N IA , DENR. For 
each approving office, the firm spends between 10 centavos and 2 pesos 
per square meter." (Special Report, Philippine D aily Inquirer, 24 July 1998)
4. A developer applied for a development permit for a 2.9-heçtare land in 
Taytay, Rizal in 1995. This lot was adjacent to a previous project 
developed in the same location. The development permit being applied 
for was Phase II of the same subdivision. It took the developer one year 
to obtain approval from the local government. The local government 
reasoned that the developer lacked some requirements. The developer 
thought otherwise since his proposed development was just the same as 
the previous project in an adjacent property. The developer had to pay
7 The term corruption is not used because it connotes moralistic meaning, immediately 
conveying a negative judgement.
the local government 100,000 pesos to facilitate the release of the permit. 
In the developer's previous project that was approved by the H LU RB, 
he also paid money but only for 10,000 pesos. (In terview  w ith  a developer, 10 
M a y 1997)
5. A company developed a 60-hectare socialized housing project in 
Batangas. In 1995, the company applied for a development permit from 
the local government. The mayor already asked for grease money from 
the start. The company was issued a development permit. A few 
months later, however, the mayor issued a cease and desist order (CDO) 
on the project. The company was restrained from continuing with the 
development. To lift the CDO, the mayor required the company to build 
a barangay road that had no direct effect on the project since access roads 
for the subdivision had been provided. However, the company gave in 
to the demands of the mayor. The company talked to the landowners of 
the land where the barangay road was supposed to be built. These 
landowners were selling their property at 3,000 pesos per square meter. 
The company did not buy the property because the cost was not 
recoverable. The company presented the problem to the mayor. The 
mayor looked for an alternative barangay road. The CDO was lifted after 
the company agreed to build the alternative road and provided some 
more money. The company bought the land in 1995 and was able to 
start development of the property in 1998. (In terview  ivith  a developer, 29 July  
1998)
6 . In the NCR, the "racket" among "grafters" in hierarchy was reported to 
start from the barangay officials all the way up to the municipal or city 
mayors. The trick was to "delay" the issuance of permits. A  barangay 
captain in one city made a million pesos by signing a "clearance" for a 
shopping mall under construction in his barangay. The captain also 
asked for two stalls in the projected shopping center. In a similar case, a 
mayor in one city demanded for a unit in a condominium that was to be 
constructed. He also requested that the contract for excavation and 
"filling" of foundations for the buildings being erected be awarded to a 
firm owned by him and his pals. (Philippine Star, 28 Oct. 1996, p .9)
7. To secure the supporting certification from the local government in 
Batangas for land development, a developer paid 30 pesos per square 
meter. Thus, for his 10-hectare project he paid 3 million pesos to obtain 
a development permit. (P.Gordoncillo, C. A ragon & T. Llorito. A  S tu d y  on the Im pact 
o f Land Use Conversion on C ARP, p.39)
8 . A real estate corporation applied for the conversion of 44 parcels of 
agricultural land for residential, commercial and recreational uses. The 
Department of Agriculture initially certified the property to be 
"m arginally to not economically suitable for agricultural purposes due 
to shallow soils, low fertility and absence of irrigation water." The same 
report also indicated that the remaining coconut trees planted in the
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10, The Office of a municipal mayor granted approval of development 
permits to applicants who requested for reclassification of agricultural 
lands without securing D AR clearance. Sim ilar cases were reported in a 
study in Cavite. Of the 401 cases of irregularities reported in the 
approval of land conversion, 97 percent were due to the failure to 
secure clearance from DAR. Instead, the Municipal Assessor's Office 
and the H LU R B  approved the applications. (D. Cardenas. 1996. A n  Assessm ent 
o f the Socio-economic Im pact o f A gricu ltu ra l Land Conversion on Cavite's Rural Communities. 
PhD D issertation. U niversity  o f  the Philippines at Los Baños, College o f  Economics and  
M anagem ent)
What seems apparent in these cases is that grease or speed money is being 
used to facilitate approval, to reduce transaction time and to be more or less 
assured of the outcome of transactions. The foremost view is that speed money 
is corruption and morally bad thus should be prohibited. The United Nations 
and the World Bank also shares this view. Both institutions are in fact 
campaigning against corruption. On the other hand, the view  among some 
socio-economists is that corruption is related to personalism in economic life. It 
is a form of relational contracting and that there are strong incentives to engage 
in this practice. It is thus, very difficult to eradicate corruption completely.
Procedural "Shortents"
Land owners or developers also device shortcuts in the process of obtaining 
permits and in the settlement of tenants/squatters. These schemes generally are 
within legal boundaries.
1. Payment of Disturbance Compensation to tenants prior to filing of land 
conversion applications. A  study by Silva (1993) showed that several cases 
of prearranged compensation for tenants or occupants takes place in 
lands applied for conversion (Table 8.4, next page). The scheme was to 
settle the tenants in the land prior to filing of conversion application. 
Since these landowners had ah ead}' perfected the agreements with their 
tenants, the presence of tenants on their lands was not indicated. Thus, 
no records of settlements need to be prepared or hearings be conducted 
between the municipal agrarian reform representatives, the landowners 
and the tenants /farmers.
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Table 8.4
Land Use Conversion with Applications and Occupants
Total Number of
Municipality
Occup
CAVITE 126
1. Bacoor 32
2. Carmona 4
3. Dasmariñas 28
4. Gen. Trias 30
5. Imus 27
6 Naie 5
LAGUNA 229
1. Binan 134
2. Cabuyao 3
3. Calamba 47
4. Sta. Rosa 45
RIZAL 38
1. Angono 2
2. Antipolo 36
BATANGAS 1
1. Nasugbu 1
TOTAL 394
Declared 
ompensated.
Time of 
Application
4
1
1
2
113
106
4
3
2
2
119
Pre-arranged
93
18
3
21
27
21
3
89
25
3
27
34
8
1
7
1
1
191
No
ompensatk
Provided
8
1
1
2
2
2
13
2
7
4
24
1
23
45
No
Information
21
12
5
2
2
14
1
9
4
4
4
39
Source: W.P.T. Silva. (1993) Effects of Land Use Conversion on CARP Beneficiaries in Critical 
Municipalities in the CALABARZON. FAO, p. 21 (TableXXI).
2. "Chop-chop” system of application. This was a practice adopted bv 
developers applying for land use conversion of a large tract of 
agricultural land. The scheme was to subdivide the total land area into 
separate small areas. Under the present land conversion approval 
system, areas measuring 5 hectares and less is within the approving 
authority of the D AR Regional Director. Applications for areas in excess 
of this lim it but not more than 50 hectares is forwarded to the Center for 
Land Use, Policy, Planning and Implementation (C LU PPI) for review 
prior to the approval of the D AR Undersecretary. Land conversion 
applications for areas 50 hectares or more are forwarded to the CLUPPI, 
then the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) Land Use 
Committee for the approval of the D AR Secretary. By having several 
applications of small land parcels only the D AR Regional Director 
would thus be involved in the approval process. The landowner or 
developer can save on time, as applications need not go through 
different levels of the bureaucracy. The following examples were cited 
by Gordoncillo, et. al. (1998):9
9 This was based on an examination of land conversion application forms and supplementary documents at 
the DAR. P. Gordoncillo, C. Aragon & T. Uorito (1998), A Study ofthe Impact of Land Conversion, p.34-35.
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a. A real estate developer owning a 400-hectare agricultural land 
in Lipa City, Batangas submitted 100 folders or land use 
conversion applications to the D AR regional office. Each folder 
contains land titles having an area of 5 or less hectares;
b. A  glass manufacturing company applied for conversion for the 
industrial use of a 34-hectare communal irrigated rice lands in 
Bauan, Batangas. The company submitted eight application 
folders with each application folder containing land titles 
having an aggregate of less than five hectares.
3. Side-agreements. Side agreements were also employed to facilitate 
approval of permission to develop land. One scheme was to avoid 
acquiring a subdivision permit. The scheme worked as follows: The 
developer initially applies for a permit for commercial apartment, that 
is, the developer would apply for an apartment-type housing for 
purposes of having the property leased rather than sold. In this case, the 
developer would not require a subdivision permit. However, in the 
middle of the project, he may change his mind deciding instead to sell 
the property. The developer then applies for a conversion permit from 
the LGU. This permit does not require City Council approval. Only the 
Committee on subdivision decides on the case. (Interview  w ith  a local official, 
Q uezon C ity, 16 July 1998)
Another scheme to facilitate subdivision approval was made via 
alteration approval. The scheme works as follows: The developer 
initially applies for the subdivision of a land into only a few lots. In the 
process of development, the developer would decide to subdivide the 
property into more lots justifying that he cannot sell the property. The 
developer gets an alteration approval that requires no public hearing 
and Council approval but is approved only at the committee level. 
(In terview  ivith  a local official, Q uezon C ity, 16 July 1998)
4. Collaborative projects. Developers may collaborate with local officials for 
low cost or socialized housing projects. One scheme is to get the support 
of local officials by declaring the development as the project of the 
mayor. No financial assistance is obtained from the local government. 
The partnership is for the local government to facilitate approval of 
permits and licenses while the developer takes charge of construction 
and marketing.
5. "Out of Court" Settlements. Squatters, illegal occupants and tenants are 
usually settled through amicable negotiations. The reason is that the 
process of court settlements takes time. Although each squatter or 
tenant may want a different type of compensation, amicable settlements 
are still more popular. For instance, private ordering has been the 
solution to private lands occupied by squatters in Metro Manila (see
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Chapter 7). In agrarian communities, farmer-beneficiaries engage 
themselves in pre-arranged compensation or negotiated land transfers. 
Negotiated land transfer involves an agreement between the 
landowner, D AR and farmer-beneficiaries to exempt a certain portion of 
the entire landholding in exchange for the smooth and uncontested 
transfer of the remaining lands to the farmer beneficiaries.10 This results 
in a faster transfer and take-over for the farmer beneficiaries while the 
landowner is able to retain much higher landholdings than the legal 
lim its.11 In most of these "out-of court" settlements, tenants as well as 
squatters have been paid compensation more than the legal requirement 
(Table 8.5).12 In addition to cash compensation, tenants and squatters 
have also been provided employment, a homelot or farmlot or a 
combination of different types of compensation.
Table 8.5
Types of Compensation Received by Occupants on Approved Land
Conversions
Types of Occupants
CARP BENEFICIARIES
Lessees 
Share Tenants 
Farm worker 
CLOA/EP 
Holders/Amortizing 
Owners
OTHERS (non­
cultivators)
Occupants under G.O. 
34 (encroachers) 
Squatters 
No Information
TOTAL
Total Occupants 
wI Compensation
1256
57
201
892
106
371
361
10
1627
Cash
Homelot/
Farmlot
Relocated Employment Combination
124 452 25 1 654
41 3 5 - 8
71 2 19 1 108
12 447 1 - 432
- - - - 106
67 3 281 - 20
57 3 281 20
10 - - - -
191 455 306 1 674
a/ based on sample of occupants displaced due to land conversion, 1988-1990.
Source: W .PT.S ilva (1993). Effects of Land Use Conversion on CARP Beneficiaries in Critical 
Municipalities in the CALABARZON, FAO, p.24 (Table XXIV)
10 “Further setbacks: conversions, reversals, ineffectual land transfer,” Farm News and Views, 
11(3), May-June 1998, p.6-9.
11 See footnote 8 on legal retention limits.
12 Under the agrarian law, tenants in converted lands have to be compensated by an amount 
equivalent to five times the value of average yield per year. On the other hand, squatters have 
to be given a relocation site.
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8.3 Estimating Transaction Cost: Land Conversion and Development
Multipliers and Permit Delays
Obtaining rights and permits to undertake construction and sale of real 
estate is a tedious process. Developers perceive the transaction costs to be high. 
The question is can these transaction costs be measured?
Transaction-economizing strategies have been undertaken basically to 
speed up the process of accomplishing the regulatory requirements in land 
acquisition and development. One possible indicator of transaction costs, thus, 
is the tune spent to obtain rights, permits and licenses. An estimate of this time 
bv a real estate firm shows that on the average, the process of acquiring raw 
land including title tracing, settlement of squatters, tenants, encroachers, etc., 
takes about 60 days (Table 8.6). On the other hand, obtaining permits and 
licensing uses the most time. This activity accounts for 43.6 percent of the total 
time spent in the land development process. On the average, it takes about 18 
months for a developer to acquire all the necessary permits and licenses for 
residential land development. In particular, the approval of the DAR 
conversion clearance and the environmental compliance certificate uses the 
most time. Each clearance takes about three months to obtain.
The whole process of land development thus, takes about 2 years and 5 
months, on the average. The time spent can be longer in "abnormal" situations. 
First, the landowner and farmers, squatters or encroachers could not agree on 
the terms of compensation. If bargaining agreements fail, some developers or 
landowners may resort to extortion.13 The more humane way is to bring the 
case in court, which as mentioned earlier involves a long process. Second, 
conflict among local politicians or between local officials and national 
government offices. This arises due to different interests and political biases. 
The mayor may not have the support of his or her sanggunian bayan . This can 
create factions in the approval of development permits. Also, disagreements 
between local and national officials can create more delays in the issuance of 
permits. Third, social pressure or public outciy on some development projects 
can hinder government officials to take actions. Public hearings have to be done 
and the government adopts a "w ait and see" attitude.
13 Extortion refers to the use of force (bullies, killers) to evict occupants of lands. There are 
“stories” about landowners/developers resorting to this scheme (see P. Gordoncillo, C. Aragon
& T. Llorito (1998) Impact o f Land Use Conversion; Special Report, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
24-26 July 1998).
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Table 8.6
Average Time Spent for Residential Land 
Development, by type of Activity3/
Activity Duration %  to(days)“ Total
Raw Land Acquisition 60 7.3
Conceptualization Phase 75 9.1
Planning Phase 55 6.7
Permits and Licenses 360 43.6
NIA Clearance 5 0.6
Barangay Clearance 5 0.6
Locational Clearance 5 0.6
Locational Viability 5 0.6
Department of Agriculture Certification 5 0.6
Environmental Impact Study 40 4.8
Environmental Compliance Certification 60 7.3
DENR Clearance 5 0.6
DAR Clearance 65 7.9
Transfer of TCT to Developer 5 0.6
Transfer of Tax Declaration to C 0.6Developer Ö
Development Permit 10 1.2
LMB Approval 60 7.3
NW RB Permit 5 0.6
MERALCO 20 2.4
License to Sell 20 2.4
Individual Titles 20 2.4
Individual Tax Declaration 20 2.4
Construction 275 33.3
Total 825 100.0
*  time spent under normal conditions. Abnormal conditions occur in the 
following cases: (1) disagreement with farmers, tenants or illegal 
claimants; (2) conflicts among LGU personnel or between LGU and 
the national government; and (3) social pressure 
b/ to compute in months, 1 month = 20days
Source: Report of the Office of Special Assistant to the EVP, Filinvest, 1996.
Some permits may have ve iy variable time spent as in the case of land 
conversion. The land use conversion data show no clear pattern on time spent 
for land conversion. The time spent in obtaining approval of conversion for 
residential purposes has been very variable ranging from 2 months to as long as
5 years (Table 8.7) In general, most conversion applications for residential 
development have been approved within a year, specifically, w ithin 4 to 6 
months. The number of applications approved after a year up to two years has 
also been substantial. On the other hand, there are also applications approved 
only after 3 to 5 years specifically in the C A LA BA RZO N  region.
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Table 8.7
Number of Approved Conversion Applications for Residential Development 
____________ By Processing Time and by Location, 1988-1996____________
Processing
time3'
Metro
Manila
3
CALABARZON Rizal Batangas Cavite Laguna
ALL
(NCR +
(months)
2-6 18 6 1 5 6
CALABARZON)
.. , Percent 
Number . T . .
to Total
21 29.6
7-12 3 16 4 6 3 3 19 26.8
13-18 - 15 6 1 3 5 15 21.1
19-24 - 7 1 3 2 1 7 9.8
25-36 1 2 2 - - - 3 4.2
3-5 years - 6 3 1 - 2 6 8.5
TOTAL 7 64 22 12 13 17 71 100.0
31 Processing time refers to the difference between the date of filing application and the date application 
was approved, 
implies zero/none 
Source of data: DAR-CLUPPI
On the average, the approval of land conversion for residential subdivision 
development takes less time in Metro Manila than in the C A LA BA RZO N  (Table
8.8) The average processing time also varies among the provinces comprising 
C A LA BA RZO N  with conversions taking a longer time in Batangas and Laguna 
provinces. However, correlation analysis on the data shows a very weak 
correlation between time and location. Even within a specific barangay (or 
barrio), the difference in processing time is substantial. For instance, in 
Cupang, Antipolo,Rizal while most conversion clearance were granted in about 
a year, a 2-hectare land in the same barrio obtained its conversion permit after 
more than 4 years. Sim ilarly, in the poblacion (town proper) of Sto. Tomas, 
Batangas, a parcel of land obtained its clearance after 46 months while lands 
located in agricultural zones obtained their clearance at much less time.
Correlation is also weak between land area and processing time. However, 
it is noted that the correlation relationship is negative, which implies that the 
processing time for conversion approval of big land areas (20-50 hectares) is 
faster than smaller areas (1 hectare or less). While there may be other factors 
that hindered land conversion in some lands (e.g. disagreements with tenants), 
it is plausible that transaction cost economizing strategies could have made a 
difference in the time spent in land conversion approval.
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Table 8.8
Approved Land Use Conversion Applications for 
Residential Development (1988-1996)_____
Location
Ave. Land Area Ave. Processing
Pearson Correlation 
Coefficient
(hectares) Time (months) a' Processing time with
Metro Manila 2.210 6.74
Land Area 
-0.4915
Location
b ;
CALABARZON 12.877 13.02 -0.1033 -0.1330
Rizal 6.313 11.29 -0.3167 0.2082
Batangas 10.085 15.26 -0.0218 b 1
Cavite 20.286 10.36 -0.1171 0.1851
Laguna 22.121 15.60 -0.0553 -0.0302
All Areas 11.954 12.83 -0.0958 -0.0996
a/ refers to the difference between the date of filing application and the date 
application was approved. 
b/ no sufficient data for a specific barangay/barrio.
Source of data: DAR-CLUPPI
The W orld Bank14 also came up with some indicators of efficiency and time 
for residential land development in various countries. These indicators are the 
following:
1. Land Conversion Multiplier: defined as the ratio between the median land 
price of an unserviced plot on the urban fringe given planning 
permission for residential development and the median price of a 
nearby plot in rural/agricultural use without such permission.
2. Land Development Multiplier: defined as the average ratio between the 
median land price of a developed plot at the urban fringe in a middle- 
income subdivision and the median price of raw, undeveloped land in 
an area currently being developed.
3. Permits Delay: defined as the median length in months to get approvals, 
permits and titles for a new medium sized (50-200 unit) residential 
subdivision in an area at the urban fringe where residential 
development is permitted.
A comparison of residential land development indicators in countries of 
Asia is presented next page (Table 8.9). The conversion multiplier is noted to be 
very low in the Philippines compared to the Asian countries with the exception 
of Bangkok. The W orld Bank study argued that this was due to the more 
stringent policies in other Asian countries (e.g. Japan, Singapore, and Malaysia) 
in the conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses.
14 The data was based on an extensive survey of housing in 1990 in various countries. United 
Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) and the World Bank. Housing Indicators 
Program, (Revised Report) October 1993.
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Table 8.9
Residential Land Development Indicators in Asia
Country (City)
Land
Conversion
Multiplier
Land
Development
Multiplier
Permit 
Delay (mos.
Philippines (Metro Manila) 2.2 6.7 36
Indonesia (Jakarta) - 2.2 28
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur) 5.5 4.3 18
Thailand (Bangkok) 1.8 2.6 11
Singapore (Singapore) 6.0 1.3 2
Japan(Tokyo) 10.4 2.0 8
Hong Kong - 1.2 2
South Korea (Seoul) 1.3 3.8 20
Source: Housing Indicators Program (Revised Preliminary report), United Nations
Centre for Human Settlements and the World Bank. October 1993
M y own data, however, do not support this finding. The conversion 
multipliers have been much higher than those provided by the W orld Bank 
(Table 8.10). These multipliers also coincided with the assessment of some 
developers who implied that:
"There is an incentive to buy agricultural lands because the price is much 
lower than lands which are granted permission for non-agricultural use. An 
agricultural lot can be bought at P50-80 per square meter but the same lot with 
land conversion clearance would cost between P350 and 500 per square meter or 
a conversion multiplier between 4.37 and 6.25."
Table 8.10
Land Conversion Multiplier a/
Y earb/ Bulacan Batangas Cavite Laguna Rizal
1991 11.3 7.0 3.8 4.3 5.6
1992 6.9 5.6 - 7.0 8.6
1993 - 7.1 6.2 6.4 -
1994 - 6.7 6.3 6.4 -
1995 - 6.7 - 6.2
a/ Ratio of the price of development lot (I.e. with permission for 
non-agricultural use) to price of agricultural lot in a particular 
city/municipality. 
b/ Difference across years may be due to differences in the 
sample city/municipality selected, as prices in the same city 
are not available.
- No data available
Source: Real Estate Monitor, monthly and weekly price data, 1991 - 
95.
The area selected may have implications on the level of multiplier. For 
instance, land conversion may be lower in Metro Manila because the city is
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highly urbanized. Most areas have been zoned non-agricultural since the 1980 
Metro Manila zoning ordinance. Thus, while there may have been some areas 
identified for agricultural use in Metro Manila, the controversies or opposition 
against conversion to non-agricultural use may be lesser than in the 
C A LA BA RZO N  areas. In CA LA BA RZO N , most areas are primarily 
agricultural and town plans are still in the process of being reviewed and 
updated. Also, the standards for converting agricultural lands to urban use are 
still unclear and tend to be influenced by the policy-orientation of government 
or bv local politics. Thus, decisions can be arbitrary and the effort of land 
conversion can be more difficult.
While the conversion multiplier in the Philippines was low according to the 
World Bank data, the land development multiplier in the countiy was the 
highest among neighboring countries in Southeast and East Asia (refer to Table
8.9). The Philippines land development multiplier was posted at 6.7 while the 
other countries had a multiplier of only about 2 (with the exception of Malaysia 
which had a development multiplier of 4.3). M y own data broadly supported 
this finding. In NCR, the land development multiplier for the years 1990 to 
1996 ranged between 6.24 and 7.39 while in the C A LA BA RZO N  primarily the 
province of Cavite, the range was from 6.18 to 8.33 (Table 8.11).
Table 8.11
Residential Land Development 
Multiplier, 1991-1996
Year NCR a/ CALABARZON b'
1990 6.2 6.2
1991 7.1 8.0
1992 7.0 7.5
1993 6.3 8.0
1994 7.0 7.4
1995 7.3 7.1
1996 7.4 8.3
a based on prices of land at the east sector of NCR 
in end-December of each year. 
b based on prices of land at Cavite in end-December 
of each year
Source: Real Estate Monitor, monthly and weekly 
prices, 1990-96.
A high development multiplier generally coincided with longer permit 
delays (except in the case of Indonesia). As with the development multiplier, 
obtaining approval of permits and titles for a residential subdivision was 
highest in the country compared to other Asian countries. On the other hand, 
Hong Kong and Singapore whose development multipliers were the lowest had 
permit delays of only about two months.
The World Bank development multipliers are useful as they provide 
comparative data. However, the development multiplier, in particular,
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captures not only transaction costs but also production costs (i.e. construction 
costs) and profits.15 Apparently in the Philippines, housing consumers pay a 
large margin over the price of raw land. The question is whether this large 
margin arises from high transaction costs, high construction costs or 
"abnormal" (monopoly) profits of developers? Data on construction costs from 
the same W orld Bank survey in 1990 show that construction costs are lowest in 
the country compared to other Asian countries (Table 8.12). On the other hand, 
Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong with ve iy low land development multipliers 
have very high construction costs. The high multiplier in the Philippines thus, 
does not result from production costs but from either transaction costs or 
"monopoly" profits.
Table 8.12
Construction Costs 
and Land Development Multipliers in Asia
Land Construction
Country (City) Development Costs a/
Multiplier (US$ per sq. m)
Philippines (Metro 6.7 148Manila)
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur) 4.3 159
Thailand (Bangkok) 2.6 156
South Korea (Seoul) 3.8 617
Singapore 1.3 749
Hong Kong 1.2 641
Japan (Tokyo) 2.0 2,604
a/ defined as the present replacement cost ( e.g. labor, materials, on-site 
infrastructure, management and contractor profits) per square meter of 
median-priced dwelling unit.
Source: Housing Indicators Program Extensive Survey, vol. 2. United 
Nations Centre for Human Settlements and the World Bank, October 
1993 (revised preliminary report).
Monopoly or oligopoly profit is difficult to measure or document since the 
collusive behavior of firms is not apparent. However, some crude measures to 
test the existence of monopolistic and oligopolistic structures among industries 
have been established.16 These measures include concentration indices and 
price-cost margins. Concentration indices measure how equal or unequal is the 
output of the industry distributed. Price-cost margins, on the other hand,
15 This is similar to obtaining a bank intermediation margin, which is the difference between the 
average lending rate and the costs of loanable funds.
16 A. Stich 1995. Insurance and Concentration: The Change of Concentration in the Swedish 
and Finnish Insurance Market 1989-1993. Discussion Papers in Statistics and Econometrics. 
No. 10. Paper presented in a Seminar of Economic and Social Statistics, University of 
Cologne.
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measure the degree of competitiveness in an industry by a comparison of 
marginal cost and price.
Using firm level census and annual data from the National Statistics Office 
(NSO) concentration indices and the price-cost margin are computed for the 
real estate sector. Two measures of concentration are provided.17 Thefirst is the 
4-firm concentration ratio, which directly gives the share of the four greatest 
firms.1S A monopolistic or oligopolistic industry structure w ill then show a high 
concentration ratio since outputs tend to be concentrated among the top firms. 
The second is the Herfindahl mdex, which gives the equivalent number of 
equally sized firms (i.e. same market share) that produce the same 
concentration like the actual industry.19 A  lower index implies a larger number 
of firms with same market share and thus a lower concentration.
The results as shown in Table 8.13 revealed a 4-firm concentration ratio of 
about 0.4 in 1994. In other words, the 4 largest firms control 40% of the market. 
This ratio was even higher in 1995 (about 0.6). On the other hand, the 
Herfindahl index depicted a lower concentration with about 18 to 22 firms 
having equal market share. These conflicting results require further analysis. It 
is plausible that the high concentration obtained from the 4-firm concentration 
ratio is due to a highly segmented real estate market. The real estate industry 
caters to different market clientele. Real estate products range from the high- 
end industrial, commercial and residential developments to low-cost and 
socialized residential developments. This highly segmented market give 
heavier weights on those firms that are mainly into high-end or high-valued 
developments or sales. The concentration ratio tends to capture this bias. The 
increase in the concentration ratio in 1995 could thus be attributed to an 
increase in high-end developments rather than an increase in the industry's 
concentration.
Data on sales volume for a specific real estate market (e.g. socialized 
housing) show much lower 4-firm concentration ratio.20 Table 8.14 reveals that 
the market share of firms providing socialized housing are evenly distributed. 
For the period 1990-95, the share of the top four socialized housing developers 
is only about 14 %. Moreover, the composition of top firms in the market varies 
from year to year. Although New San Jose Builders, Inc. has the largest share in 
the socialized housing market for the period 1990-95, the firm only developed 
socialized houses in 1994. In the years 1990-93 and 1995, the firm has no 
socialized housing outputs. In the same period, it is also noted that the top 
three firms in the socialized housing market varies by year and cannot really be 
attributed to specific firms. It is thus probable that the real estate sector is a
17 There are different measures of concentration e.g. concentration ratio, Herfindahl index, 
exponential index, Rosenbluth index. Ibid.p.2.
18 Concentration ratios maybe computed for the top 1 to 10 firms.
19 The number of firms is computed as the reciprocal ofthe Herfindahl index
20 The NSO data do not provide a means to segregate value added by type of market or 
development, thus market share on sales volume was used rather than value added.
highlv competitive market.
The price-cost margin measure also suggests a competitive real estate 
market (refer to Table 8.13). The PCM  of about 0.90 to 0.95 approximates the 
competitive market condition wherein price is equal to the marginal cost.
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Table 8.13
Industry Structure Indicators for the Real Estate Sector
Number of 
Establishments
Concentration Indices
Profit-Cost 
Margin 
(PCM) a'
Real Estate Sector a/
4-Firm Concentration 
Ratiodi
Herfindahl 
Index (H)e(
1994(CE) w 385 0.366 0.045 (22) » 0.895
1995 (A SE)ci 427 0.587 0.111
(10) 0.951
Real Estate
Development
Companies
1994(CE)bi 257 0.409 0.055
(18) 0.905
1995 (ASE) <* 278 0.617 0.122 
.. (8) ...
0.958
a/ includes real estate development companies, agents, brokers, managers, appraisers 
b/ Census of Establishment, NSO 
c/ Annual Survey of Establishment, NSO
d' Share of the 4 largest firms in total subsector/industry census value added. Census value added 
represents the difference between the value of output and the total costs of materials and supplies 
including industrial services done by others (e.g. industrial repair, maintenance works, installation).
In the real estate sector the census value added basically consists of the development costs, 
personnel/compensation costs, non-industrial costs (e.g. rents, commissions, representations, 
fees,etc.) and profits.
H = IS ¡2 where S¡ = share of the ith firm to total subsector or industry census value added.
" figures in ( ) refers to the number of equally-sized firms, which is computed as the reciprocal of the 
Herfindahl index.
g/ Price-Cost Margin (PCM) = (Census value added - compensation) / Value of Output. In the real 
estate sector, the numerator basically approximates the development costs plus non-industrial 
costs.
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Table 8.14
Top 20 Socialized Subdivision Developers (BP-220), 
Expanded NCR (ENCR)a, 1990-1995 (number of units)
Rank Developers 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1990-95
Total “/„S ha re
i New San Jose Builders, Inc. • - 5,481 5,481 4.3
2 Household Development Corp. - 209 2,163 1,382 33 318 4.105 3.2
3 Palao Construction and Dev. Corp. 2,012 - 1,987 - - 3,999 3.2
4 Palmera Homes, Inc. - 1,553 645 1,310 180 3,688 2.9
D inter Venture Realty Corp - 2,621 2,621 2.1
6 Stateland Investment Corp. - 1,211 - 1,360 2.571 2.0
7 Legacy Homes. Inc - - - 901 1,288 2,189 1.7
8 Futuristic Properties - - - 580 1,575 2,155 1.7
9 La Paz Housing and Dev. Corp. 1,397 - - - - 708 2,105 1.7
10 Durawood Construction Corp. - 93 517 770 - 494 1,874 1.5
11 Molino Homes, Inc. - 679 - - 1,185 1,864 1.5
12 National Housing Authority (NHA) 1,360 - - - - 482 1,842 1.5
13 Freedom to Build - 609 1,163 - 1,772 1.4
14 Timberland Properties, Inc. - 727 591 - 1,318 1.0
15 Carville Homes Construction Mgnt. - - 1,306 1,306 1.0
16 Landhaus Properties Dev. Corp. - - - 1,293 1,293 1.0
17 AFP Retirement and Separation 948 214 - 1,162 0.9
18 Trihead Development Corp. 178 148 368 421 - 1,115 0.9
19 Filinvest Development Corp. - - - 874 213 1,087 0.9
20 Golden Bay Realty and Dev. Corp. 620 - - 426 - 1,046 0.8
Sub-Total Top 20 Developers 6,515 4,716 8,876 8,615 13,689 2,182 44,593 35.2
Total ENCR Housing Production 16,497 17,749 13,954 10,295 26,108 41,931 126,534 100
a/ Expanded NCR include production in the NCR region, Bulacan and in Region 4 (Palawan, Laguna, Batangas, Cavite, Rizal) 
Source: HLURB approved “license to sell" projects
The above findings do not support the hypothesis of a monopolistic or 
oligopolistic structure for the real estate industry. Given the absence of 
"abnormal" profits, the land development multiplier thus can be an indicator of 
transaction costs in the market. This multiplier also allows a comparison of 
transaction costs across areas. For instance, we can state that Metro Manila has 
high transaction costs as the development multipliers in other countries in 
Southeast Asia show much lower levels (refer to Table 8.10). Sim ilarly, 
C A LA BA RZO N  has higher transaction costs than Metro Manila, as 
development multipliers are higher in the former (refer to Table 8.11).
The transaction costs in the real estate sector are mainly expressed in time. 
This sector is sensitive to timing. Conjunctural fluctuations in demand and 
supply are primarily met by the sector's ability to change markets and speed up 
or delay deliveries. Thus, raw land, rights and permits have to be obtained at 
the right time. The high transaction costs in the market thus is not measured in
direct money terms (e.g. expenditures on grease money) but are an indication of 
the fact that waiting time is costly. It costs money to let invested capital wait for 
a long time.
It is also possible that actual transaction costs in the market are hidden in 
the real situation. The transaction costs obtained from individual firms 
measured in terms of time suggest more moderate costs than those indicators 
based on comparative data. The price ratios and time data apparently have 
captured two levels of transaction costs. The first is a situation of high 
transaction costs. These transaction costs have been captured at the aggregate 
level by relative price ratios. The situation in Manila is compared to that of 
neighboring countries. Some countries have veiy low development multipliers 
that one can hypothesize that the situation is close to a frictionless world (no 
transaction cost). Manila with the highest development multiplier thus has veiy 
high transaction cost.
The second situation is that of low transaction costs. This situation is 
reflected at the client level where transaction costs are noted to be lower than 
the aggregate level. The time spent for permits and licensing at the firm level is 
lower. The data on land conversion also indicate that average time spent can be 
veiy short (4 to 6 months). The above differences in the levels of transaction cost 
arise because in the real situation developers come up with mechanisms to 
reduce potentially high transaction cost. Developers are not passive participants 
but are already dealing with the existing transaction costs in the market. It is 
therefore difficult to measure transaction costs in the market from micro level 
observations. W e can only point this out at the macro level, using macro 
indicators and on the basis of comparisons.
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CHAPTER 9
Summary and Conclusions
Research Direction and Key Arguments
This study provides an institutional analysis of the urban land market in 
Metro Manila. Its main theoretical argument is based on the neo- 
institutional economic framework, which posits that economic transactions 
do not occur in a "frictionless" world of zero transaction costs. There are 
costs involved in making, negotiating and enforcing exchanges because real 
world transactions are most often faced w ith uncertainties due to limited 
and asymmetric information and that people do not have exclusive rights to 
important goods and services. Economic actors w ill tend to economize on 
transaction costs through different institutional arrangements and 
alternative forms of exchange and allocation. The nature and level of 
transaction costs w ill thus give rise to different ways of market clearing.
The study examined the sources and nature of transaction costs in the 
urban land market. It delved into institutional arrangements that have risen 
and persisted in the market and the effects of such institutions on market 
outcomes. The study also provided estimates on the level of transaction 
costs in the market.
The conclusions can be summarized into five main arguments, to wit:
1. The urban land market is characterized by high transaction costs 
because of insecure property rights and unclear government land 
use and zoning regulations.
2. The high transaction costs in the market are mainly expressed in 
terms of time-consuming procedures resulting iii direct money costs.
3. The attempts of economic actors in the market to reduce or 
circumvent transaction costs have affected the organizational forms 
of the market. Auctions are absent while bilateral bargaining and 
relational contracting are the dominant market transactions.
4. The phenomenon of grease or speed money should be understood as 
a form of relational contracting.
5. The land and real estate market in the countiy is volatile due to the 
boom and bust pattern of the economy. Timing plays an important 
role to clear markets such that "time-saving" mechanisms rather 
than price adjustments are prim arily employed to clear the market.
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Sources of Transaction Costs
The land market is generally characterized by uncertainties due to 
information problems and asset specificity. Information problems arise from 
asymmetric and limited information. Land and real estate are goods of 
experience quality. The quality of these goods cannot be fu lly established in 
brief ocular inspection but only during their use. Moreover, "third parties" 
such as behavior of neighbors, proximity of land to squatter colonies, 
changes in zoning ordinances of local authorities can influence the value of 
real estate. Property rights in the country thus have major bearing on 
transactions involving land and real estate.
Information about land and real estate transactions is also limited. The 
land or property market is generally "th in." Each land or property is unique 
thus similar transactions are rare and information about the market is 
scanty.
High asset specificity also typifies land and real estate transactions. Land 
by its nature is a site-specific asset. The location of land determines the 
suitability, profitability and costs of a particular development project. Land 
becomes even more site-specific for certain purposes such as the expansion 
of a previous subdivision project, when a contiguous large area is required 
or when a parcel of land is needed for a "right-of-way." Likewise, property 
rights are also specific in the sense that it refers to a particular person or 
legal entity and to a particular parcel of land.
The nature of land and real estate goods puts considerable transaction 
costs in the market. However, because property rights also affect the value 
and attributes of these goods, weak and insecure property rights exacerbate 
transaction costs in the market. This is the case in the Philippines where 
fraudulent activities in land titling and registration, confusing permitting 
and licensing system, populist attitude of government on squatting, and 
weak "police protection" on private and public lands have resulted in 
greater uncertainty in the market. These conditions are strongly felt in 
urbanized areas like Metro Manila where land and real estate properties 
have become scarcer and more expensive.
In Metro Manila and possibly other parts of the countiy, caution must be 
exercised in buying land. First, there is the problem of "fake titles." These 
titles arise from unscrupulous activities of some people in collusion w ith 
government officials, who fake surveys and deeds of conveyance and 
tamper w ith previously issued titles or surveys. Second, there is the problem 
of double titles or titling of lands that are classified as forestlands. Third, 
there is the problem of squatters, tenants and illegal occupants on private 
lands. Government adopts a populist attitude w ith regard to squatting and 
tenancy. This has made settlements w ith squatters and tenants a costly and 
tedious process. Fourth, the resolution of land cases is a slow process. W hile
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the government upholds the Torrens title and guarantees any buyer of good 
faith the right to the safeguards and remedies of the Torrens title system, 
going through the legal process is costly. The resolution of these cases takes 
years. For instance, resolving the issues on illegal occupants or tenants via 
the court system takes at least three years. Cases of fake titles, double titles 
and titling of forestlands take even longer. Some cases have been resolved 
only after 20 years.
Obtaining permits and licenses from the government has also created 
much uncertainty in the market due to the confused state of government 
planning regulations. First, town plans are inadequate in guiding land use 
conversion and urban planning. Town plans are being used as basis for the 
approval of most permits and licenses (e.g. locational clearance, conversion 
clearance, development permits, ECC, etc.). M any municipalities, however, 
do not have town plans or have outdated town plans. In Metro Manila, for 
instance, the legally recognized land use and zoning plan is based on a 1981 
land use and zoning map. Spot zoning has thus become prevalent. In 
addition, approvals of locational clearance or development permits have to 
be obtained from the local councils since many land uses do not conform to 
existing zoning ordinance. Many town plans are also not technically sound. 
The town plans at the urban fringes of Metro Manila have been limited to 
the town centers while areas outside these centers have not been given 
adequate attention. These plans have not been based on w ell conceived and 
valid land allocation criteria. For agricultural lands, in particular, the 
government has yet to develop specific guidelines to operationalize, 
implement, and monitor land conversions.
Second, land use on industrialization and agrarian reform tends to 
conflict. The inadequacy of town plans makes the permit and licensing 
system vulnerable to changes in government policy directions. For instance, 
under the Ramos administration policies and programs to fast-track 
industrialization in the country were pursued. This thrust called for an 
urban-based growth that was achieved by relaxing the guidelines for land 
conversion. Between 1992 and 1998, there had been significant cases of 
reversals in decisions pertaining to land conversion. W hile the Department 
of Agrarian Reform has categorically denied some applications for 
conversion, the Office of the President reversed these decisions. The basis 
for these reversals showed that provisions of the land reform and agrarian 
laws could be "negotiable" for purposes of industrialization. Irrigated lands 
or agricultural lands earmarked for irrigation, which by law cannot be 
converted, had been subject of conversion. Certificates of land transfer (i.e. 
agrarian reform patents), which by law cannot be sold w ithin a period of 
five years, had also been traded.
Third, the delineation of authority between local and national 
government agencies is unclear. The local government code of 1991 granted 
local government units autonomy and greater responsibility in the 
management of local affairs. This Code empowered cities and municipalities 
to reclassify agricultural lands and this has created conflict w ith regard to 
land conversion. In this mandate of the local government, it would seem 
that D AR is no longer responsible in classifying lands. DAR, however, 
argues that the local government code merely confers to local governments 
the general authority to re-classify agricultural lands and the authority to 
convert agricultural land remains w ith DAR. The private sector, on the other 
hand, feels that the local government now shares the authority of the D AR 
but only to a limited extent since the local government's authority applies to 
only a percentage of the total agricultural land area. Moreover, there are 
laws that tend to lim it DAR's authority over conversion. One such law is 
DOJ Opinion 44 that pertains to agricultural lands exempted from CA RP 
coverage. Under this law, DAR's authority is limited to validating a 
particular land that has been reclassified before the C A RP took effect. Also, 
the N PA A  charter of the DA has not significantly protected agricultural 
lands. Although the network of protected agricultural areas (N PA A ) has 
been identified in the land use plans of cities and municipalities, the 
guidelines have been biased toward industrialization. Thus, backed by the 
Local Government Code and the N ED A 's blueprint for industrialization, 
local governments have been hastily reclassifying lands and incorporating 
commercial, residential, tourism and industrial zones in their land use 
plans.
Fourth, the standards for the issuance of permits are quite vague. There 
is no transparency in terms of requirements for some permits, neither of the 
bases for additional requirements nor for the different requirements on 
similar developments. The conversion of agricultural lands has been 
arbitrary. For instance, in some municipalities at the urban fringe, 
development permits have been issued in areas demarcated as agricultural 
zones and even on irrigated lands, which by law are non-negotiable for 
conversion. These arbitrary approvals result from the absence of clear land 
use guidelines in different municipalities. The absence of strong enforceable 
punitive measures against illegal land conversion is another weakness in the 
development control process. These regulatory weaknesses open the process 
to personal bias and political patronage.
The system of permits and licensing in the countiy has become more 
complicated overtime. W ith  the enactment of the local government code and 
the comprehensive agrarian reform program in the 1990s, there has been an 
increase in the number of permits required and the number of government 
agencies and personnel to deal with. For instance, prior to 1992, it took 4.5
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months to obtain planning permission from the government for residential 
subdivision development. After 1992, the same process is accomplished 
w ithin an average of 18 months. The number of permits required has 
increased from 16 to 41 from 1980 to 1992, and the number of approving 
personnel also increased from 27 to 155 in the same period. This finding is 
contrary to the general belief that bureaucracies are becoming more efficient 
everywhere. In the urban land market, this belief does not hold true. The 
bureaucracy has become more inefficient.
The difficult transactions in the land and real estate markets are those 
that deal w ith the third party, the state. Developers have to apply for 
permits and obtain titles and these "goods" can only be obtained in 
government counters. Government officials can delay the issuance of rights 
and permits given an environment where rights can be imperfect, the 
allocation can be manipulated, and titles can be faked. More so, zoning and 
land use laws are unclear, inconsistent and open to different interpretations. 
Transaction w ith the state thus, is not a simple "yes" and "no" but a 
bargaining process w ith all kinds of intermediary outcomes that can be 
subsequently manipulated. These transactions are causing high transaction 
costs in the urban land market. On the side of the buyers, there is "m istrust" 
in the market due to the presence of "fake" or "illegal" titles and the 
perception that quality standards (i.e. permits and licences) can be bought. 
In the case of the developers, the processes of titling, registration and 
permitting have become time-consuming procedures resulting in direct 
money costs.
Forms o f  Exchange and  Allocation
Developers, however, are not passive participants in the market. They have 
actively invented mechanisms to reduce or circumvent high transaction 
costs. These attempts to economize on transaction costs resulted in different 
organizational forms of exchange and allocation for land and real estate 
properties in Metro Manila.
It is noted that the urban land market in Metro Manila involves different 
transactions in different markets. These transactions are as follows: (1) the 
developer buys raw land in the raw land market; (2) the developer contracts 
builders, architects, suppliers in the service market; (3) the developer 
obtains permit and licenses from the government; and (4) the developer sells 
the final product in the developed land market. In all these transactions, 
auctions or "arms-length" trading are absent. Instead, bilateral bargaining, 
relational contracting and hierarchy are the prevalent forms of exchange. 
Bilateral bargaining refers to direct bargaining between the buyer and seller 
whereby the outcomes can be different or uncorrelated among buyers. 
Relational contracting or repeated bilateral bargaining also involves direct
208 The Urban Land and Real Estate Market in Metro Manila: A  Socio-economic Analysis
bargaining between buyers and sellers but the outcomes are prim arily based 
on future relations or networks of long-term personal relationships. 
Hierarchy, on the other hand, is an administrative form of exchange 
wherein firms internalize production rather than deal w ith the market (i.e. 
make instead of buy).
Auctions are usually common in goods w ith search quality, i.e., the 
quality of the good can be established in brief ocular inspection (e.g. rice, 
vegetable). On the other hand, goods w ith experience quality, (e.g. cattle, 
second hand cars, houses) whose quality can be established only after some 
time, are too much dependent on a "high trust" environment for auctions to 
succeed. For instance, there are housing auctions in Australia. This is 
possible when there is a guarantee that the seller is not out to deceive the 
public. The houses are probably of standard quality, the year of construction 
is known, defects have been reported (inspection reports probably 
available), property rights cause no problem, and city regulations are strictly 
enforced. A similar situation is noted in the auctions of government lands in 
Australia. The ground rent, development rights and responsibilities of the 
prospective developer are clearly defined. The prospective developer knows 
what he or she can or cannot do w ith the land as w ell as what neighbors can 
do w ith their land, hi other words, auctions of land and real estate goods 
are plausible in a high trust environment w ith strong government presence. 
This is not, however, the case in the Philippines. Carrying out transactions 
in the "arms-length" (or auction) way is difficult because transactions 
involving land and real estate are done under a cloud of "m istrust." Buyers 
cannot trust developers, developers cannot trust the government, and 
government cannot trust developers. Bilateral dependency thus dominates 
land and real estate transactions.
In W illiam son's view, high transaction costs cause firms to internalize 
production and, hence, expand firm size through vertical and horizontal 
integration. However, in the case of real estate development firms in the 
Philippines, the road to expansion is not chosen. Instead, firms move toward 
increased specialization by dividing up into companies that cater to a 
particular market (e.g. high-end, low-cost and socialized housing, vertical or 
horizontal land development) or real estate service (e.g. construction, 
marketing, suppliers and land banking). Firms prefer to remain small and 
create a niche in a specific market. The reason may be that the real estate 
industry consists of different activities that are interrelated but governed by 
different standards, networks, rules, procedures and market strategies. By 
keeping the firm w ithin a specific market, the transaction costs and risks are 
minimized. On the other hand, the specialization and greater division of 
labor in the industry suggest that development firms do a lot of contracting 
or sub-contracting (e.g. long-term contracting, reciprocity, tied sales, etc).
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Such contracting may be done among firms w ithin a conglomerate or 
outside of the conglomerate.
Firm expansion has been mainly applied in the raw land market where 
the high transaction costs lead to greater land banking activities. Land 
banking is a form of hierarchy where developers bring into the firm raw 
lands much earlier than the decision to develop the land. This activity 
enables developers to readily respond to a volatile real estate market. The 
real estate market is sensitive to economic boom and bust. In a boom, 
developers would want to take advantage of the high demand and get the 
final product in the market w ithin a reasonable period of time. They thus, 
have to speed up the process of getting rights, permits and clearances. 
Otherwise, poor timing can lead to the following negative consequences: the 
deal with investors is off, capital invested w ill not yield enough profit, or 
prices w ill not be right. Land banking allows developers to obtain 
developmental lands at the right time taking into consideration delays due 
to title tracing, the difficulty in settlement of tenants and squatters, and the 
confusion in the issuance of permits and licenses.
In those transactions involving government, a different form of bilateral 
dependency has surfaced. Contracting among firms, which W illiam son 
referred to as "hybrids", applies only to the private sector. In the interface 
between the private sector and government, this type of arrangement is not 
possible. The reason is that providing rights and planning permissions 
cannot be made arbitrarily or be governed by an elastic contracting 
mechanism. This being so, firms find other ways to internalize the high 
transaction costs of dealing w ith government. Informal relational 
contracting is one way. In particular, procedural "short-cuts" and grease or 
speed money have been the popular forms of "inform al" contracts in the 
land market.
Procedural "short-cuts" are adopted to avoid litigation procedures that 
are tedious and costly or to minimize bureaucratic hassles. These "short­
cuts" are generally w ithin legal boundaries. One scheme is the pre­
settlement of squatters, tenants or farmers. Developers negotiate w ith the 
occupants of the land prior to applying for land conversion clearance or 
development permits. In this way, occupants w ill not create problems and 
pressure government to withhold issuance of permits. Another scheme is 
the "out-of-court" settlement w ith squatters and illegal occupants. Although 
private property rights are upheld in court, the litigation process takes a 
minimum of three years. Most landowners often prefer to settle with 
squatters and illegal occupants through amicable negotiations.
Collaborating w ith local governments for specific projects is also another 
way to reduce bureaucratic hassles. Under the 1991 local government code, 
issuance of most permits and clearances has been devolved to the local
government units. By making the local government part of the development 
project even without the infusion of capital, the approval of permits and 
licenses can be facilitated. Another procedural short cut is the use of side 
agreements. The idea is to avoid the tedious requirements of the land 
development permit by in itially applying for a construction permit and later 
converting this permit into a development permit. In obtaining land 
conversion clearance, a common practice among landowners or developers 
is the “ chop-chop" system. In this scheme, landowners or developers who 
seek conversion clearance for a big tract of agricultural land subdivide the 
total area into small parcels (i.e. 5 hectares or less). Through this scheme, the 
developer avoids going through the bureaucratic processes at the D AR 
Central office, where permits for larger land parcels (i.e. more than 5 
hectares) would have to be processed. It is more manageable to obtain land 
conversion approval for five hectares or less since this can be done at the 
regional level.
Another form of relational contracting is the use of "speed" money. The 
unclear and inconsistent laws on land use and zoning create a chance for 
government employees or officials to use the situation for personal gains. 
Since one is unsure whether the permit w ill be granted or when the permit 
w ill be granted, transactions with government have become a bargaining 
process. "Grease" or "speed" money is a possible and logical choice as this 
allows things to get done. It can facilitate approval. The experience of 
developers show that monies speeded up the issuance of permits and 
brought about approvals for development projects that could not have been 
given planning permission under certain laws. Speed money also becomes 
important silice relying simply on the law, can penalize the developer. The 
amount of "speed" monies varies and depends on the size of land being 
processed. In residential subdivision developments in the C A LA BA RZO N  
region, "speed" money ranged from 10 centavos to 3 pesos per square 
meter.
E stim a ting  Transaction Costs
The time spent in the land development process and price ratios have been 
used as indicators of transaction cost in the urban land market. The data on 
time spent have been mainly obtained from individual firm or client level. 
Data showed that the whole process of land development takes about two 
years and five months. About 43.5 percent of this time is spent in obtaining 
permits while 7.3 percent is used in buying raw land. Among the permits 
specifically needed for residential land development, obtaining the D AR 
conversion clearance and the environment clearance takes the most time. A 
further examination of the time spent on land conversion clearance show 
that the experiences of development firms are varied. On the average, most
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D AR conversion clearances have been obtained w ithin 4 to 6 months. Some 
clearances were obtained w ithin one year while a few were obtained 
between two to five years. Although the average processing time for land 
conversion is higher in C A LA BA RZO N  than in Metro Manila, the time 
spent on conversion has no significant correlation either on the size of the 
land or the location of the land. This implies that small land areas do not 
necessarily obtain conversion permits faster than large areas. Moreover, the 
time spent in obtaining conversion clearance for lands w ithin similar zones 
can be significantly different.
Estimates of transaction costs in the land market have also been obtained 
using price ratios. For residential land development, the land development 
multiplier, which is the ratio of the price of raw land to the price of 
developed land, is highest in Metro Manila compared to other major cities in 
Southeast and East Asia. Metro Manila has a land development multiplier of
6.7 while Hong Kong has a multiplier of 1.2 and Singapore has a multiplier 
of 1.3. Between Metro Manila and the C A LA BA RZO N  region, the 
development multiplier is higher in the latter.
The lim itation of the development multiplier, however, is that it 
captures not only transaction costs but also production costs and profits. It is 
thus necessary to rule out that the high multiplier in Manila does not come 
from either construction costs or "abnormal" (i.e. monopoly) profits. A 
comparison of construction costs across Asia shows that construction costs 
are very low in the country (i.e. the Philippines has the lowest construction 
costs per square meter among Asian countries). There is also an apparent 
absence of "abnormal" (i.e. monopoly) profits in the industry. Measures of 
industry concentration using the 4-firm concentration ratio and the 
Herfindahl index are low. In the former, the market share of the top 4 firms 
engaged in socialized housing development is only 14%. On the other hand, 
the Herfindahl index is between 0.045 and 0.055, which means that 22 to l8 
equally sized development firms comprise the industry. The 
competitiveness of the industry has also been measured using the price-cost 
margin (PCM ). The PCM  for real development firms ranges from 0.90 to 
0.95. This reflects a competitive industry. The lowT construction costs and 
absence of monopoly profits in the real estate sector suggest that the land 
development multiplier is an indicator of transaction costs.
The land development multiplier is useful because it provides a means 
to compare transaction costs across areas. The situation in Manila is 
compared to that of neighboring countries. Some countries have very low 
development multipliers, and it may be possible to hypothesize a situation 
close to a "frictionless" world (no transaction costs). On the other hand, 
Manila w ith the highest development multiplier has very high transaction 
costs.
W e can point out real transaction costs in the market using macro level 
indicators (e.g. price ratios) and on the basis of comparisons. However, these 
costs may not be fu lly reflected in the client or firm level data. The data on 
time spent for processing permits show that transaction costs are more 
moderate than the cost computed from aggregate or macro figures. For 
instance, in the land conversion data, most firms have been able to obtain 
their conversion clearances w ithin 4 to 6 months. Also, some firms have 
accomplished raw land acquisition w ithin 3 months. These time periods 
spent are short compared to the computed permit delay of 36 months for 
Metro Manila.
The difference in transaction costs shows that high transaction costs may 
not be reflected in the micro or firm level. This may be due to transaction 
cost-economizing strategies employed by developers that have succeeded in 
reducing real transaction costs in the market. W hat we observed thus, are 
transaction costs that are already the result of people's interventions to 
reduce those costs. In this case, it is difficult to measure real transaction costs 
at the micro level. However, transaction cost-economizing strategies may 
not necessarily work at all times since there are post-contracting hazards. 
Procedural short cuts and "speed" money are informal and politically 
motivated transactions. Intervening factors may also exist that could 
pressure the government officials to go slow on approval or to reverse 
decisions (e.g. public pressure, conflict w ith some officials, etc.). Thus, while 
some firms have been able to obtain conversion clearance w ithin 6 months, 
others have obtained the same clearance in two to 5 years. Sim ilarly, while 
raw land have been acquired in three months, in some cases it may take the 
developer two years to accomplish the same process. These conditions 
imply that while relational contracting can minimize transaction costs, it 
does not permanently reduce or eliminate these costs. Developers may 
succeed in some cases but the same mechanisms may not work for all 
development projects. Changes in administration or shifting of government 
field employees w ill also affect the approval process. In some cases, 
developers may actually experience real transaction costs in the market.
M arke t  Clearing in the Land and  Real Estate M arke t
Bilateral dependency involves personalized exchanges. This implies that 
personal relation w ith seller, long-term personal networks, and reputation 
of developer (e.g. branding) are major considerations for the land and real 
estate markets to clear. Strategies thus, to meet changes in demand and 
supply are not necessarily done through changes in prices but through non­
price mechanisms. Adjusting the quality of goods is one way. For instance, 
in the socialized housing market, where the prices of land and real estate are 
administratively determined, the quality of development has deteriorated
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overtime. Land and floor areas of socialized housing have become smaller. 
Socialized houses have also been provided with the barest finishing. 
Another non-price mechanism is to favor some customers over others (e.g. 
"suk i"  system). Goods are made available to regular customers while others 
are asked to "w ait." Developers may also entice more buyers by creating 
attractive financing schemes such as easy credit terms.
In the land and real estate markets, the major non-price mechanisms 
employed are those that aim to manipulate time. Time is the most direct 
transaction cost in the market. Demand for land and real estate is largely 
influenced by economic cycles of boom and bust. The real estate market 
becomes very active during periods of economic expansion while inactive in 
periods of recession. These conjunctural fluctuations in demand have been 
met through non-price mechanisms. One mechanism is the provision of 
facilitating finance to increase or hasten sales. This is done through 
attractive financing schemes and easy credit or by offering in-house 
financing. The Asian crisis that hit the Philippines in mid-1997 saw the 
proliferation of financing "gimmicks" among developers to perk up demand 
in the market. The objective is to influence decision of buyers to buy now 
rather than to postpone consumption.
Another mechanism is to bring government into the market. This is 
employed in the socialized land and housing market which mainly operates 
through government financial programs. Government financing basically 
stimulates demand in this market thus, developers support public housing 
funds, government subsidies and guarantees. To some extent therefore, real 
estate developers adopt a pro-government attitude and even a preference 
for populist and socialistic measures for the poor.
The real estate sector has also the ability to delay deliveries or 
production during economic slump and speed up production and deliveries 
during economic booms. In particular, the ability of the sector to delay 
deliveries in economic slump has largely substituted for large decreases in 
real estate prices. On the other hand, its ability to speed up production has 
substituted for large price increases during economic boom specifically for 
the low-income real estate market. During the 1990s real estate boom in the 
country, phenomenal rise in land and real estate prices has been reported. 
However, such increase did not occur in all segments of the market. The 
developed real estate market is highly segmented based on income level. 
Unprecedented increases in price have been reported in the market for the 
high-income sector. In the low-income sector, price increases have been 
constrained by structural factors such as insufficient income of most buyers, 
inferior infrastructure development of low-cost real estate properties, and 
the absence of positive externalities in the area. These factors constrained
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price adjustments and therefore developers substitute non-price 
mechanisms in response to conjunctural fluctuations in demand.
How did high transaction costs affect the land and real estate prices? 
Agricultural land or raw land prices in the country are relatively modest. On 
the other hand, the prices of urban land and real estate are considerably 
high. This can be traced to high land development costs arising from high 
transaction costs. These costs as mentioned earlier are time-related. 
Altogether, there is much delay in building development (or land 
improvement) in the country. It is difficult to actually obtain development 
lands due to land titling and registration problems, the prevalence of illegal 
occupants, and the constraints in the transfers or sale of agrarian lands. 
There is also the difficulty of finding the appropriate development land for 
housing, commercial or industrial sites because land use and zoning plans 
are most often technically deficient and unreliable. Unclear land use and 
zoning laws have made it difficult for prospective developers to determine 
the land use patterns in the area. The developer is unsure what government 
w ill do or what the neighbors w ill do w ith their lands. Although institutions 
have risen to minimize delays, these institutions do not work at all times. In 
addition, other forms of costs may result from some institutional 
arrangements. For instance, land banking reduce the "w aiting" time to 
obtain land for development. However, because of the necessity of 
purchasing land in advance of development, the opportunity cost of capital 
increases. Likewise, "speed" money facilitates planning permission, 
however, it can be abused and the developer may end up paying more. 
These factors contribute to the high costs of developed lands and real estate 
iii the country.
Policy Implications
High transaction costs in the urban land market arise prim arily from 
confusing regulations in obtaining permits and licenses. Although these 
costs have been internalized through different forms of market organization, 
these forms do not im ply an alternative to regulation. The reason is that the 
forms of organization that arise are not necessarily morally acceptable. Foi- 
instance, the use of speed or grease money creates the impression of 
"opportunistic" government officials and developers. This practice also 
defeats the purpose of instituting development controls in the country and 
creates more uncertainties in the market. Moreover, "speed" money do not 
permanently reduce or eliminate transactions costs, and does not necessarily 
work in all cases.
Although it is difficult to totally eradicate "speed" money in the real 
world, this practice can be minimize through clearer guidelines and better 
monitoring system. "Speed" money takes place within a principal-agent-
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client interaction w ith the central government as the principal, the local 
government as the agent, and the developer as the client. Monitoring and 
control between the principal and the agent becomes more difficult when 
there are no institutional mechanisms that would provide the check and 
balance specifically w ith regard to local development planning. Moreover, 
contradicting policies have to be corrected. In particular, there is an 
apparent contradiction in Philippine land use policies. On the one hand, the 
government wants industry to expand and housing to improve. But on the 
other hand, there are strong barriers to expanding the industrial and 
residential areas because of agrarian zoning and D AR regulations. This 
contradiction is probably w idely spread in the world but it creates a real 
problem in countries where organizations supporting property rights are 
weak.
Weak or insecure property rights have contributed to high transaction 
costs in the urban land market. However, the impact of insecure property 
rights has produced deeper negative externalities iii the economy than in the 
real estate sector itself. For instance, land banking has been used to reduce 
transaction costs in the real estate market. This practice, which involves the 
"hoarding" of raw lands, has resulted in the existence of vast areas of 
agricultural and urban lands that are idle or underutilized. Observers often 
conclude that there is too much speculative holding of land and inflationary 
macroeconomic policies are often blamed for it. However, it is our 
contention that the insecurity of property rights exerts a heavier influence 
on land speculation.
The land and real estate market works w ell in an environment w ith 
strong government presence. W hile the recent view  is that "perfect markets" 
or "arms-length" dealings work better w ith minimal government 
intervention, this condition apparently does not work in the case of 
commodity land. Where government has been aloof in land planning, the 
result is misuse, land speculation, and high transaction costs. Strong and 
more direct government presence seems necessary in the land and real 
estate market. The reason is that land unlike other commodities is non- 
reproducible and produces significant externalities. This does not imply that 
all lands should be publicly owned. Instead, government should directly 
intervene in land use allocation and play a prominent role in the land 
market.
Research Implications
The socio-economic analysis on markets has contributed to the recent 
theoretical developments on market as a social institution. The framework 
could be applied to analyze forms of exchange and allocation, market 
structure and market clearance in other industries.
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The framework has also contributed to the on-going discourse on 
transaction cost. The transaction cost framework has been applied prim arily 
to microanalytic issues although studies on its macroeconomic applications 
have also started. The challenge for future research along this line is to 
provide measurement for transaction costs. Measurement poses some 
difficulties due to the generality by which transaction costs have been 
defined.
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APPENDIX A
Features of Government Housing Finance Programs
Programs Agency Objectives Description Target Features
UHLP NHMFC To provide loans for financing 
purchases of residential lot or 
new house and lot and for the 
construction of housing units
Take-out mechanism for loans 
from the SSS, GSIS and 
HDMF for the purchase of 
residential lots, construction of 
dwelling units, purchase of 
newly-constructed housing 
units or existing units 
foreclosed by the government 
or for construction of a new 
house
Members of SSS, 
GSIS and HDMF
Loans:
• Up to P150,000, 9%/annum
• Over P150,000-P220,000, 
12%/annum Over P225,000- 
375,000, 16%/annum;
Term of loan: up to 25 years;
Amortization not to exceed
33.33% of monthly income.
Fees:
• Origination Fee=5% of the 
loan amount.
• Penalty Rate=1/5 of 1% of the 
loan per day of delay
Abot-Kaya 
Pabahay Funds
NHMFC To enhance the affordability of 
low-cost housing by low- 
income families
entire program consist of four
components:
• amortization support
• developmental financing,
• cash flow guarantee: 
guarantee system that 
eliminates the risk of non­
collection from loans of 
P150,000 and below
• interest subsidy and liquidity 
support
Families with gross 
income not 
exceeding 
P5,000/month
A. For amortization support: 
Families with gross monthly 
income < P4,000, maximum loan 
of P80,000 with the ff. 
Amortization support for the first 
five years: (i) amortization period 
from 1-12 months, 35% of 
monthly amortization; (ii) 13-24 
months, 30%; (iii) 25-36 months, 
25%; (iv) 37-48 months, 20%; (v) 
49-60 months, 14%;
Families with gross monthly 
income < P5,000, maximum loan 
of P100,000 with the ff. 
amortization support for the first 5 
years: (i) amortization period from 
1-24 months, 25%; (ii) 25-36 
months, 20%; (iii) 37-48 months, 
14%; and (iv) 49-60 months, 7%;.
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Features of Government Housing Finance Programs (continued)
Programs Agency Objectives Description Target Features
B. For developmental financing: 
Minimum of 20 units per project 
with selling cost not more than 
P150,000 for house and lot 
packages; and from P45,000 to 
P60,000 for lot packages. Interest 
rate of loans at 9%/annum, 
payable in 25 years.
C. Cash flow guarantee:
Free guarantee for loans of SSS, 
GSIS and HDMF not exceeding 
P150,000 with interest rate not 
exceeding 12%.
HIGC To ensure a viable cash flow 
for the SSS, GSIS and HDMF
SSS, GSIS, HDMF Eligible loans: those not 
exceeding P150,000 bearing 
interest not exceeding 
12%/annum; in case of default, 
the fund takes over and pays out 
80% of the total amount due.
Social Housing 
Development 
Loan Program
NHMFC To provide low -income families 
in key urban areas with 
affordable housing packages 
through the development of a 
property and/or construction of 
housing units
Financial assistance for the 
development of property 
and/or construction of housing 
units, the SHDLP offers a low - 
cost fund wherein the selling 
price of housing packages 
should not exceed P150,000
Developer, NGOs, 
landowners, LGUs, 
members of SSS, 
GSIS and HDMF
Loan amount bilaterally 
determined by the NHMFC and 
the borrowers. Loan for house 
and lot packages:
• Packages < P150,000: 10%
• P150,000 -  P225,000: 9%
• Packages > P225,000: 8%
Retail Guaranty HIGC To provide incentives for 
private sector participation in 
housing finance by making 
bank loans risk free
Extended to individual 
residential mortgages 
underwritten by private or 
government lending institutions 
to finance the purchase of 
homebuyers of housing units
Lending institutions Unconditional guarantee of 
principal and interest up to 
8.5%/annum; guaranteed 
mortgages are classified risk­
free; interest income up to 8.5% 
is free from all taxes.
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Features of Government Housing Finance Programs (continued
Programs Agency Objectives Description Target Features
Municipal 
Pabahay Bonds
HIGC To insure the face value of 
housing-related municipal 
bonds
Enables LGUs to float 
municipal bonds as a means of 
generating funds for housing or 
housing-related programs
Local government 
units (LGU)
Insuring the face value of the 
bonds and the interest to the 
extent of 8.5%.
Housing packages generated 
from the projects enjoy the 
following tax exemptions:
• Packages < P150,000: 10%
• P150,000 - P225,000: 9% 
Packages > P225,000: 8%
Developmental
Guaranty
HIGC To ensure the development 
loans extended by financial 
institutions to developers of 
subdivision, townhouses, 
condominiums and apartment 
or rental units.
Financial assistance extended 
to private lending institutions 
accredited to process 
developmental loans and are 
assured of automatic 
insurance coverage upon 
enrolment of the loan with 
HIGC
Lending institutions Guaranty may involve either: (a) 
insurance coverage of 
developmental loans for 
individual projects; or (b) 
accreditation of funders to 
process developmental loans 
Fees:
Audit Fee/Year=0.25% 
Application Fee=P5,000 for loans 
< P225M and P10, 000 for loans 
> P225M
Expanded 
Housing Loan 
Program (EHLP)
HDMF To provide homeownership to 
member-households of the 
HDMF
Housing loans with purposes 
as the UHLP
Members Same as UHLP plus:
• Over P375,000- P500,000, 
17%/annum 
Fees:
Penalty Rate = 1/20 if 1% of the 
unpaid amount or 18% p.a.
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Features of Government Housing Finance Programs (continued
Programs Agency Objectives Description Target Features
GLAD HDMF To provide financial assistance 
to organized groups of HDMF 
members
Financial assistance to 
organized groups of fund 
members for the acquisition 
and development of rawland or 
partially developed land which 
will serve as the site of their 
housing units
member Maximum loan entitlement per 
individual is 46x and 36x the fund 
salary for employees with 
employer counterpart and 
employees w/o employer 
counterpart, respectively; payable 
in 25 years.
Applicable rates:
• Interest rate = 9% p.a.
• Penalty rate = 1/10 of 1%
Development
Loan
HDMF To create additional housing 
inventories
Provides financial assistance 
at lower interest rate and 
easier terms for development 
of housing projects
Private developers, 
landowners, NGOs, 
LGUs and other 
government 
agencies
Maximum loan of P15M per 
project phase per site.
Interest Rates:
• 11%/year for loans of 150,000 
and below
• 13% for over P150,000 to 
P225,000
• 15% for over P2250,000 to 
P375,000
• 17% for over P375,000 to 
P500,000
Local
Government
Pabahay
Program
HDMF To provide LGUs with the 
necessary financial support to 
fast-track the development and 
implementation of housing 
projects
Loan proceeds to be used for: 
(a) acquisition and 
development of rawland; (b) 
land development of a project 
site; and (c) construction of 
housing units
LGU employees or 
individuals or 
employees (within 
an eligible lGu 
area of jurisdiction) 
that are members of 
HDMF
Maximum amount of P20 million 
per project phase per site to be 
paid over a maximum period of 
24 months from date of loan 
release; sells units to households 
at below-market-price
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Features of Government Housing Finance Programs (continued
Programs Agency Objectives Description Target Features
Individual Real 
Estate Loan
GSIS To provide homebuyers 
financing for members of the 
GSIS
Conceptually similar to the 
UHLP and SSS's EHLP in that 
it provide homebuyers 
financing for members.
GSIS members Loan packages and loan terms 
follow those of the UHLP plus
• Over P375,000 - P1 million = 
18% p.a.
Max. allowable loan amount:
• Repair loans = P500,000
• House and lot purchase = P1 
million
Application Fees:
• Loans P50,000 and below = 
P250
• Loan P51,000 and above = 
P500
Individual 
Housing Loan 
Program
SSS To provide members an 
alternative way of financing 
construction and/or purchase 
of housing packages
SSS's in-house home lending 
program established to provide 
an alternative source other 
than thru NHMFC
SSS members • Max, loanable amount = 
P375,000 or whichever is lower 
of the amount applied for
• Term = in multiples of 5 up to a 
maximum of 25 years
• Interest rates charged are 
similar to those under UHLP. 
The program is also available 
through accredited financial 
institutions.
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Features of Government Housing Finance Programs (continued
Programs Agency Objectives Description Target Features
Corporate
Housing
Program
SSS Designed to support the 
government's low cost housing 
project, help accelerate 
economic activity, and 
promote good labor 
management relations and 
industrial
Targeted at employees willing 
to put up 20% of the project 
cost, to undertake an 
employee housing program 
consists of two components:
• The developmental loan (for 
land development and 
house construction)
• The commitment line (for 
employers who plan to 
utilize the HLP and who are 
willing to collections and 
amortization remittance to 
SSS)
Employers of SSS 
members
• Projects must have at least 20 
housing units the selling price 
of which must not exceed 
P375,000
• Loanable amount for 
developmental loan = P10 
million the interest rate of which 
is 12% p.a., with individual loan 
ceilings at P375,000
The interest rate for the individual
borrowers:
For loan amount,
• P100,000 and below = 6%
• Over P100,000 - P150,000 = 8%
• Over P150,000 - P225,000 = 11%
• Over P225,000 - P375,000 = 15%
Housing
Development
Program
SSS To provide low -income families 
in key urban areas with 
affordable hosing packages for 
the development of a property 
and/or construction of housing 
units
A lending program of the SSS 
designed to support the social 
housing project of the 
government as well as to 
provide affordable and decent 
houses to all homeless SSS 
members
Housing developers 
(corporation or 
partnership) and/or 
low -income SSS 
members
• Max. loanable amount = P20 
million
• Loan Term = 2 years form initial 
release of the loan.
The loan is subject to a condition 
that the selling price of the house 
and lot package should not 
exceed P375,000 subject to 
review and approval by the SSS. 
The loan may only be used for 
land development and house 
construction.
Fee(s):
• Interest rate = 16% p.a. 
maximum
• Penalty rate = 24% p.a. 
additional interest
Source: HUDCC
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APPENDIX B
Slum Upgrading Programs of Government, Metro Manila
Project
Name Location Land Area No. of Units Site Development
Project
Cost
Bagong Barrio 
Project
Bagong Barrio, 
Caloocan City
60 hectares 5400 Physical development of the project which includes infrastructure programs and 
introduction of other amenities such as roads drainage, water, sewerage and 
community facilities
133.998 M
Tangos, et al. 
Project
Tangos,
Navotas
19.04 hectares Phase - 145 
Phase II -  741 
Longstrip -  166
Physical development of the project which includes infrastructure programs and 
introduction of other amenities such as roads drainage, water, sewerage and 
community facilities
50.961 M
Libis Espina, et 
al. Project
Poblacion, 
Caloocan City
11.77 hectares 1345 Physical development of the project which includes infrastructure programs and 
introduction of other amenities such as roads drainage, water, sewerage and 
community facilities
43.453 M
Landless 
Barangka (Zip)
Barangka,
Marikina
6.56 hectares 467 lots Cemented roads, alleys and footpaths, drainage line and water lines 8.135 M
Bo. E. 
Rodriguez 
Project
Grace Park, 
Caloocan City
1.8427 hectares 234 Physical development of the project which includes infrastructure programs and 
introduction of other amenities such as roads drainage, water, sewerage and 
community facilities
2.588 M
San Martin de 
Porres (Zip)
Cubao, 
Quezon City
4.18 hectares 601 lots Cemented roads, alleys and footpaths, drainage line and sewer lines, water lines 19.111 M
Hulo Estate 
(Zip)
Hulo,
Mandaluyong
City
Phase I - 6.9 
hectares 
Phase II - 5.9 
hectares 
Phase III - 5.4 
hectares
Phase I- 436 lots 
Phase II - 414 lots 
Phase III - 389 
lots
Cemented roads, alleys and footpaths, drainage line, waterlines 27.594 M
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Slum Upgrading Programs of Government, Metro Manila
Project
Name Location Land Area No. of Units Site Development
Project
Cost
Bulelak 
Minahan (Zip)
Malanday, 
Marikina City
3.93 hectares 278 lots Cemented roads, alleys and footpaths, drainage lines, water lines 14.232 M
Sitio Olandes 
(Zip)
Industrial Valley, 
Marikina City
Phase I - 6.52 
hectares 
Phase II - 3.56 
hectares
667 lots Cemented roads, alley and footpaths, drainage lines, water lines 8.135 M
Balubad 
Nangka (Zip)
Brgy. Nangka, 
Marikina City
5.01 hectares 610 lots Cemented roads, alleys and footpaths, drainage lines and water lines 6.193 M
Coronado 
Estate (Zip)
Brgy. Pineda, 
Pasig City
1.77 hectares 279 lots Cemented alleys and footpaths, drainage lines, water lines 4.910 M
Pansol Estate 
(Zip)
Pansol, Balara, 
Quezon City
5.52 hectares 532 lots Cemented roads, alleys and footpaths, drainage lines, water lines 8.702 M
Sitio Maligaya 
(Zip)
Brgy. Bahay 
Toro, Project 8, 
Quezon City
1.84 hectares 237 lots Cemented roads, alleys and footpaths, drainage lines, water lines 7.733 M
West Crame 
(Zip)
West Crame, 
San Juan
8.41 hectares 508 units Cemented roads, alleys and footpaths, drainage lines, water lines 18.580 M
Capri Estate 
(Zip) Novaliches, 
Quezon City
Phase I - 4.5 
hectares 
Phase II - 4.57 
hectares
Phase I -  708 
lots
Phase II - 417 
lots
Cemented roads alleys and foothpaths drainage and sewer lines, water line 17.997 M
Bagumbayan
(Community
Self-Help)
Bagumbayan, 
Quezon City
5.06 hectares 272 lots Cemented roads, alleys and foothpaths, drainage lines, water lines 2.082 M
Libis Murphy
(Community
Self-Help)
Libis Murphy, 
Quezon City
1.09 hectares 138 lots Cemented roads 3.043 M
Tramo Wakas Parañaque 8.86 hectares 966 lots Completed, turned over to LG Lot filling and monumenting, road lots, alleys, 
drainage canals, upgrading of power and water system
25.225 M
North Daang 
Hari
Taguig 5.77 hectares 604 lots Completed, turned over to LG lot monumenting, road lots, alleys, drainage canals, 
water and power system
16.878 M
Tramo/F. Victor 
I
Pasay City 8.42 hectares 825 lots Completed, turned over to LG lot monumenting, titling, reblocking 24.113 M
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Project
Name Location Land Area No. of Units Site Development
Project
Cost
Tramo/F. Victor 
II
Pasay City 1.74 hectares 248 lots Completed, turned over to LG monumenting, titling, reblocking 13.252 M
Tramo Lines Las Piñas City 9.42 hectares 751 lots Turned over to LG, lot monumenting, filling, individual titling, drainage system 20.93 M
CAA
Compound
Las Piñas City 6.73 hectares 754 lots monumenting, road works, water supply system 17.742 M
PAL
Transmitter
Pasay City 1.37 hectares 191 units Road works, water system, sewer system, drainage 2.573 M
Maricaban 
Phase I and II
Pasay City 19.75 hectares 2144 lots Completed, turned over to LG, road works, drainage system, sewer system, water 
system, on-plot developmen, land-filling
51.43 M
LRT Phase I Pasay City 3.01 hectares 430 lots Completed, turned over to LG, road works, drainage system, sewer system, water 
system, earth-filling, community facilities
6.598 M
LRT Phase II Pasay City 4.04 hectares 566 lots Completed, turned over to LG, road works, drainage system, sewer system, water 
system, earth-filling, community facilities
16.457 M
Fortune Bus Pasay City .0354 hectares 56 lots Completed, road works, water system, sewer system, drainage system 0.802 M
Fort Bonifacio 
Tenement
East Service 
Road, Western 
Bicutan, Taguig
671 units Tenement type 
(seven-storey)
Bukas Palad 
Housing Project
Tramo Lines 
corner Villa 
Barbara, Pasay 
City
973 sq.m. 50 units Drainage, alleys and MERALCO lines; two storey row house 3.168. M
PEA Projects 
(Madrigal, 
Lopez, 
Bernabe)
Las Piñas City 12.25 hectares Lopez - 366 lots 
Madrigal - 307 
lots
Bernabe - 925 
lots
Total - 1598 lots
Completed, Lot monumenting, filling, titling, infra road works, macadam roads, 
communal faucet, open drainage
35.140 M
C5R4 Phase II Fort Bonifacio , 
Taguig
13.0 hectares 1219 lots Roads, drainage, water distribution and MERALCO line -
Altina/Altura
ZIP
Sta. Mesa, 
Manila
3.03 hectares 241 roads, alleys, drainage P 12.616 M
LG = Local Government MERALCO = Metro Manila Electric Company
Source: National Housing Authority
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APPENDIX C
Community Mortgage Program, Metro Manila (as of December 1997)
Project Name Location Land Area Landowner No. of Beneficiaries Statusa
Hulavi CMP Project Caloocan City 3,745 sq.m. BTTB Inc. 120 Taken-out
HACCI CMP Project (Homeowners 
Assn. Of Concerned Citizen)
Caloocan City 19,000 sq.m. Atty. Arroyo 227 Taken-out
Ordoñez CMP Project Caloocan City 6666 sq.m. A. Ordoñez 127 Taken-out
Camarin CMP Project Caloocan City 20,375 sq.m. Carmen Pan 215 Taken-out
PIDABI CMP Project (Pinag-isang 
Damdamin ng Arkong Bato, Inc.)
Valenzuela City 72,577 sq.m. PIDABI 544 For cash payment by CA, 2 has. 
For sale to private person
Bagbaguin CMP Project 
(Samahang Magkapatiran sa 
Kaunlaran ng Bagbaguin, Inc.)
Caloocan City 4,535 sq.m. H.M. Rivera 84 Taken-out
Bisig ng Kabataan CMP Project 
PH -VII
Caloocan City 38,048.22. Sq.m. PNR 905 PCLhas been granted on July 15, 
1994
Riverside Rivera CMP Project Malabon 3,909 sq.m. D.M. Lapuz 90 Compliance to NHMFC findings
Daing ng Maralita CMP Project Navotas 250 sq.m. C. Nuñez 7 Awaiting PCL release
Bangkulasi CMP Project Navotas 4,102 sq.m. F. Del Rosario 92 Awaiting PCL approval
Pabiayan-Daungan CMP Project Navotas 3,184 sq.m. A. Adriano 70 Taken-out
Sto. Niño CMP Project 
(Kapitbahay Assn.)
Caloocan City 34,745 sq.m.
-
437 Awaiting Letter of Guarranty 
findings
Capitol Parkland CMP Project Caloocan City 12,984 sq.m. Biyaya Corp. 186 For letter of Guaranty compliance
Tambakan CMP Project 
(Magkapitbahay ng Tambakan 
Assn.)
Caloocan City 7,959 sq.m. Estrella Ice Plant Company 143 Taken-out
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Community Mortgage Program, Metro Manila (as of December 1997), continued
Project Name Location Land Area Landowner No. of Beneficiaries Statusa
T. Policarpio CMP Project Navotas 5,960 sq.m. A. Mallari 106 Taken-out
Binigkis ng Pagkakaisa CMP 
Project
Navotas 9,523 sq.m. S. Cruz 216 Taken-out
Castro Compound (Castro Compd. 
Homeowers Assn.)
Navotas 3,000 sq.m. 50 Taken-out
Paterno Compound (Samahang 
Pagkakaisa ng Sitio Kumunoy 
Area C HDAI)
Quezon City 6258 sq.m. 59 For issuance of Letter of 
Guarantee (LOG)
Arambulo I (Sandigan ng 
Mahihirap Sa Balara, Inc.)
Quezon City 810 sq.m. 19 Taken-out
Arambulo II (Sandigan ng 
Mahihirap Sa Balara, Inc.)
Quezon City 2400 sq.m. 51 Taken-out/individualized titles on­
going
Samahang Kapit-bisig ng 
Waterhole A, Inc.
Quezon City 15,063 sq.m. 152 Taken-out/individualized titles
Bagong Ilog PNR Neighborhood 
Assn., Inc.
Quezon City 100 On-going negotiations
Samahang ng Pagkakaisa sa 
Garcia Heights Homeowners 
Assn., Inc.
Quezon City 5,717.35 sq.m. LDB 137 Taken-out/individualization of 
titles on going
Mountainville Homeowners Assn. Quezon City 1,000 sq.m. 26 Taken-out/unitized loan
Celis Property Marikina City 8,169.60 sq.m. 154 For compliance with findings of 
NHMFC
Tanguile Homeowners Assn. , Inc. 
Phase II
Marikina City 6,911.7 sq.m. 153 Taken-out
NHA-Sitio Balite Marikina City 13,772.70 sq.m. 176 Taken-out/individualized titles
Manggahan, Pasig Pasig City 38.3 hec. MMDA 5000 On-going negotiations
Aldhai-Villa Pangarap Las Piñas City 25.638 sq.m. T. Ignacio 261 On-going negotiations
Samahang Kapitbisig ng Mahihirap Las Piñas City 8,736 sq.m. T. Ignacio 235 On-going negotiations
PNR Bagong Tanyag Taguig 20,295 sq.m. PNR 177 On-going
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Community Mortgage Program, Metro Manila (as of December 1997), continued
Project Name Location Land Area Landowner No. of Beneficiaries Statusa
Samahang Magkakapitbahay Muntinlupa City 5,255 sq.m. Atty. Alcaraz 96 Taken-out
Tambakan Las Piñas City 20.750 sq.m. Municipality of Las Piñas 436 Deferment, pending approval of LG to 
construct the project
Gabriel Compound Las Piñas City 8,699 sq.m. Gabriel et.al. 107 Document submitted to NHMFC for 
PCL release
Gloria Compound Las Piñas City 2.718 hec. Santos et.al. 286 Taken-out/for subdivision approval
Medina Compound Las Piñas City 6719 sq.m. C. Cruz 99 lots On-going
Kaingin II Sto. Niño Las Piñas City 513 sq.m. Marsteel Company 66 lots On-going
Pulo Balite Las Piñas City 274 sq.m. J. Almanon et.al. 72 lots Taken-out/for subdvision approval
Tuktukan Project Taguig 1,330 sq.m. V. Sonona 23 lots Taken-out
P. Dandan Pasay City 3,220 sq.m. A. Cruz 48 lots Taken-out with subdivision plan
Aroma Parañaque 5,910 sq.m. Oasis Realty 115 lots Taken-out/for parcellation
Bagong Tanyag Taguig 2.922 hec. Fortune Dev. et.al 472 lots Taken-out/for subdvision plan 
approval
B. Mayor Pasay City 3,990 sq.m. R. Icasas 94 lots Taken-out/for parcellation
a Taken-out implies that NHMFC has approved and released the loan for purchase of lot. 
CA = Community Association 
PCL = Purchase Commitment Line 
LG = Local Government
NHMFC = National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation 
Source: National Housing Authority
